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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
A story often told by law teachers concerns a famous judge-perhaps
it was Learned Hand-who while walking to the courthouse passed a
hopscotch board drawn in chalk on the sidewalk. Below the board was
written: "Rules: (1) No cheating." That was the only instruction for the
game. The judge mused to himself about the hidden sophistication of a
rules system whose only command was not to cheat. Indeed, there is
something compelling about the idea that a phrase like "no cheating" may,
over time, express a host of concepts, understandable to all, conveying
accepted substantive standards of social behavior.
In a similar manner, the United States Constitution, employing vague
and broadly drafted phrases, seeks to define an entire system of social
order. That document establishes the process of government, describes the
powers of governmental entities, and establishes the authority of individuals,
under certain circumstances, to affect, alter, use, and command the political
system.
As has been verified by two hundred years of constitutional adjudication
and interpretation, the precise meanings of even the most specific portions
are unclear. Certainly, the particularly broad based, vaguely worded passages
are subject to any number of alternative, often conflicting, interpretations,
none more so than the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those grand passages have been the
source of much legal concern, for their commands require us to conceive
[Vol. 45:1
IRRATIONAL UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
and design a social system predicated on fairness.' Even if "fairness" was
concrete, objective, and discerned through a priori rules, rather than defined
by political interactions of judges, lawmakers, lawyers, and other actors,
we would not know, nor are we likely to ever fully understand, the complete
dynamic of due process and equal protection.
We know from historical insight that these concepts assumed particularly
complex meanings shortly after the Civil War. Yet, as detailed below, ,our
notions of due process and equal protection have taken on meanings much
more profound than the immediacy of their historical origins. 2 Indeed, the
Civil War aftermath, and its implications for the struggle of human dignity
and freedom as defined by law, was the starting point of a legal process to
rid society of myriad forms of discrimination which, although closely held
and valued by many, served no purpose other than demeaning individuals
for the aggrandizement of powerful classes.
The commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments became, in
large part, the supplement to the more specific proscriptions of the Bill of
Rights and other portions of the Constitution which set forth particular
forms of treatment to which every individual is entitled. What the Framers
failed to include specifically was subsumed by the commands for due process
and equal protection. Like some sort of constitutional residuary clause,
these two concepts protect individuals from treatment so demeaning and
dehumanizing that it offends our notions of fair treatment. 3
To energize the constitutional system, Congress has enacted a series of
civil rights laws designed to protect individuals from public and private
forms of irrational discrimination. 4 To be lawful, such civil rights statutes
must conform with the definition of rationality required by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, in one fashion, these statutes are as irrational
as the behavior they seek to control. The statutes protect only certain classes
of individuals in limited instances. This article argues that the existing civil
rights laws, although integral to a free society, are but a first step. The
statutes will never be fully rational, never completely fair, until all persons
1. See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (establishing that the constitutional
command for rationality requires, at a minimum, that all governmental entities accord indi-
viduals and groups fair treatment).
2. See infra note 59 (citing proposition that Constitution is to expand and grow); see
also, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-192 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Commenting on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., which he found controlling in Runyon, Justice
Stevens observed that Jones' holding, applying 42 U.S.C. § 1982's prohibition against certain
forms of racial discrimination to private real property transactions, was probably not within
the contemplation of the enacting Congress. Nevertheless, ". . . even if Jones did not accurately
reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing
sense of justice today." Id. at 191. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 177-278 and accompanying text. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
proscribes racial discrimination in contractual transactions because race is irrelevant-has
nothing legitimate to do with-the actual ability of an individual to make and enforce a
contract.
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are protected from arbitrary discrimination. For instance, a statute which
protects individuals from racial discrimination in contractual transactions
serves a valued social function. Yet, the same statute reformed to protect
all persons from the imposition of irrational discrimination in the realm of
contracts would be better. This article shows that limiting the coverage of
civil rights statutes to a handful of selected classes unduly limits the
protections which should be accorded to every person.
The proof of this thesis begins by addressing equal protection analysis
to devise a general definition of "rationality". The investigation reveals
that governmental action is "rational" when it is designed to achieve a
legitimate goal through legitimate means. The determination of legitimacy
stems from a complex analysis of benefits versus costs establishing the
overall utility of the governmental action in question. This analysis, however,
does not rely solely on accustomed cost/benefit measures sounding in
economic efficiency. Instead, the factors for consideration involve notions
of dignity, fairness, selfhood, and personal integrity.
The general definition of rationality serves to reveal three specific
situations wherein government actions are by definition unconstitutionally
irrational: (1) when they are totally random and, thus, no better than a
coin flip; (2) when they threaten to create useless caste systems; and (3)
when they are designed to promote outmoded stereotypes or to disadvantage
an unpopular group solely because of the group's unpopularity.'
After establishing analytical tools under equal protection analysis, the
article then reviews selected federal civil rights enactments to discern their
purposes and assess their rationality. We find that these laws, joining the
equal protection precedents, form a national project of equality and dignity
designed to allow each individual the opportunity to achieve ends and pursue
chosen goals free from certain forms of irrational discrimination. 6 Thus,
the very project of devising both civil rights statutes and constitutional
standards of rationality to proscribe certain forms of irrational discrimina-
tion plants the seeds for a more pervasive and important social endeavor,
specifically the vindication of the individual dignity of all persons engaging
in social interactions and projects such as employment, housing, and con-
tractual negotiations. Legislatures, therefore, must sculpt the civil rights
laws to protect all individuals who engage in the particular type of activities
5. See infra notes 87-157 and accompanying text (discussing rationality). The analysis
tells us, in great measure, what is "good" about rational governmental actions and "bad"
about irrational ones.
The three situations, of course, are not talismanic. They are simply convenient referents
to help order the concepts under rationality analysis discussed herein.
6. Admittedly, case law reveals that the "national project of equality and dignity" is
not enforced perfectly. Arguably, many precedents restrict or distort the process. See General
Building Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (stating that section
1981, unlike the Fair Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., does not recognize a cause
of action in unintentional racial discrimination). Still, the fact that the project is imperfectly
applied does not negate the existence of the project or its many important successes.
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encompassed by the statute. The thesis holds that any coverage less complete
or coverage that fails to protect individuals from arbitrary infringements of
their civil rights renders the statute itself partially arbitrary and irrational.
7
II. "DEFnING "RATIONALITY" UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. Rationality and Political Morality
1. Introduction
Clearly, the starting point to support the thesis requires a usable
definition of "rationality". A definition is available to us from the com-
mands of the Fifth and 'Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution as
explicated by judicial opinions-and scholarly commentary. This section of
the paper, then, analyzes the meaning of "rationality" pursuant to the
interpreted concepts of "equal protection of the laws" as set forth in the
Constitution. These interpretations reveal that the Constitution protects
every individual from arbitrary and irrational governmental action regardless
of its source or purposes. It is not too much to say, in fact, that every
member of American society has a Constitutional right to be free from
irrational governmental behavior.' If we can cull a definition from the
7. If the thesis of this article were accepted, the courts would be required to take one
of two steps. The least preferable would be to invalidate the civil rights acts leaving it to
Congress and other official actors to re-enact the statutes to protect all individuals from
arbitrary treatment in given projects.
The preferable course would be for the courts to declare the statutes underinclusive and
expand them to conform with the equal protection requisites. See infra notes 160-176 and
accompaliying text. It would be hoped that the affected legislatures would not contravene the
courts by attempting to amend or revoke the affected laws.
Some who have read drafts of this article have asked me where does my theory end. For
instance, under the proposed theory of rationality, must legislatures enact civil rights laws in
the first place? Perhaps so. My project, however, is to explore one important aspect of the
interrelationship of Constitutional law and statutory enactment. I am not prepared at this time
to give a complete detailing of every possible effect or manifestation of my theory; nor, do I
feel I must. No idea could withstand scrutiny if it is a valid critique to assert that the
proponent has not addressed every possible nuance and ramification of her idea. Nobody can
know that much-I certainly don't.
I attempt to establish that the theory of rationality presented herein demonstrates that
civil rights statutes are too narrow. I accept criticisms that my interpretation of Constitutional
law and statutory law are infirm and that my application of the former to the latter is flawed.
I also accept criticism that the society I would construct under the proposed legal standards
is unfortunate. That I have not accounted for every planet and comet in the proposed
constitutional universe is not, to my mind, a legitimate objection.
8. For instance, the Supreme Court has noted that all governmental action makes
distinctions and classifications among individuals, groups, or both. "[T]he Equal Protection
Clause 'imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out."'
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972) (emphasis added; quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 308-309 (1966)). See also Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct.
1645, 1653 (1988); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985).
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opinions and commentaries addressing "rationality" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, we will possess a useful tool with which to test
the basic rationality of civil rights statutesY
2. Al is Rationality-A Threshold Review of Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Analysis.
a. The General Guarantee of Rationality.
The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.ie
It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
governmental bodies from classifying and differentiating among individuals.
Indeed, all persons need not be treated identically under the Constitution.
As explicated by the Supreme Court,
"All persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike," [nev-
ertheless] "[tihe Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same.""
It is equally settled, however, that governmental bodies may not devise
classifications subjecting individuals to arbitrary or irrational treatment.'
2
Thus, the Fourteenth amendment's equal protection component, "... does
9. As a final introductory caution, it must be added that even if the reader agrees with
the definition of "rationality" offered herein, the specific applications of that definition may
be disputed. Reasonable persons may embrace a generally agreed upon definition while differing
regarding whether given governmental acts are even minimally rational in discrete factual
situations. Indeed, dissenting justices demonstrate that the courts themselves may split regarding
application of concepts of "rationality." Such ad hoc disagreements, of course, do not
challenge the viability of the proposed definition of "rationality." Rather, they reaffirm that,
no matter how sound a definition may be, its specific applications-bringing the definition
down to earth-are functions of the personal assessments of individual decision makers.
10. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV (emphasis added).
11. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Grand Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141; 147 (1940)).
12. See, e.g., Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1653 (1988);
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamer Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-464 (1981); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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not prevent States from making reasonable classifications among [covered]
persons." 3
Although courts often accept legislative determinations that legislative
classifications are reasonable,' 4 the legislative classification must be bottomed
on some judicially determined rational basis. As a general matter, then, the
Constitution protects individuals' liberty from arbitrary intrusions perpetu-
ated through irrational official actions.' 5
Historical surveys demonstrate the persistence of rationality analysis in
American constitutional law. 16 For nearly a century the courts have noted
that:
[t]he mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute
from the reach of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
... it must appear not only that a classification has been made,
but also that it is one based upon some reasonable ground-some
difference which bears a just and proper relationship to the at-
tempted classification-and it not a mere arbitrary selection.
1 7
13. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equlization of California, 451
U.S. 648, 657 (1981) (emphasis added, citations omitted). This article will focus primarily on
equal protection analysis to investigate the concept of "rationality." It may be noted, however,
that irrationality is identically forbidden under the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
14. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that legislatures enjoy:
initial discretion ... to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature
of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and
private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to
remedy every ill.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
Similarly, addressing an equal protection challenge to provisions of the Social Security
Act, the court has held consistently that "Governmental decisions to spend money to improve
the general public welfare in one way and not another are not confided to the courts. The
discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power,
not an exercise of judgment."' Mathews v. deCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)); see also Bowen v. Owens, 106 S. Ct. 1881,
1885 (1986).
15. The equal protection analysis applicable to states under the Fourteenth Amendment
has been extended to restrict Federal governmental actions as well. In Bolling v. Sharpe, the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional prohibition again racially segregated state public
schools, recognized in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) as emanating
from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is applicable under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to federally regulated public schools in the District
of Columbia. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Subsequent precedent clarified that the
due process component of the Fifth Amendment includes an equal protection command
constraining all actions taken by the Federal Government. The federal level, no less than state
and local governments, must obey the edicts of equal protection. See Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 542 n.2 (1983).
16. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Dem-
ocratic Theory, 67 CAin'. L. Ray. 1049, 1052-1056 (1979).
17. Id. at 1052 (quoting Gulf Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-166
(1897)). Interestingly, the Supreme Court initially viewed rationality analysis in a most limited
19881
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Although the specific words and phrases used to describe "rational" have
often differed slightly from case to case, 8 the Supreme Court has never
retreated from its position that irrational governmental action violates the
Constitution.
b. The Purported "Levels of Scrutiny"
Over the decades, equal protection analysis has become increasingly
complex. A significant example of the complexity is found in the various
"levels of scrutiny" against which legislative actions may be analyzed. It is
necessary, therefore, as a threshold consideration, to review briefly these
purported analytical constructs. The interesting conclusion derived from this
review is that all forms of equal protection analysis are predicated on
underlying conceptions of "rationality". 9 Indeed, rationality constructs
vitalize and define every level of equal protection analysis. Thus, under-
standing "rationality" is integral to understanding the entire equal protection
sphere.
At one end of the analytical spectrum is the popularly known "strict
scrutiny" level of analysis. As explained by the Supreme Court:
The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state
legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional premises.
Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications
that disadvantage a "suspect class" or that impinge upon the
exercise of a "fundamental right." With respect to such classifica-
tions, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection
by requiring the State to demonstrate that the classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
fashion holding that regulation is rational so long as it "places under the same restrictions,
and subjects to like penalties and burdens, all who ... are embraced by its prohibitiois. .. "
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888). But, as the quote from Ellis in the text
above illustrates, less than a decade later, the Court abandoned Powell's tautological definition
of "rationality" in favor of one applying an independent, extra-statutory measure of analysis.
See TitmE, American Constitutional Law, 994, 991-1000 (1978); see generally Note, A Changing
Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis
Test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 LoYoiA L.A. L. REv. 921, 922-926
(1987).
Of course, the fact that rationality analysis has been persistent does not infer that it has
been consistent. Indeed, commentators have noted unsubtle shifts in the courts' purported
willingness to defer to legislative classifications. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 458-460 (1985) (Marshall, J., with two justices, concurring). One may argue,
that, in many cases, supposed presumptions that legislative classifications are rational are
accorded little more than lip service as the courts subject the classifications to thorough and
exacting analysis to determine rationality vel non. See infra notes 98-152 (discussing cases in
which Supreme Court analyzes rationality).
18. Bennett, supra note 16 at 1054 and n.34.
19. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-455 (1985) (Stevens,
J., with Burger, C.J., concurring); Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100
H. v. L. REv. 1146 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Stevens].
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Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classi-
fications as "suspect." Some classifications are more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative ration-
ality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated
on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the
constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged indi-
vidually and is entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications
treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative
goal .... Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups,
have historically been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 36 L. Ed.2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278,
1293 (1973).... The experience of our Nation has shown that
prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our
response to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special
disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances be-
yond their control suggests the kind of "class or caste" treatment
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.
In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is
deserving a strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we
look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source,
explicitly or implicitly, therein. But we have also recognized the
fundamentality of participation in state "elections on an equal basis
with other citizens in the jurisdiction," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 L. Ed.2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972), even though
"the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right."
San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, at 35, n. 78, 29 L.
Ed.2d 534, 85 S. Ct. 283. °
Statutes reviewed under "strict scrutiny" analysis, therefore, are presump-
tively invalid.
In addition the Court has established a level of review less rigorous
than "strict scrutiny" but which likewise does not presume the validity of
the challenged enactment. As noted by the Supreme Court:
... we have recognized that certain forms of legislative classifica-
tion, while not invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring consti-
tutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances, we have sought
the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment
consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether
20. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 & n.14-15 (1982) (citations omitted); see also
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). See generally TsmE,
supra note 17, at §§ 16-6 through 16-22; Note, supra note 17, at 926-929.
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it may fairly be viewed as of the state furthering a substantial
interest.2'
This "middle level" of scrutiny has been applied, inter alia, to test the
constitutionality of enactments which made sex-based distinctions2 or clas-
sifications predicated on illegitimacy of childbirth. 3 Governmental classifi-
cations are subjected to "middle level scrutiny" when they appear to
jeopardize:
... principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout
the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and
to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of
a particular time and place. 4
By contrast, "rational" basis analysis, often referred to somewhat
unkindly as "mere rationality," is considered the least exacting standard
with which to evaluate the constitutional validity of a governmental action.
Unlike the "strict scrutiny" or "middle level" standards, the governmental
classifications reviewed for "mere rationality" are presumed to be valid
unless the challenger can establish otherwise. "The burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it. ' ' 25 The Court has held that:
"we do not inquire whether ... (a) statute is wise or desirable....
Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional" (James v.
Strange,) 407 U.S. (128) at 133 (1972).... Our task is merely to
determine whether there is "some rationality in the nature of the
class singled out." Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 .... 26
Indeed, even challenges predicated on empiricism-challenges attacking the
factual bases underlying legislative classifications-cannot succeed unless the
challengers demonstrate that, "the legislative facts on which the classification
is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true to the
governmental decisionmaker."27
21. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). See generally Note, supra note 17, at 929-
932. The Court recently stated, "To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification
must be substantially related to an important governmental objective." Clark v. Jeter, 108 S.
Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988).
22. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-726 (1982).
23. See Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983).
24. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.,
quoting A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government, 114 (1978));
accord, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217, n.16.
25. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547-548 (1983)
(citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
26. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974). But see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); supra notes 31-32, 37, 46, notes 121-27 and accompanying
text (discussing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center).
27. Minnesota Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting Vance v.
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The existence of these levels of analysis, then, provides the appearance
of an established, orderly, and objective analytical tool enabling the courts
to discover rather than create the validity or invalidity of the governmental
action under scrutiny. It must be recalled, however, that these levels of
scrutiny are judicial constructs predicated on courts' best assessments of
how to interpret the vague and broadly phrased provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The ultimate choices regarding both the establish-
ment of levels of scrutiny and the choice of under which level particular
fact patterns fall, are decisions requiring the courts to review precedent,
history, sociology, economics, and politics. They are, in short, nothing more
or less than political and moral choices.
Moreover, the three levels mask the reality of equal protection analysis,
namely, that all equal protection challenges require the courts to make one
basic determination: whether the challenged action is or is not rational.
Strict scrutiny, middle level, and "mere rationality" analysis are simply
convenient labels to describe certain constructs, the contents of which are
set by the courts' subjective determinations regarding what types of govern-
mental classifications deserve very serious, serious, or not-so-serious con-
cernu
That is not to imply that judicial analysis is made solely through political
fiat, rather, judges do try to render reasoned judgments, constrained by
such traditions as stare decisis, deference to the will of the legislature, and
Federalism. Nevertheless, equal protection analysis covers cases arising from
an immense variety of social settings; and, the social, moral, political, and
economic implications of those settings must be considered by the courts
Bradley, 400 U.S. 91, 111 (1979)). The Court went on to hold that where the legislature had
evidence "reasonably supporting the classification" challengers cannot invalidate the enactment
merely with evidence that the legislature was incorrect. Similarly, as noted by Professor
Bennett, the court has gone so far as to hold that legislation may be valid if any possible
legitimating purpose could be envisioned to support the legislative classification regardless of
whether the legislature had ever actually considered, much less embraced, such a purpose.
Bennett, supra note 16, at 1057 (discussing Justice Harlan's opinion in Fleming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730
(1982).
As will be demonstrated later in the text, but worth a brief mention at this juncture, the
foregoing judicial standards must be read with a critical eye. The mere articulation of arguably
legitimate purposes, whether expressly recognized by the legislature or suggested during judicial
review, will not revitalize otherwise irrational legislation if, in its analysis, the Court concludes
that the harm engendered by the statute outweighs the benefits promoted by the legitimate
legislative aims. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
28. Many commentators dispute the clarity supposed to exist among the foregoing three
levels of scrutiny. Some argue that fine, but material, distinctions are made within each level
of scrutiny depending on both the particular facts of each case and the legislative policies at
stake. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I,
12-20 (1972); Note, supra note 17, at 932-933. Thus, each level of scrutiny contains any
possible number of sub-levels. See United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10
(1980). If this is so, and it likely is, we have further fortified the point that all purportedly
different levels of scrutiny collapse into rationality analysis.
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to determine if the classification is lawful. Similarly, equal protection cases
concern whether classes of individuals are being accorded such minimal
respect, dignity, and fair treatment as is incumbent upon a just society.
The courts cannot easily ignore the troubling and difficult analysis required
to reach the conclusion whether a given classification or policy is rational
and, thus, fair under the Constitution. The courts must determine if the
given political system, such as a legislature, an agency, or judicial body,
has acted properly in the distribution or withholding of rights, largesse, and
other scarce resources. Such review of regulation is what is meant when it
is said that equal protection analysis by courts is a political process.
The analytical factors and considerations underlying judicial determi-
nation, in a given case, to apply one level of equal protection analysis over
another are identical regardless of the particular level ultimately chosen.
Thus, in the first instance when the level of equal protection scrutiny is
selected, the court utilizes but one mode of analysis. 29 Moreover, once the
"level of analysis" is chosen, the court still must weigh political and moral
concerns that the given case raises to finally determine which party will
prevail. Thus, in the last analysis, all levels of scrutiny require such similar
considerations that they dissolve into one mode.30
Brief illustrations demonstrate the foregoing. As discussed earlier, leg-
islation which classifies by creating a "suspect class" of individuals is
subjected to "strict scrutiny" which, ipso facto, renders the classificatory
29. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-447 (1987) (stating
that mentally impaired persons are not a suspect classification).
30. Justice Stevens has been a leading and vocal critic of the "levels of scrutiny" analysis.
In his most recent and thorough discussion of the issue, Justice Stevens unequivocally stated,
"I have never been persuaded that these so called standards [levels of scrutiny] adequately
explain the decisional process." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted). For Justice Stevens, equal protection involves the inquiry:
whether I could find a "rational basis" for the classification at issue. The term
"rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could
logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus the word
"rational" . . . includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.
Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, every review under equal protection analysis is, in
fact, a judicial determination whether the challenged governmental act is rational. See Justice
Stevens', supra note 19, at 1153-64. It is not apparent, however, what Justice Stevens means
by his assertion that rationality vel non includes considerations whether the "sovereign[]" has
"govern[ed] impartially." Indeed, the concept of impartiality seems counterintuitive under
equal protection law which requires a court to determine whether a governmental classification-
a governmental action differentiating some from others-is rational. The very act of creating
the classification betrays the concept of impartiality, at least in the broadest sense of the word.
What presumably is meant by "impartially" is that the governmental actor did not rely on
impermissible considerations when designing the given classification. That, in turn, is determined
through a special type of cost-benefit analysis. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Justice Stevens embraces the concept of a cost-benefit analysis to operationalize
rationality analysis. See Cleburne at 452 n.4.
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schb.me presumptively unconstitutional. But choosing what classes will be
": uspect" is a political endeavor. In San Antonio School District v. Rod-
riquez,31 the court upheld Texas' system of financing public education by
means of, inter alia, an ad valorem tax on property within discrete school
districts even though the system resulted in disparte per capita funding for
each pupil depending on the district. Speaking for the Court, Justice Powell
rejected the challengers' contention that the judiciary must apply a strict
scrutiny standard when reviewing governmental classifications predicated on
wealth. Justice Powell argued:
The system of alleged discrimination and, the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.
3 2
Certainly, one may choose to agree with Justice Powell's analysis,
although there is definitely a case to be made that the poor have been more
victimized than protected by our political system. Partisanship notwithstand-
ing, it seems obvious from reading the foregoing passage that the Court
decided rather than discovered that wealth based classifications should
receive no special degree of scrutiny.33 This decision may have been predi-
cated on the majority's best assessment of the origins and purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment,. but none can truly say that the Court's holding
was mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
34
If the foregoing is correct in asserting that the devising of levels of
equal protection scrutiny and the application thereto of discrete cases are
31. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
33. The Court applied a similar formula to withhold heightened scrutiny from cases
involving age discrimination. The Court reasoned:
While the treatment of the aged in this nation has not been wholly free of
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say those who have been discriminated against
on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
Pursuing identical lines, the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing
a zoning ordinance imposing on proposed homes for the mentally retarded the unique obligation
to secure a special use permit. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985). See infra note 121
(discussing specific analysis leading the majority to deny special scrutiny to classifications based
on mental health). The Court, nevertheless, invalidated the special permit requirement as
lacking a rational basis. See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
34. One commentator, reflecting a widely shared view, argues that phrases such as "due
process" and "equal protection" were drafted with deliberate ambiguity and uncertain scope
"to repose in the courts the authority to resolve multiple disputes in unobvious ways in the
distant future." Bennett, supra note 16, at 1091; see also Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality
of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. oF PA. L. R.v. 933, 948
(1983).
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political and moral judgments, then all equal protection analysis is really a
matter of the courts' subjective concepts of rationality. Thus, in our example
from Rodriguez, when a court calls X a "suspect class," it is simply
asserting that, with the exception of a small handful of special instances,
there are no rational bases which the legislature can purport and which the
courts will accept to justify statutory classifications predicated on X. When
a court, by contrast, applies rational basis analysis to class Y, it is saying
that, based on knowledge and experience, there are few instances when
classification on the basis of Y is irrational.
35
The same holds true both for "strict scrutiny" analysis predicated on
the deprivation of fundamental rights and for middle level scrutiny. In
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,36 for example, the Court
invalidated Virginia's imposition of a poll tax holding, "[A] State violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it
35. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged as much in a thorough review of Equal
Protection analysis:
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as "sus-
pect." Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation
predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as compatible with the constitutional
understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal
justice under the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Three years later, Justice Stevens explained rationality analysis as follows:
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a "tradition of
disfavor" by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law?
What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate
treatment?" In most cases the answer to these questions will tell us whether the
statute has a "rational basis." The answers will result in the virtually automatic
invalidation of racial classifications and in the validation of most economic classi-
fications, but they will provide differing results in cases involving classifications
based on alienage, gender, or illegitimacy. But that is not because we apply an
"intermediate standard of review" in these cases; rather it is because the character-
istics of these groups are sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant to a valid
public purpose, or, more specifically, to the purpose that the challenged laws
purportedly intended to serve.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 453-454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring.
Emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Indeed, the majority, speaking through Justice White,
tacitly accepted Justice Stevens' conclusions:
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage
or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.
Id. at 440 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
36. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard. ' 37 Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, noted that "strict
scrutiny" was the appropriate standard since the challenged legislation
infringed on the fundamental right to vote.
38
The Court further noted that a poll tax is irrelevant and serves no
rational interest related to voting. "Voter qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax." 39 Accenting that
the ability to pay a tax is as irrelevant to qualifications for voting as are
race, creed and color, Justice Douglas concluded, "(such factors are) not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process
* (wealth is a) capricious or irrelevant factor.'' 4  The poll tax was
constitutionally infirm not simply because the Court applied the condemning
"strict scrutiny" analysis but because the Court could discern no rationale,
that is, no legitimate purpose for the tax.
Similarly, in Plyer v. Doe,4' the court defined the essence of "middle
level scrutiny" as, "the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference
to well-settled constitutional principles." 42 Having defined the applicable
analytical standard, the Court held that states may not grant free public
education to the children of citizens and of legal aliens but deny such
education to offspring of illegal aliens. The Court accented that, under
"middle level scrutiny" a state does not act rationally unless the classifi-
37. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
38. Id. at 670. The franchise is a "fundamental political right" because it helps to
preserve all rights. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
39. Harper at 666 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
40. Id. at 668 (emphasis added). Cf., id. at 676-677 (Black, J., dissenting). In an identical
vein, Justice Stevens observed two decades later:
The rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains why a law
that deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a different
pigmentation than that of other voters violates the Equal Protection Clause. It would
be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on'the basis of height or weight; it is
equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color. None of these attributes has
any bearing at all on the citizen's willingness or ability to exercise that civil right.
We do not need to apply a special standard, or to apply "strict scrutiny," or even
"heightened scrutiny," to decide such cases.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452-453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
41. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
42. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (emphasis added). Referring once again to the
more recent Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Court recalled the rationale for
subjecting gender based classifications to purported "middle level" review:
[Gender] generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability
... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) ...
(plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes dis-
tributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
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cation promotes a substantial state goal-goals which were not demonstrated
under the challenged educational scheme.
43
The foregoing sampling shows that creation and application of each
level of scrutiny really revolves around courts' determinations of what is
and is not rational. Further, as the earlier discussion indicated, the deter-
mination of rationality must be a political and moral choice. A practical
and meaningful understanding of the entirety of equal protection, therefore,
requires thorough analysis of the process whereby official acts are deemed
rational or irrational. 44
3. Judicial Policy Making, the Concept of "Rationality" and the Threat
to the Majoritarian System
The political and moral value judgments integral to the resolution of
any equal protection issue have been the source of particularly acute concern
43. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. A similar analysis is found in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) which overturned Missouri's workman's compensation
provision permitting widows to collect benefits for the death of a spouse while only allowing
widowers to collect if they are mentally or physically unable to earn their own wages or if
they "prove [] actual dependence on . . . [their] wife's earnings." 446 U.S. 142, 144 (1980).
The Court, applying middle level scrutiny, found that the classification bore no relationship
to an important government objective. Id. at 150-151. The Court questioned why the statutory
scheme neither provided equally for all surviving spouses nor limited recovery only to needy
spouses regardless of gender. Id. at 151.
44. As has been accented in this portion of the discussion, Justice Stevens has openly
repudiated the utility of a level of analysis approach to resolving equal protection questions.
See supra notes 30 and 35. The majority opinion in Cleburne, to which Justice Stevens focuses
the thrust of his disagreement regarding setting and explicating appropriate equal protection
standards, impliedly embraces the conclusion that all equal protection analysis is predicated
on concepts of rational-fair-treatment. See supra notes 35 and 42. Speaking for the majority,
Justice White concluded:
... [W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing charac-
teristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, the courts
have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our
respect for separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether,
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42.
Implicated by contrast, when the State focuses on irrelevant characteristics or creates
relevant classifications but applies them to interests over which the State has no authority to
regulate, the State has acted in an unlawfully irrational manner. Even the Cleburne majority's
approach implies that a single rational basis framework controls equal protection analysis.
As accented at infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text, collapsing all civil rights analysis
into rationality analysis does not homogenize or sanitize civil rights theory as some commen-
tators fear. Cf., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future 42 Omo St. L.
J. 223 (1981).
Recognizing that rationality is the underpinning of our civil and constitutional rights does
not require us to forget those specific classifications that, to our satisfaction, history and
experience demonstrate to be presumptively irrational. To the contrary, such classifications
provide ease of analysis because we can immediately and easily draw upon a rich body of
scholarship to establish whether they are irrational and unlawful as applied in discrete instances.
Moreover, we may logically refer to such time established classifications as guideposts and




in the area of "rational basis" analysis. Some commentators argue that the
courts should have no authority in our system of government to weigh the
basic rationality, and, by implication, the social utility, of legislation.
45
Judge Linde, for instance, disapproves of court action invalidating legislation
even when the goals of the legislation are "merely sentimental, or parochial,
or old fashioned ....
Linde argues that it is the essence of legislation "to favor one interest
at the expense. of another, ' 47 favoritism which often serves no purpose
other than to convey the legislature's notion of "the fitness of things."
4
1
For Judge Linde, judicial assessment of the subjective rationality of legis-
lation offends notions of majoritarian rule which underlie the American
system of government. He believes that rational basis analysis is judicial
usurpation of legislative functions.
Yet, Judge Linde is not troubled by the similar anti-majoritarian pros-
pects of "strict scrutiny" analysis. For instance, commenting on the concept
of "suspect class" as ia basis to establish presumptive illegitimacy of
governmental action, Judge Linde observed:
For what it is that "suspect classifications" are suspected of? The
suspicion, in that phrase, is suspicion of prejudice-not simply
prejudgment based on ignorance and mistaken notions of fact, but
invidious prejudgment, grounded in notions of superiority and
inferiority, in beliefs about relative worth, attitudes that deny the
premise of human equality and that will not be readily sacrificed
to mere facts. The suspicion of prejudice focuses on the lawmaker's
sense of values, not on his rationality.49
Judge Linde's attempt to differentiate the judicial role in assessing
"suspect classes" as contrasted with determining rationality is based on his
attempt at the close of the above quote to divorce "rationality" from "sense
of values." As the latter is impossible, the former likewise fails. It has been
shown that (1) all equal protection analysis is based on concepts of rationality5 °
and (2) that a judicial determination of rationality vel non is based on the
attendant determination whether the given classification or act is fair.51 The
general framework to assess fairness, 52 requires courts to determine the
comparative costs and benefits of the classifications. The cost/benefit anal-
ysis is predicated on the identification, application and weighing of the
45. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Ray. 197 (1976).
46. Id. at 221.
47. Id. at 212.
48. Id. at 211.
49. Id. at 201-202 (emphasis supplied except for final line).
50. See supra notes 8-44 and accompanying text (discussing rationality under equal
protection analysis).
51. See id.
52. See infra notes 62-152 and accompanying text (describing framework to discuss
fairness).
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relevant, often conflicting, values involved. If, as this article asserts, a
"sense of values" is a "sense of" rationality, then Judge Linde must be
incorrect when asserting that strict scrutiny involves "values" but other
forms of analysis involve a concept unrelated to "values" which, according
to Linde, is "rationality."
Similarly, Professor Bennett observed:
The distinction that Linde advances between legislation founded in
"prejudice" and that based on a "sense of fitness of things" or
on "merely sentimental, or parochial, or old-fashioned" concerns
is certainly not based on constitutional text, nor is it otherwise self-
defining. His elaboration of what constitutes prejudice is not in
itself revealing. Yesterday's sense of fitness may be today's preju-
dice. .. .53
And, indeed one might supplement Professor Bennett's well placed criticism
by noting that Judge Linde's formulation, permitting "sentimental" and
"parochial" legislation, promises to become apologetic for the persistence
of prejudices afflicting weak and unpopular groups justified simply on the
basis that these victims have been unable to amass sufficient political support
to protect themselves from the unjust effects of influencing the majoritarian
system.
It is this propensity for apology which demonstrates why judicial scrutiny
of the rational bases of legislation is both integral and legitimate in our
constitutional system. As Professor Bennett argues, "judicial value judg-
ments at some level are unavoidable even when applying this most minimal
of constitutional standards, ' 54 for legislatures may exercise their powers in
an illegitimately selfish, vindictive, or otherwise improper fashion to harm
or subjugate politically powerless individuals. Or, legislatures, either through
deliberate defiance of their duties or by inadvertenance, may fail to antic-
ipate the adverse consequences their actions will have on all affected persons
and groups.5 5 The judiciary stands as the final arbiter of rationality because
the legislative
mechanism still leaves the real possibility that legislation will fail to
account for its effects on any minority that remains unreconciled
to it. If the net cost to the minority is substantially greater than
the net benefit to the majority, a spectator outside the process
might well conclude that the result was an irrational balance of
costs and benefits.5 6
53. Bennett, supra note 16, at 1080; see also supra notes 22-23, 33-42 and accompanying
text (discussing "suspect classifications").
54. Bennett, supra note 16, at 1065.
55. Id. at 1066-1067.
56. Id. at 1067; see also Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with
Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 501 (1979). The courts have recognized the
failings of the majoritarian process. In unambiguous terms, for instance, the Supreme Court
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To be sure, our judicial system ultimately links much of our destinies
to the personal morality of a majority of Supreme Court justices. But, as
has been argued so often in this unendfng debate, a body of judges reviewing
legislation seems to be the only workable counterweight against legislative
acts that debase, humiliate or unduly dominate individuals and groups. For
these individuals and groups-, the majoritarian. systen has failed to provide
even a minimally acceptable modicum of protection from arbitrary discrim-
inatory treatment.17 This is not simply a reflection of the usual consequences
of a competitive political system, that disappointed actors perceive them-
selves to be less well off than they would have been had they prevailed.
Rather, application of rationality analysis concerns the possible failure of
the political system to maintain some rudimentary standard of decent
treatmenL
Furthermore, it may be highly unlikely that the already partially per-
verted majoritarian system will right itself in the near future. Those holding
power surely are not likely to alter their irrational behavior merely at the
behest of those whom. they deliberately sought to harm. Therefore, in the
absence of a judiciary with power of review, individuals opposing the
irrational acts must try to activate the majoritarian system to shift the
power balance to other han.ds.,
Naturally, the influencing process, even if successful,. takes years, per-
haps decades, during which one sector of society continually suffers the
ravages of treatment that fails to comport with concepts of minimal decency.
Indeed, since it is problematic whether the downtrodden ones can amass
has noted that strict judicial scrutiny is accorded certain legislative classifications,, such as race,
not only because of such classifications' presumptive arbitrariness but also "because such
discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means." Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S-. 432, 440 (1985). See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text
(discussing equal protection analysis). Limiting that observed political reality only to "strict
scrutiny" cases is unavailing. Surely, legislatures are not significantly more inclined to spon-
taneously and volitionally amend or revoke irrational classifications falling without the ambit
of "strict scrutiny" than they would be regarding "strict scrutiny" classifications. For example,
given contemporary precedents, a. legislature may be more inclined to self-correct a law
predicated on an irrational racial classification (a "suspect" class) than on an- arbitrary wealth,
age, or handicap classification.
57. Of course, the term "majoritarian process" is used broadly to encompass the full
panoply of possible processes and outcomes, associated with our electoral system. It is widely
recognized, for instance, that elected officials do not-and ought not-always represent the
wishes of the voters who put them in office. Their special knowledge and experience influence
legislators to temper political pressure with independent judgment-at least, such is the theory.
Moreover, the "majoritarian process" includes the formation of shifting majorities through
ad hoc alliances; of various political groups. Thus, it is not always simple for a legislator to
determine where the majority lies if there is a majority position, and what the majority's
interests are.
The foregoing presupposes that there is a "majority" whose wishes are reflected in the
results of the "majoritarian process2' History is replete with instances where minority inter-
ests-made powerful by wealth and position-have controlled over, the will of a majority.
Under such circumstances, application of rationality analysis may vindicate, rather than
contravene, majority rule.
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sufficient political clout to halt the irrational acts, they may be reduced to
waiting for any of three events: (1) that some intervening circumstances will
prompt those in power to reconsider their irrational acts; (2) that more
sensitive and caring others will be moved to use their power to fight the
irrational acts; or, (3) that a judicial body, presumably not seriously tainted
by the partisan politics underlying the irrational acts, will bring a more
speedy resolution to the problem. Thus, we create a class of professional
judges, give many of them life tenure, accord them the myriad trappings
of respect, pay them decently, empower them broadly and hope that they
will act with fairness and justice. 8
58. None of the foregoing is intended to infer that judicial review is not susceptible to
co-option and misuse. Certainly, the judicial process is subject to its own forms of abuse,
delay, and error. That reality, however, simply leads to the venerated supposition upon which
our entire constitutional system is based: the hope that the judiciary may cure the abuses of
the majoritarian system while the elected branches and levels may correct the perceived missteps
of the judiciary. For instance, just as the judiciary, in Brown v. Board of Education, addressed
the failure of the majoritarian process by invalidating legislation mandating racially segregated
public schools, the Congress statutorily overturned General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976), through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which declared that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy is per se sex based discrimination under the Fair Employment Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Any study of history or law can supplement these examples
with numerous others to demonstrate that the "checks and balances" of our constitutional
system can work.
An additional noteworthy criticism of broad judicial review holds that the threat to the
majoritarian process by the judiciary is so overwhelming that it is worth suffering instances
of legislative irrationality as a necessary cost to preserve the overall system. (Let us assume
that the argument is not made solely by those who are so content with things as they are that
they do not personally feel the impact of majoritarian abuses and, thus, are unconcerned with
the plight of others. Rather, the response will address the argument on its own merits.)
It seems cruel and narrow to assert that the extant system must be bedrocked on the
unearned suffering of those who are too powerless to relieve effectively their conditions. While
arbitrariness and undeserved injury may be commonplace in even the most uncorrupt and
efficient systems, such persistence is no reason to retreat from measures to alleviate the
irrationality. I would rather trust the "checks and balances" to arrest the excesses of the
judicial process than to sentence individuals to unfair treatment, without hope of reprieve,
under the theory that the rest of us are better off if we do not challenge the status quo any
further. Perhaps humanity can never devise a fully fair political system even if it cared to;
however, to resign the quest would result not only in an apology for such existing unfairness
that could be remedied, but also would threaten to erode the fairness we have achieved.
Complacency makes those who are comfortable much less vigilant regarding both eliminating
injustice and preserving the justice already gained.
Finally, it is hardly clear that less judicial review would protect the majoritarian system
through less judicial activism. The decision to uphold legislative action often involves judicial
interpretation and analysis no less searching-no less political-than decisions to invalidate
acts. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (right to privacy does not include protection
against state enactments criminalizing privately performed consensual homosexual acts between
adults); infra note 127 (discussing Court's holding in Bowers). Complete analysis to uphold
governmental behavior is often absolutely necessary to support a court's holding lest the court




The foregoing discussion is fortified by recognizing that our Constitution
was designed to expand and grow over time.5 9 The original words and
purposes of the drafters of the Constitution are only the starting point from
which American society makes its moral stands. It is paradigmatic in our
jurisprudence that our past legal and social experiences do not constitute
the climax, but only midpoints, in what will be an ever-enlarging awareness
of freedom, dignity and rationality. Indeed, it is not too much to argue
that the framers of the Constitution anticipated the time when 'the broad
implications of doctrines such as "due process" and "equal protection"
would encompass and invalidate even those prejudices that premised ac-
ceptable acts of daily living in colonial and early post-bellum America 0
Judicial determinations of an expanding constitutional conception of ra-
tionality are consistent with our belief in an expanding constitution. 6'
59. This proposition has become a foundation of our jurisprudence. See Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Holding that States may not mandate racial
segregation in public education, the Court stated, "In approaching this problem, we cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537 (1896) (the rule of which, permitting publicly mandated
racial segregation, was overturned with regard to public education)] was written." Id. at 492;
see also Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-670 (1966) (invalidating
polltaxes). See also, e.g., Bennett, supra note 16, at 1096-1097; Baker, supra note 36, at 948.
60. See Bennett, supra note 16, at 1092; and accord, Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating state practice of mandatory racially segregated public education
despite the fact that such segregation was commonplace shortly after the civil war and
throughout the formative years of equal protection analysis).
This same point will be reaccented in our discussion of civil rights statutes and rationality.
For instance, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. the Court held that section 1982's prohibition
against racial discrimination in property transactions forbids a private realty firm from refusing
to sell a home because of the willing purchaser's race. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S.
409 (1968). The majority was unpersuaded by Justice Harlan's dissent which argued that the
Framers of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the precursor of section 1982, recognized and prized
the right of private persons to dispose of property as they see fit, including the commonplace
practice of racially discriminatory refusals to deal. See Jones at 473-475 (Harland, 'J., dis-
senting); infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (discussing Court's holding in Jones); see
also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-192 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); supra note
2 (discussing Court's holding in Runyan).
61. Interestingly, Professor Bennett would not extend his rationality analysis to cover
"disparate impact" cases. Bennett, supra note 16 at 1075-1076. Disparate impact occurs when
a legislative classification results in an unintended-often wholly unanticipated-damaging
effect upon another classification not explicitly encompassed by the terms of the first classi-
fication. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-85 (1988). For instance,
in Washington v. Davis the District of Columbia classified applicants for positions on the
police force pursuant to whether they passed or failed a written examination. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Those who failed the examination were excluded from further
consideration in the application process. Davis at 234-235. It happened, however, that a
disproportionate percentage of black applicants failed the examination as contrasted with the
percentage of white applicants who failed. Id. Thus, although the original classification-based
on the seemingly neutral test-made no express racial distinctions, the effect of the classification
was racially felt.
Although acknowledging that disparate impact may be unlawful pursuant to express
statutory prohibition, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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B. Defining Rationality on a Social Scale of Costs and Benefits
The foregoing analysis has established long-held and basic propositions
related to the value laden methods by which the judiciary applies "mere
rationality" analysis. The next step, then, is to devise some general, abstract
definition that will be both the starting point and major expression of the
moral imperative associated with the constitutional command that legislative
acts must be at least rational.
Amendment does not recognize a cause of action sounding solely in the disparate effects of
legislative classifications. Id. at 239-248. Rather, the challenger must demonstrate that the
racially disparate effects were deliberately intended by the legislature. Id. Thus, had the District
of Columbia purposefully utilized the written examination with the intention of discriminating
on the impermissible basis of race, the challengers could have established a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Bennett argues that disparate impact analysis has no place in rationality theory particularly
because impact theory is purportedly too unwieldy and standardless. See BIumstein, Defining
and Proving Racial Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from
the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633 (1983). Bennett's criticism of impact analysis, like
his own critique of Judge Linde, does not flow naturally from his theory of rationality and
judicial decision making. Bennett argues that it is necessary and legitimate for the courts to
examine governmental actions to determine whether they are rational. Surely, as part of that
examination, a court may assess the rationality of a statute's disparate impact along with the
constitutionality of the statute's facial classifications. Indeed, the Davis Court recognized as
much by basing its analysis on a brief review of equal protection precedent, coupled with its
reluctance to open a floodgate of litigation involving impact challenges to every form of
governmental action. Davis at 239-248. Nowhere does the Court imply that the judiciary is
unable to actually perform disparate impact analysis; nor, could the Court make that assertion
in light of the fact that the judiciary is called upon routinely to review disparate impact cases
under certain civil rights statutes. See Watson, supra, at 2786-88. Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (invalidating under the Fair Employment Act of 1964, defendant-employer's
use of a written examination as part of its promotion process because of the examination's
unlawful disparate racial impact). In light of the judiciary's ability to perform disparate impact
analysis-an ability which it puts into practice on a regular basis-Professor Bennett's aversion
to incorporating disparate impact theory into rationality analysis seems hasty.
Possibly, the critics of impact analysis believe that discrimination must include an intent
requisite and feel that discriminators cannot discriminate by accident or that it is unfair to
hold individuals civilly liable for the unintentional discriminatory impact of their actions.
However, a significant purpose underlying many of our antidiscrimination laws is to eradicate
the effects of practices that harm and demean individuals on the basis of irrational criteria
such as race and gender. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (Fair
Employment Act of 1964). As such, facially neutral practices that inadvertently promote
cultural, economic, social, and educational differences associated with such irrational discrim-
ination are as detrimental to affected individuals, and therefore as destructive to a society
predicated on fairness and rationality, as are purposefully discriminatory actions. See infra
notes 358-65 and accompanying text (additional detailed discussion of this point). No serious
scheme of societal rationality may reject impact analysis. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
642-653 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In fact, even Professor Bennett seems to accept the utility of impact analysis at least in
civil rights cases. "Even if we could figure out what ... [disparate impact] would mean, there
is no particular reason to think that we would want to pursue it, except perhaps in matters




The Supreme Court has adopted the following two part probe to
determine the underlying rationality of a statute: the statutory classification
cannot (1) be totally unrelated to attaining (2) legitimate governmental
objectives.
62
At the minimum level... the Court "consistently has required that
legislation classify persons it affects in a manner rationally related
to legitimate governmental objectives.
' 63
Similarly, Prof. Michelman suggests that rationality review consists of
"nullifying legislative acts ... found to be irrational, meaning patently
useless in the service of any goal apart from whim or favoritism.' 64
In essence, irrational acts are those that concern some sort of illegitimate
governmental project. As will be explicated through examples in Part II-C,
the illegitimate project need not have been devised with an evil mind. The
legislature does not have to espouse, expect, or even anticipate those effects
which will render the project irrational. Rather, the only necessary pur-
poseful project under rationality analysis is that thd legislature create a
classification which has, in some manner, affected society in an impermis-
sible degree.
65
We may posit, then, that something is irrational when the classification
employed has nothing to do with the advancement of a legitimate goal or
purpose. For instance, racial discrimination in employment is irrational
because skin color and racial heritage, except in the rarest circumstances,
reveal nothing about the actual ability of an individual to perform work.
It is true that, over time, prejudice has created a social reality in which
62. "General, statutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relationship to
legitimate governmental purposes." Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,
461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); see also Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct.
1645, 1652 (1988); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1983); Western & Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981); United
States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
7576 (1971).
63. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 439 (1982) (plurality opinion quoting
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 235 (1981)); See Kadrmasu v. Dickinson Pub. Schools,
108 S. Ct. 2481, 2489 (1988).
64. Michelman, supra note 56, at 499.
65. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's holding in Zobel). Therein, a legislative classification differentiating
residents of the State of Alaska prior to 1980 from individuals who commenced residence
after 1980 was declared irrational by the U.S. Supreme Court. The classification was created
for the seemingly altruistic purpose of disbursing state money gifts in gratitude to residents
who, through their length of residence, had contributed tangible and intangible benefits to the
State.
Fearing that such a dichotomy would lead to the illegitimate linking of state largess to
duration of residency, the Court invalidated the classification even though it was drawn neither
to harm deliberately individuals nor to devise a caste system. Nevertheless, the potential harm
rendered the classification unconstitutional. Indeed, one might argue that Zobel reflects a
species of the "disparate impact" analysis which Prof. Bennett contends is inappropriate under
rational basis scrutiny. See supra note 61.
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race does affect a person's ability to work. But, if we look at the actual
qualifications mandated by the nature of the labor itself, we find that race
is totally irrelevant. Thus, equal protection analysis-in a manner similar
to civil rights laws-restructures those aspects of society which have imposed
needless, humiliating-indeed, irrational-restrictions on social projects like
employment.
Profs. Bennett and Michelman recognize, however, that our definition
of rationality is far from complete for we have heuristically presumed that
legislative action usually serves only one purpose. Legislative classifications
do not perform but a single function nor do they have only one effect on
society.. Classifications affect many groups differently through direct and
indirect effects some of which are intended by the legislature, some of
which are anticipated but unrelated to the express purpose of the enactment,
and some which are totally unforeseen. 66 For instance, even if the fifty-five
mile per hour highway speed limit, originally designed to conserve gasoline,
is proved unable to achieve significantly that end, it may still be rational
because we realize that it unexpectedly saves lives and reduces traffic
accidents. 67 Furthermore, governmental actions may be irrational if legiti-
mate goals are pursued through illegitimate means. To offer an extreme
example, a statute designed to promote gasoline conservation by shooting
every third motorist would clearly be irrational. The goal is not a problem,
but the too-extreme means renders the acts untenable.
Recognizing the multiplicity of purposes and effects a given govern-
mental classification may produce, Profs. Michelman and Bennett supply
the needed social dynamic to energize our definition of rationality-that is,
an explanation of how rationality works in society. The heart of the dynamic
stems from the realization that the judiciary must sift through and evaluate
the multitude of purposes and effects emanating from each governmental
classification to discern if the social utility, of the classification, as applied
in each case, outweighs its social dysfunction. If, after making this subjective
determination-a societal cost/benefit analysis-the court finds that the
legislative classification is predominately dysfunctional, it is labeled "irra-
tional" and hence, a violation of the "due process" or "equal protection"
components of our Constitution. Otherwise, the classification is sustained
as "rational.''68
66. It has been long recognized in social science that a structure or entity in society may
perform a variety of tasks or functions. Similarly, a single function or task may be performed
by a variety of structures. The system of structures and their functions is even more richly
complex for structures may carry out deliberate or "manifest" functions as well as unforeseen
or "latent" functions. See, e.g., MERTON, ROBERT, SOcIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE,
Chapter 2 (1957).
The complexities of the legislative process demonstrate that rarely, if ever, can a single
purpose be said to motivate the passage of legislation. Rather, the process is more often
energized by officials pursuing many goals-often competing ones-which are resolved through
power struggles, compromises, or both.
67. Bennett, supra note 16, at 1076.
68. See id. at 1067; Michelman, supra note 58 at 501. See also Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Prof. Bennett demonstrates that rationality is a question of interrela-
tionships through a clever hypothetical: the case of flouridating drinking
water.6 9 If a fluoridation project is enforced, all individuals, unless they
purchase it elsewhere, must drink, cook with, clean with and bathe in water
permeated with flouride. Generally, water is fluoridated to strengthen chil-
dren's teeth, which are particularly susceptible to tooth decay. If the
fluoridation (1) significantly reduces cavities in children, and (2) costs
relatively few tax dollars, and (3) creates very slight inconvenience, discom-
fort or danger we can say that the classification-fluoridated water-is
rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental goal-protecting
the health of children. The benefits clearly overwhelm whatever minor costs
the program engenders.
Suppose, by contrast, that fluoride affects all persons' teeth-both
children's and adults'-but is very expensive, reduces cavities a noticeable
but insignificant amount, and poisons one out of every 500 newborn babies.
As Prof. Bennett notes, the classification may be technically perfect since
fluoridation benefits in some small measure almost every individual in
society, yet its costs clearly outstrip its benefits. Since the means-the
fluoridation-is weakly related to a valid state project-protecting health-
and the illegitimate effect-harming the health of infants-is substantial,
the classification is irrational. If the legitimate state goal was to protect the
teeth of its citizens, that purpose has been overwhelmed by the unintended
yet destructive effects of the fluoridation project on society. If the goal was
to harm infants, then the legislature acted irresponsibly. Either way the
legislative act is irrational.
70
A final element implicit in this social dynamic of rationality must now
be added. The cost/benefit analysis, although sounding in economic theory,
is not limited to concepts such as profit, loss or economic efficiency. To
the contrary, fundamental rights which include the right to be free from
irrational governmental actions include certain intangible, moral values as
part of the calculus. Dignity, freedom, self-worth, self-respect, fairness, and
other integral aspects of sense-of-self play a large role in assessing the
69. Bennett, supra note 16 at 1063.
70. See supra note 65 (brief reference to Zobel that illustrates the foregoing points
through caselaw). In Zobel, the legitimate legislative purposes served by doling certain monies
to state residents was overwhelmed by the inadvertent harm engendered by the classification
utilized to determine each resident's share of the disbursed funds. Zobel, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
The Bennett fluoridation example and the Zobel case illustrate that the popular theory
arguing that rationality is discerned simply by proving that the classification in question is
neither over nor under inclusive cannot resolve all questions concerning the statute's consti-
tutional reasonableness. See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 Chin'. L. REv. 341 (1949) (classic statement addressing this theory of rationality.) The
perfect nature of a classification-that is, covering exactly those groups it is designed to
embrace-cannot end the inquiry if, deliberately or inadvertently, the classification engenders
unacceptable social harm. Indeed, to accept the Tussman and tenBroek argument would require
returning to the time when rationality was circularly defined solely on the basis of whether
the legislature had in fact created the classification it intended to enact.
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rationality of a statute. 7' In this manner, the applicable cost/benefit analysis
goes beyond dollars and cents. We imbue the political process-legislative
and judicial-with our "search for good and right answers to the questions
of directions for our evolving selves." '7 2 Clearly, then, the economic analogy
is heuristic and we intuitively eschew unabashed economics when addressing
sensitive social situations impregnated with moral issues.
The observation that the cost/benefit analysis associated with rationality
analysis includes assessing normative concepts such as dignity and self-worth
is not limited to scholarly commentary. Judicial opinion recognizes that the
consideration of personal individuality and integrity is an indispensable part
of constitutional adjudication. The United States Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, has noted that denial of equal protection in the realm of education
offends individual integrity, "(posing) an affront to one of the goals of the
Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting
unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit." ' 73
The Plyer Court, holding that states must provide otherwise available
publicly funded education to the children of illegal aliens, noted that a lack
of education would prevent such children from achieving social esteem,
reduce their self-sufficiency through resulting illiteracy, and extract a heavy
toll on the "social, economic, intellectual and psychological well-being of
the individual." 74
Similarly, in Zobel v. Williams, Justice Brennan wrote:
While some imprecision is unavoidable in the process of legislative
classification, the ideal of equal protection requires attention to
individual merit, to individual need. In almost all instances, the
business of the State is not with the past, but with the present: to
remedy continuing injustices, to fill current needs, to build on the
present in order to better the future.7
5
71. See infra notes 220-43, 270 and accompanying text (the notion that statutory civil
rights transcend pure economic considerations is likewise integral to our analysis). Rivers of
ink have flowed to describe and debate the application of various forms of economic theory
to law. See 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980) (symposium on law and economics). Some have
argued that economic efficiency should be the basic criterion to resolve legal issues. See Posner,
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Association, 8
HoFsTRA L. REv. 487 (1980). Others argue that an efficiency paradigm must be modified by
reference to concepts of fairness. See, e.g., Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis
and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STA. L. REv. 1169 (1984). And other critics
dispute the very viability of cost-benefit theory. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. Rav. 387 (1981).
72. Michelman, supra note 56, at 509.
73. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
74. Id. "The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the
abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation." Id. at 213.
75. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). Similarly,
Justice Stevens has observed,
The federal interest vindicated by ... [equal protection] requires every State to
respect the individuality and the essential equality of every person subjected to its
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In brief, an irrational governmental act is one that is unrelated to-has
nothing to do with-a legitimate governmental project or goal. Moreover,
we have seen that, given the multitude of purposes and effects which an
action may purport to advance, determination of rationality requires analysis




Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648,
677 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Naturally, the foregoing proposition holds equally firm in the area of statutory civil
rights. For example, as Justice Goldberg noted, "The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ... as the Court recognizes, and as I would underscore, is the vindication of human
dignity and not mere economics." Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
291-292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
76. One irony is noteworthy. The foregoing discussion argues as though legislation is
rational except for one flaw, the isolation of which either leads to the salvaging of the
rationality of the statute or requires its total invalidation. Sometimes, legislation consists of a
series of arguably irrational premises, only one of which is subject to a particular constitutional
challenge. Thus, the courts may isolate a discrete instance of irrationality and rectify it while
preserving-or at least leaving unaddressed-the other irrational components.
In Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co. the Court invalidated that
portion of the Louisiana "wrongful death" statute which prohibited surviving parents of
deceased illegitimate children from suing for damages. Glona, 391 U.S. 73 (1968). The majority
rejected the State's averred justification that permitting wrongful death recovery would reward
or condone the "sin" of bearing illegitimate children. There is no rational basis, the Court
retorted, "for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death
of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served." Id. at 75.
. Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Black and Justice Stewart joined, dissented on the
ground that a court should not inject its subjective concepts of rationality into a statutory
scheme that consists of nothing but arbitrary assumptions. Specifically, Justice Harlan observed
that wrongful death enactments must accord recovery to certain classifications of individuals.
By necessity, these classifications are predicated on arbitrary assumptions. Id. at 77-80 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). For instance, under the Louisiana Law, a child may always sue for the wrongful
death of a parent; but, a surviving parent cannot sue unless the deceased has no surviving
offspring. Thus, Justice Harlan concluded, a wealthy child, heir to the parent's fortune, may
sue for wrongful death recovery even if she/he hated the parent. By contrast, the surviving
parent of the hypothetical deceased may not sue instead of the surviving child even though
the parent was financially dependent upon and greatly adored the deceased. The thrust of
Justice Harlan's argument seems to be that, in our system of government, the judiciary may
not legitimately seek to salvage portions of a law which, by its very need to classify, makes
arbitrary assumptions about the relationships among individuals. See id. at 80 (Justice Harlan
additionally argued that the legitimacy-of-birth classification was not irrational).
Even if one agreed that all the classifications of the Louisiana wrongful death statute
were irrational, it hardly follows that litigants must willingly capitulate to be victims of such
wholesale irrationality. It is incongruous to argue that the enormity and complexity of the
irrationality insulates it from any form of attack, in whole or piecemeal. Indeed, the island
of rationality carved by the Glona Court in the sea of irrationality which characterized the
wrongful death scheme might be the first restorative step. Subsequent litigation might identify
the additional anomalies in the law until, at some point, the law was fully restructured to be
rational or returned to the legislature-neither of which would be terrible outcomes.
Justice Harlan, however, might have meant that it is impossible to construct a perfectly
rational wrongful death act because the presumptions underlying the various classifications
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C. The Theory in Practice-Explication of Our Definition of Rationality
Through Review of Supreme Court Precedent
We are now ready to see how the cost/benefit calculus, permeated as
it is with normative principles, has been defined in modern constitutional
law. These examples will provide "operational definitions" 77 through which
we can uncover more specific concepts to explicate our definition of ration-
ality.
Professor Baker provides a useful set of ideas with which to evaluate
how the courts have applied the definition of rationality. 78 Prof. Baker's
suggestions are particularly applicable because of his heavy emphasis on the
social and moral questions posed by rationality analysis-questions which
are the heart of Supreme Court analysis.
Taking his cue from the philosophy of Rawls and Kant, Prof. Baker
argues that the normative basis for all equal protection analysis-and,
will not hold true in all instances: Since it is probably more socially useful to enact wrongful
death legislation than to forego coverage altogether, the legislation should not be subjected to
challenge on the basis of "mere rationality."
At times lawmakers must draw seemingly irrational lines to enact legitimate legislation.
See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (demonstrating that at times lawmakers must
draw seemingly arbitrary lines among classes of individuals). Although appearing arbitrary,
the classifications are rational because, under the given situation, there is simply no better way
to design the statute. For instance, it is rational, perhaps integral, to set a minimum age
requisite in many voting statutes. We may sense a general range of ages about which individuals,
more often than not, may be deemed qualified to vote; however, the setting of the particular
age limit is somewhat arbitrary since choosing one or two years difference might be just as
useful. Yet, since an age must be chosen, any reasonable choice will be satisfactory.
The fact that lines must be drawn, however, cannot mean that every line drawn is
rational. As we have seen, the social utility of the classification determines its rationality, not
the objective fact that the legislature might have drawn its line in a slightly different manner.
Thus, one may argue that the classification giving surviving children preference over
surviving parents is rational because the purpose of the statute is to alleviate, to the fullest
possible degree, the financial hardship resulting from tortuous deaths. The underlying rationale
presumes that, more often than not, the child rather than the grandparent was financially
dependent on the deceased. The preferential classification, therefore, furthers the legitimate
legislative goal. (Of course, a classification permitting any person demonstrably dependent
upon the deceased to sue in wrongful death might be more logical and just.) Recall, however,
under our analysis, a court may not invalidate the preference favoring offspring and attempt
to interpose such a substitute classification unless it believed that the social good of the
challenged classification was outweighed by its dysfunction. The court might render that
holding if a sufficient number of dependents were systematically excluded from recovery merely
through the fortuity of their particular relationship to the deceased. But, for the purpose of
this discussion, we can see how the preference for offspring is arguably rational.
The statutory classification based on legitimacy of childbirth, by contrast, serves no useful
function. Through punishing the offspring, the statute strives to demean, disadvantage and
humiliate couples for having brought illegitimate children into the world. The challenged
provision is not related to the rational purposes of compensation for wrongful death.
77. "Operational definitions" define concepts not in the abstract but through reference
to how they operate or affect someone or something. For instance, an operational definition
of "temperature" would refer to mercury rising or falling in a thermometer.
78. Baker, Outcome Equality of Equality of Respect: the Substantive Content of Equal
Protection, 131 PA. L. Rav. 933 (1983).
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therefore, the basis for all rationality analysis-is the "equality of respect
principle:"
[a]ll people (or, at least, all members of the relevant community)
rightfully can demand that the community treat them with full and
equal respect and concern as autonomous persons. Such treatment
is a necessary part of the justification for the community's claim
that all members have an obligation to abide by the rules or
mandatory norms of the community.
79
Baker suggests that the "equality of respect principle" yields three
secondary principles explicating how society can accord individuals their
due. The first is the "Political Participation Principle" which allows indi-
viduals the opportunity to participate in the policy making process, especially
as performed by various legislatures. 0 However, as noted earlier, many
commentators are skeptical regarding the fairness of the majoritarian system
if left to its own devices. Baker., numbering himself among such critics,
lists two additional principles which, in the name of preserving individual
autonomy and dignity, act to limit the unbridled power of the legislative
process. Baker's second principle holds that:
the state must not pursue purposes, and the political process must
not further individual's preferences, to subordinate or to denigrate
the inherent worth of any category of citizens."
Baker's third principle states, "the state must guarantee to everyone
those resources and opportunities that the existing community treats as
necessary for full life and participation in that community.
'82
79. Id. at 938 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 959.
81. Id. Consistent with his framework, one may presume that a single individual may
constitute a "category of citizens." If that is not implicit in Professor Baker's analysis, I
would suggest accommodating the analysis to permit such individual consideration.
82. Id. It is worth noting that Professor Baker drafted his model of analysis not only
to suggest a social dynamic of judicial decision making, but also to respond to certain
constructs offered by Professor Rawls. While he agrees with many of Rawls' basic premises,
particularly the concept of the "original position," Baker quarrels with some of Rawls'
suggestions concerning constituent elements of the "good" social order. Id.
Under the "original position," individuals exist without extant prejudices or interests
other than devising what they feel to be the best social order possible. Without vested, selfish
interests to distract them, Rawls suggests, people would be inclined to devise a fair and
equitable social system. If we try to create or conceive the "original position," therefore, we
may be able to divine applicable truths about fairness and social order. See id. at 939 n.16.
Baker is concerned with-what he perceives to be Rawls' insensitivity to the inherent worth
and effects of the political structures which energize the distribution, redistribution, and
reproduction of social resources. Id. at 950-953. Because, according to Baker, Rawls' project
is to equitably distribute the social pie, the optimal government is the one that divides the pie
most fairly and efficiently. If a computer could be programmed to do that, Baker says,
government by floppy disk would be preferable to government by election. Id.
An additional infirmity in Rawls' theory, Baker asserts, stems from the list of goods
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As Baker admits, these principles, like all philosophical constructs,
cannot give us set answers, but they greatly inform judgments by directing
viewpoints "to society's responsibility to guarantee the goods and oppor-
tunities needed for full life and participation. Both directives, however,
become indeterminate at some point."'8 3 Nevertheless, Baker's ideas, partic-
ularly those dealing with the limits on governmental actions, seem to reflect
those considerations used by courts to perform the societal cost/benefit
calculus in rationality analysis. 84 Indeed, to borrow Baker's formulations,
judicial considerations address whether governmental actions "subordinate
or ... denigrate the inherent worth of any category of" individuals and
whether the community has deprived some one or some group of "those
resources and opportunities that the existing community treats as necessary
for full life and participation."
The number of cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated
governmental action on the ground that it utterly lacks rational basis is
understandably small. Still, the cases in which no rational basis was discerned
provide insights into how the courts envision the outmost limits of dignity,
respect, and selfhood in American society. These unusual cases, then, help
mark the present parameters of acceptable governmental behavior-para-
meters that will refine our notion of rationality.85
For convenience sake, we may discern three distinct although interrelated
situations emanating from Supreme Court cases that apply our general
definition of rationality:
(1) Governmental actions are irrational if the decisions to establish the
classifications under scrutiny are as totally random as if the government
has decided on the classifications by flipping coins;
(2) Isolating and deliberately inflicting harm on downtrodden or polit-
ically unpopular groups is irrational; and
which persons in the "original position" may consider for social disbursement. Baker argues
that individuals in the "original position" cannot make truly rational distributions, for the
perceptions gleaned in that nonsocial situltion may not account for the actual interplay of
doled resources in society. Had they known how the resources would actually interrelate, they
might have chosen a different distribution. Thus, carving the pie from the "original position"
may be neither the most rational nor the most beneficial construct upon which to form a
social order.
To remedy the foregoing two anomalies, Baker suggests that a more reasonable operation
to perform in the "original position" is to devise the system with which to distribute the
social goods. Thus, Baker's article, focusing on equal protection analysis, seeks to provide the
insights and tools to structure a fair societal system for the routine and continuous distribution
of resources. Id. at 961-970.
83. Id. at 971.
84. As will be shown at Part III, identical considerations explain the unique and vital
nature of civil rights statutes.
85. It is common to examine the most extreme or unusual cases to determine the limits
of socially acceptable actions. For instance, to comprehend what behavior society will tolerate,
investigators often review criminal laws and societal standards determining insanity. See, e.g.,
ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS, chapter 1 (J. Weiley & Sons, 1966).
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(3) Governmental action may be unlawful if it creates or threatens to
create a caste system.8
6
86. Of course, the choice of three general categories is illustrative only, designed to
demonstrate certain overall concepts which have energized Supreme Court rationality analysis,
especially in recent years. Some cases defy easy categorization except if one were to include
them simply under the overall heading "the State failed to play the game fairly." Consider,
for instance, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, which invalidated an Alabama statute which
"granted a preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substantially lower
gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-state (foreign) companies." Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 870 (footnote omitted). Foreign companies could reduce their
tax rates by investing in certain Alabama assets and securities, although the tax rate on foreign
companies could never be reduced to that of domestic enterprises. Id. at 872.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Powell asserted that, "this Court always has held that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely
by burdening 'the residents of other state members of our federation."' Id. at 878 (quoting
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 533 (1959)). The Court, thus, rejected
Alabama's assertions that the statute's rational base was to promote domestic industry. Justice
Powell contrasted the Ward legislation with a seemingly similar California tax scheme upheld
in Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization. Ward, 470 U.S.
at 876-880; See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). The
California tax, the Court noted, only disadvantaged foreign corporations from states which
themselves had enacted retaliatory taxes. The California plan, therefore, was designed to
promote competitive equality rather than "seek[ing] to benefit domestic industry within the
State only by grossly discriminating against foreign competitor." Id. at 878.
The Court additionally rejected Alabama's second averred premise, that the tax scheme
promotes investment in Alabama. While foreign companies could reduce their tax burdens by
purchasing specified Alabama assets and securities, no amount of investment could reduce the
foreign tax rate to the level of domestic corporations. Id. at 882-83. "Moreover, the investment
incentive provision of the Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to
eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute." Id. at 882.
An interesting coalition of justices dissented. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice (now
Chief Justice) Rehnquist and Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that the Court abandoned
established rationality analysis by examining whether the means were legitimate rather than
the ends. Id. at 883-902.
Justice Powell concluded that "encouraging investment in Alabama assets and securities
in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state purpose." Id. at 883. It is
obvious that promoting the State goal did serve a legitimate purpose. Clearly, encouraging
domestic enterprise is a legitimate goal. The Ward majority recognized, however, that even
this understandable desire may be implemented in an arbitrary and destructive fashion. The
majority identified a countervailing and overwhelming detrimental effect which could not be
sustained constitutionally. The promotion of state enterprise must meet some level of fairness
lest competition among the states become too bitter and hostile. The Court, as referee,
determined that Alabama committed a "foul" by attempting to close itself to out-of-state
competition or, in the alternative, to extract an unreasonable premium on those states wishing
to do business in Alabama. See generally Andersen, Equal Protection During the 1984 Term:
Revitalized Rational Basis Examination in the Economic Sphere, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 25, 40-43
(1986-87).
Similarly, Williams v. Vermont invalidated a tax scheme that imposed a "use tax" on
automobiles registered but not purchased in Vermont, but allotted a tax credit for "the amount
of any sales or use tax paid to another State if that State would afford a credit for taxes paid
to Vermont in similar circumstances. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985). The credit is
available, however, only if the registrant was a Vermont resident at the time he paid the
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1. Rationality Cannot Be Derived From Flipping a Coin
In Reed v. Reed,87 the Supreme Court overturned an Idaho statute
which mandated that among individuals equally entitled to administer in-
testate estates, men would be favored over women with the latter having
no opportunity to establish individual superior qualifications." Noting that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from according "(d)ifferent
treatment ... to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute,''89 the
Court found that the classification failed to further the legitimate state goal
to efficiently choose among two or more equally qualified applicants who
seek to administer an estate. 9° Although gender based selection might be an
efficacious manner to speedily select an administrator, the fatal flaw was
singling out a particular gender for preference. The goal of efficiency would
have been enhanced just as well by favoring women over men. Idaho's
choice to favor men, therefore, was arbitrary. 9'
The Court explicated Reed in the following way: the offending statute
was arbitrary because
the State's articulated goal could have been completely served by
requiring a coin flip .... Such legislative decisions are inimical to
the norm of impartial government. 92
taxes. " Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned:
We perceive no legitimate purpose, however, that is furthered by this discrim-
inatory exception. As we said in holding that the use tax base cannot be broader
than the sales tax base, "equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported
from out-of-state." Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963). A
State may not treat those within its borders unequally solely on the basis of their
different residences or States of incorporation. WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117,
119 (1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-572 (1949). In the
present case, residence at the time of purchase is a wholly arbitrary basis on which
to distinguish among present Vermont registrants-at least among those who used
their cars elsewhere before coming to Vermont. Having registered a car in Vermont
they are similarly situated for all relevant purposes. Each is a Vermont resident,
using a car in Vermont, with an equal obligation to pay for the maintenance and
improvement of Vermont's roads. The purposes of the statute would be identically
served, and with an identical burden, by taxing each. The distinction between them
bears no relation to the statutory purpose.
Id. at 23-24.
Once again, the State did not play the commercial game fairly.
87. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
88. Id. at 72-74.
89. Id. at 75-76.
90. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72-74.
91. Id. The courts now use "middle level" scrutiny to evaluate sex-based statutory
classifications. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). But,
as our previous discussion illustrates, all levels of equal protection analysis are really species
of rationality analysis. See supra notes 8-44 and accompanying text.
92. Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 n.24 (1983).
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The legislation was infirm because it failed the basic definition of rationality.
The special favoritism accorded to males was unrelated to-had nothing to
do with-a legitimate Governmental project. Thus, the classification was
either arbitrary in its own right, or promoted an unspoken, irrational
governmental goal to demean women. Either way, it failed "rational basis"
scrutiny.
The argument that it is irrational to draw arbitrary limitations or
classifications particularly when they could have been as well achieved by
flipping a coin does not-indeed cannot-mean that every limitation or
classification in a statute is by definition arbitrary. There are times when,
to accomplish a legitimate governmental end, lawmakers must draw seem-
ingly arbitrary lines among classes of individuals. Over half a century ago,
Justice Holmes explained the necessity of such apparently irrational lines:
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it
may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any
other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn,
or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the
change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the
necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as
well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But
when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there
is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision
of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very
wide of any reasonable mark. 93
Justice Holmes' observations seem complete. A seemingly arbitrary line
may not be unreasonable if one can demonstrate that (1) it was impossible
to draw a more reasonable or rational line and (2) drawing some sort of
classification was indispensable to completion of a legitimate governmental
goal. For example, the Supreme Court overturned an act of Congress setting
the minimum voting age in state elections at 18. 94 It would seem that one
cannot challenge a state law setting the voting age at 21 on the basis that
choosing twenty-one over eighteen is as arbitrary as flipping a coin.95 While
it cannot be said that, invariably, there is a given age at which individuals
are competent to vote and prior to which they physically, intellectually or
emotionally are not, it is nonetheless equally clear that some age limitation
on voting is required. As a general matter, children do not demonstrate the
required maturity to vote. Furthermore, there is no objective test to deter-
mine when discrete individuals attain the necessary state-of-mind to cast a
93. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
94. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-118 (1970) (per Black, J.), reh. den., 401
U.S. 903 (1971).
95. Cf. id. at 294-95 (per Stewart, J.). "Obviously, the power to establish an age
qualification must carry with it the power to choose 21 as a reasonable voting age, as the vast
majority of the states have done." Id. (footnote omitted).
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minimally intelligent vote. Indeed, even if such a test were available, it is
hardly certain that it would be an attractive alternative to setting a voting
age. After all, standardized tests attempting to measure minimal intellectual
qualifications for voters threatens to impose-by accident or design-res-
trictions based on political, cultural, religious, racial and similar prejudices.9
These are factors which have no legitimate place in a free electoral system.
Thus, to establish a reasonable pool of voters by eliminating those who are
presumably too young to understand the voting process, some age limit
must be set. It will be imperfect, but setting an age limit seems preferable
to the alternatives. 97
By contrast, the statute invalidated in Reed was purely arbitrary. The
goals of efficiency could have been easily accomplished through alternative
measures such as a brief hearing to establish by relevant standards, divorced
from gender, which applicant would be the best administrator for the given
estate. Or, they could flip a coin.
2. The Government May Not Single Out Politically Weak or Unpopular
Groups for the Purpose of Harming or Punishing Them Because of Their
Unpopularity or Politically Impotent Status.
As the foregoing has emphasized, one primary purpose of rationality
analysis is to preserve and promote dignity, individuality and selfhood of
all social actors through the guarantee that their government will act
rationally. Certainly, rationality analysis will not tolerate governmental
action which serves no better purpose than to demean and humiliate the
powerless of society.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno" concerned the
1971 amendments to the Food stamp Act of 1964. Formerly, food stamps-
a Federal program designed to help poor people purchase food-were
available to economically eligible "households" regardless of whether the
occupants therein were related to one-another. Under the 1971 amendments,
an eligible "household" could only consist of "related" individuals.9
As it happened, plaintiffs were members of various households each
consisting of themselves, their poor relations, and one unrelated friend-
also poor and in some cases old and crippled. The fact that these households
had selflessly taken in a needy nonrelative resulted in depriving all members
of the benefits of food stamps.' ° Under these grim facts, the Court could
96. Cf. id. at 131-134 (Black, J.).
97. Of course, a voting age may be so contrary to logic or necessity that it is unrelated
to any rational bases. Setting the age at 50, for instance, seems totally arbitrary.
98. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
99. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529-532 (1973).
100. Id. at 531-532. "Appellee Jacinta Moreno, for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic
who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. They share common living
expenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps care for appellee." Id. at 531. Their combined monthly
income was $208.00 of which, after other expenses, approximately $10.00 remained for food.
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have premised its holding by implying a limited statutory exception to the
"no non-related individuals" rule covering households consisting of a family
plus one unrelated occupant.
The Court, however, forthrightly held that the new statutory restrictions
in no manner promoted any of the three purported goals of the food stamp
program, namely to: (1) safeguard the health and well being of the popu-
lation; (2) "raise levels of nutrition among low income households;" and,
(3) "promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural
abundances and... strengthen our agricultural economy .... "10, The Court
did not strike down the 1971 amendments as they applied to the facts of
the particular litigants, for the Court understood that the 1971 amendments
were founded on a greater irrationality than overinclusiveness of coverage.
The infirmity-the irrationality-of the amendments was not that some
needy individuals would suffer; rather, the flaw was that "[the] Amendment
was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating in the food stamp program."' 0 2 Striking out at "hippies"
proved an insufficient justification for the amendment,
For if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare con-
gressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest. 03
101. Id. at 533.
102. Id. at 534.
103. Id. (emphasis supplied). A year later in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974), the Court upheld a local zoning ordinance limiting land use to one-family dwellings.
"Families," under the enactment, were divided into two classes: (1) any sized groups of related
individuals, and, (2) groups of no more than two unrelated persons. The Court distinguished
Moreno, accenting that the Boraas ruling did not undermine the law in the former case, id.
at 8 n.6, for the latter case merely recognized a community's legitimate interest in preserving
traditional family values. Yet, a community may not legislate to limit the number of related,
co-habitating individuals to the traditional nuclear family because a government has little
legitimate interest in sculpting family living arrangements. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Arguably, however, the Boraas ordinance imposed a burden on
households of unrelated individuals no less severe than the economic harm invalidated in
Moreno. Boraas, then, may reflect a retreat from Moreno in the limited instance of residential
planning.
In Lyng v. Castillo the Court upheld certain amendments to the Food Stamp Program
which, inter alia, require that to be a "household" eligible to receive food stamps, co-habitating
individuals who are either unrelated or distantly related must "customarily purchase food and
prepare meals together." 106 S. Ct. 2727, 2728 (1986). Speaking for the Court, Justice Stevens
held that the classificatory scheme was rational because it promotes "economies of scale"
allowing group purchases of food while limiting the potential for fraud, abuse and mistake in
acquiring food stamps. Id. at 2730-31. Moreover, the amendments promoted program efficiency
by reducing the instances in which the Department of Agriculture would have to make discrete
determinations. Families consisting of parents, children and siblings rationally may be presumed
to purchase and prepare meals together, even if the presumption is imperfect. Id. at 2731-32.
The Court was careful to distinguish Moreno, noting that:
Unlike the present statute, the 1971 definition completely disqualified all households
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In a similar vein, the Court has been particularly sensitive to penalties
in the latter category. Not only were all groups of unrelated persons ineligible for
benefits, but even groups of related persons would lose their benefits if they admitted
one nonrelative to their household. We concluded that this definition did not further
the interest in preventing fraud, or any other legitimate purpose of the Food Stamp
Program.
Id. at 2730 n.3.
The Lyng Court purported not to retreat from the general holding of Moreno prohibiting
governmental action motivated to disadvantage unpopular groups. Indeed, the Court observed
that
The House Committee Report on the Food Stamp Act of 1977 made this reference
to the 1971 amendment invalidated in Moreno: "This proviso was essentially an
attempt to ban food stamp participation by communal households (so-called 'hippie
communes'). In 1973 the Supreme Court in Moreno v. U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 37 L. Ed.2d 782, upheld an earlier ruling by
a lower court to the effect that this provision was unconstitutional. It had been
implemented for only a brief period in a few states." H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, p. 140
(1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1977, p. 2110.
The 1971 definition was, therefore, "wholly without any rational basis" and "invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 413 U.S., at 538, 93 S.
Ct. 2821, 37 L. Ed.2d 782.
Id.
The amendments challenged in Lyng, by contrast, were not designed to politically
disadvantage weak or unpopular groups. Rather, the amendments, according to the Court,
promoted the beneficient purposes of the Food Stamp Program in a rational, orderly and
efficient manner.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice White, argued that Congress had presented
"no hard evidence" that distantly related or unrelated "persons living together were in fact
significant sources of fraud. . . ." Id. at 2734 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall further observed:
The food stamp benefits at issue are necessary for the affected families' very
survival, and the Federal Government denies that benefit to families who do not,
by preparing their meals together, structure themselves in a manner that the Gov-
ernment believes will minimize unnecessary expenditures. The importance of that
benefit belies any suggestion that the Government is not directly and substantially
influencing the living arrangements of families whose resources are so low that they
must rely on their relatives for shelter.
Id. at 2733.
The spirit of Moreno further was weakened by Lyng v. International Union, 108 S. Ct.
1184 (1988), which upheld "[a] 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act stat[ing] that no
household shall become eligible to participate in the food stamp program during the time that
any member of the household is on strike. . ." 108 S. Ct. at 1187. Noting that the amendment,
which was part of a series of cuts of the entire national budget, "would save a total of about
$165 million in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984," Justice White ruled that denying food
stamps to households harboring striking workers is rationally related to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes.
Id. at 1188, 1192.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, noted that, unlike
strikers, others who quit their jobs may continue to receive food stamps; therefore, the
challenged policy was not designed to promote the legitimate goal of encouraging the able to
work. Id. at 1196-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rather, the amendment was designed to
discourage workers from exercising their right to strike. Thus, Justice Marshall concluded, the
amendment contravenes the clear lesson of Moreno. Id. at 1198-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
-[Vol. 45:1
IRRATIONAL UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
imposed on groups who, through no fault of their own, are despised by
portions of society. For example, the Court has held that a state must
provide public education to children of illegal aliens to the same extent that
it provides education to the children of state citizens and resident aliens.
°4
As part of its rationale the Court held,
Legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his
children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of jus-
tice .... Legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
.responsibility or wrongdoing. ... It is ... difficult to conceive of
a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence
within the United States. 0
Not surprisingly, the foregoing considerations likewise play an integral
part of analysis addressing classifications predicated on legitimacy of birth.
In Levy v. Louisiana,'06 for example, the Court found no rational basis to
support a statute which prohibited an illegitimate child from suing over the
wrongful death of a parent. Noting first that illegitimates are "persons"
under the terms of the Equal Protection Clause, 0 7 Justice Douglas, speaking
for the Court, stated that since the situation under review involved "inti-
mate, familial relations between a child and his own mother," it was wholly
unclear "why, in terms of 'equal protection,' the tortfeasors should go free
merely because the child is illegitimate ... especially when the child is
nonetheless subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen .... -10
The Court fortified its distaste for the classification by adding that
"These children . . .were indeed hers [the mother's] in the biological and
in the spiritual sense. . . ."09 The mother nurtured the children who,
therefore, suffered when she died. "We conclude that it is invidious to
discriminate against them [illegitimates] when no action, conduct, or de-
meanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother." 10
Almost a decade later, relying on a similar rationale, the Court struck
down that portion of the Illinois probate code which permitted legitimate
children to inherit through intestacy from either parent, but which limited
an illegitimate's right to intestate inheritance from the mother's estate."'
Interestingly, the State attempted to justify the statute by characterizing it
as a progressive or remedial act. The law, Illinois argued, was designed "to
ameliorate the harsh common-law rule under which an illegitimate child was
104. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
105. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
106. 391 U.S. 68 (1968), reh. den., 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
107. Id. at 71.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 72.
110. Id. (footnotes omitted).
111. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763, 766 (1977).
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filius nullius and incapable of inheriting from anyone."" 2 To be sure, the
statute did partially achieve that goal, although it did not place illegitimates
on parity with the rights of legitimate children. Nevertheless, Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, ruled that the statute offended the judicially
established policy that:
a State may [not] attempt to influence the action of men or women
by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate
relationships ... (the parents may) conform their conduct to societal
norms, but their illegitimate children can affect neither their parents'
conduct nor their own status."
3
The Court reasoned that penalizing children is inconsistent with the
purported purpose of reforming the law of illegitimacy to render it just and
fair. "1
4
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"5 the Court struck as lacking rational basis a
Massachusetts statute which, inter alia, made it a criminal offense to
distribute contraceptive devices to unmarried persons except to prevent the
spread of disease." 6 One purported basis was to control fornication-sex
between unmarried persons. Even assuming, however, that the state had a
legitimate interest in limiting premarital sex, the Court noted too many
exceptions to link the offending statute to that goal. For instance, the state
112. Id. at 768. Illinois additionally contended that the limitation was designed to promote
family relationships-a contention the logic of which even the State's advocate could not
explain. Id.
113. Id. at 769-770. In Matthews v. Lucas, the Court observed, "... the legal status of
illegitimacy, however defined, is like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by
causes- rot within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. " Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 505 (1976) (emphasis added); accord, Reed v. Campbell, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 2237 n.5 (1986).
114. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770. The courts now apply the so-called "middle level" of
scrutiny to classifications predicated on legitimacy. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
As has been earlier discussed, one may cogently argue that "middle level" and "strict scrutiny"
are no more than convenient classifications which are actually forms of rationality analysis.
See supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
Although the general lessons of rationality analysis remain the same, they have been
applied with arguably inconsistent results-something that is prone to happen given the political
nature of judicial opinion making. For instance, Pickett invalidated Tennessee's two-year
statute of limitations "on paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain
illegitimate children." Pickett, 462 U.S. at 3. And, as discussed in the text, Trimble overturned
a statute which limited an illegitimate's intestate inheritance to the mother's estate. By contrast,
the court has upheld that portion of New York's intestate succession statute requiring that no
illegitimate child may inherit from the father's estate unless the paternity of the child was
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction during the father's lifetime. See Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
115. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
116. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440-443. While deprivation of access to contraception impli-
cates the fundamental right to privacy, the Court declined to apply the purportedly more
exacting "strict scrutiny" analysis because it perceived the statute to be devoid of rationality.
Id. at 447 n.7. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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placed no controls over access to contraception by unmarrieds to prevent
disease. Neither did the state attempt to control contraception used during
adultery committed between a married and a single person.1 7 Moreover,
the Court argued, fornication itself was classified by Massachusetts as a
misdemeanor, while violation of the contraception provision was a felony.
It is anomalous, the Court concluded, to think that the state truly sought
to control a misdemeanor by creating a new class of felonies." 8
The Court, therefore, implied that the statute was not designed to
promote legitimate ends, but rather, to punish copulating single individuals
by forcing them to run the risk that the female will become pregnant. One
might quibble whether the statute was really unrelated to promoting the
arguably legitimate goal of deterring premarital or extramarital sex. After
all, recalling that statutory classifications are necessarily imperfect and,
under rationality analysis, need not even be particularly well conceived, it
is possible that some unmarried individuals might forego sex because they
are neither clever nor persistent enough to obtain contraception. However,
recall that our definition of rationality weighs competing effects of statutes
to determine their societal worth. One senses, therefore, that the offending
enactment was irrational because of a hidden purpose sounding like, but
actually unrelated to, a legitimate state end. The statute did not, according
to the Court, actually deter sex between unmarried persons, nor was it
designed to. Rather, the statute was a harsh measure to extract an unrea-
sonable and irrational penalty from unmarried individuals who engage in
intercourse. We may reasonably interpret Eisenstadt v. Baird to mean,
therefore, that the classification's purported social utility-the handful of
single persons who do refrain from having sex-was overwhelmed by social
disutility-the number of resulting unwanted pregnancies coupled with the
vindictive and harsh manner with which the State attempted to control
sexual behavior.
A recent opinion accents the Court's distaste for statutory classifications
designed with no purpose better than to demean, humiliate and otherwise
disadvantage a politically unpopular group. Applying the rational basis
standard, an unanimous Court invalidated a zoning ordinance of Cleburne,
Texas requiring that proposed group homes for the mentally retarded obtain
a special use permit.1 9 Special permits were required exclusively to authorize
"[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug
addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."' 20
117. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448-449.
118. Id. at 449-450. In addition, the Court rejected the state's claims that the statute
protected the health of the citizenry. The Court held that discriminating between married and
unmarried persons regarding access to contraception did not address health problems which
were shared identically by both classes of people. Id. at 450-452. Finally, the Court held that
"viewed as a prohibition on contraception per se, [the statute] violates the rights of single
persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 443.
119. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
120. Id. at 436.
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The majority declined to apply equal protection scrutiny more height-
ened than rational basis, yet found the ordinance lacking sufficient ration-
ality to survive constitutional review.' 2' Specifically, the Court found that
121. Id. at 442-47. The Cleburne majority opinion has been subject to much analysis
regarding the rational basis standard it applied. For instance, Justice Marshall regarded the
majority's approach to be a form of heightened scrutiny clothed as rational basis. Id. at 458-
60 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice Stevens used the majority opinion as the point of departure
to renew his continued opposition to assigning challenged classification schemes purported
levels of scrutiny. Id. at 451-455 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Justice Stevens' supra
note 19, at 162-63; supra notes 30, 35 and accompanying text.
Lower courts have likewise noted that rational basis analysis under cases such as Cleburne
sounds more in concepts of middle level or strict scrutiny than in the traditional rational basis
framework. See, e.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986); Knutzen v.
Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1354 (10th Cir. 1987). Naturally, the
Cleburne opinion has inspired much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Note, 20 Loy. L.A. L.
Rav. 921 (1987); Note, Equal Protection, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 201 (1986-87).
As earlier documented, every purported level of equal protection scrutiny always devolves
into rational basis analysis. See supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text. To be sure, the
Court has addressed new issues and expanded concepts of rationality since the tiers of equal
protection analysis were first established. The interesting question, however, has always been
"why did the Court decide that X was rational and Y irrational" rather than "how many
levels of scrutiny can dance on the head of a pin?"
The Cleburne majority's determination to apply rationality analysis merits a brief word.
The Court identified four reasons explaining why as a matter of course, discrimination
predicated on mental impairment is not presumptively irrational. It is interesting to contrast
these arguments to strict scrutiny as applied to racial discrimination.
First, the Court noted, "it is undeniable, and it is not argued otherwise here, that those
who are mentally retarded have reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday
world .... They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States' interest
in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
442 (footnote omitted). In this regard, race and mental handicap are fundamentally different.
As the Cleburne majority analysis accents, however, reviewing classifications on the basis of
mental impairment under a rational basis test in no wise signals abdication of a court's duty
to carefully evaluate and consider the purposes and means-costs and benefits-imposed by
enforcement of the classification. As accented by subsequent judicial opinion, "the simple
articulation of a justification for a challenged classification does not conclude the judicial
inquiry." Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Cleburne and
Moreno). To the contrary, "the minimum rationality analysis calls upon the judge's personal
understanding of the needs of society." Deible v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 334
n.1 (3d Cir. 1986) (Ziegler, J.). Thus, fulfillment of the requirements of rational basis analysis
mandates a thorough and thoughtful review of the relevant purposes and effects of the
challenged action.
Secondly, the Court denied heightened scrutiny for the mentally handicapped because,
"lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy
or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 443. The existence of the Cleburne ordinance itself, and the extensive history of
discrimination against the mentally handicapped belie the simple premise that, in certain
instances, contemporary legislation evinces sensitivity to the plight of the mentally impaired.
Id. at 461-65 (Marshall, J.).
Moreover, the fact that law is less hostile to the classification than it once was seems
sparse reason to deny heightened scrutiny. Certainly, contemporary law is significantly more
friendly to blacks and other racial minorities than it was 100 or 25 years ago. Nevertheless, it
seems unlikely that the Court, therefore, would determine to lessen judicial scrutiny of racial
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"the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the
Featherston home would pose any threats to the city's legitimate interests
... [sufficient to justify the singular requisite for a special use] permit for
this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely
permitted" [.]22
The Court advanced several reasons underlying its holding.'2 Of par-
ticular concern to the inquiry of this article is the fist and primary standard:
unfounded prejudice and distaste are not constitutionally valid reasons to
impose disparate or special requisites upon a given group or individual. The
Court addressed the question in clear and unequivocal terms:
First, the [City] Council was concerned with the negative attitude
of the majority of property owners located within 200 feet of the
Featherston facility, as well as the fears of elderly residents of the
neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated
by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding,
classifications. The reason is obvious. While a history of discrimination is an index signaling
the need for protection, the underlying question in any equal protection case is whether the
particular classification as applied in the given case is rational. See id. at 452-455 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Racial classifications, as logic and experience teach, are rarely fair, thus, rarely
rational. By contrast, certain classifications based on mental impairment may be rational more
often.
Third, the Court opined that the existence of legislation protecting the mentally handi-
capped "negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense
that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers." Id. at 445. The response
to the Court's third argument is identical to that of the second argument. Surely, blacks and
other racial minorities enjoy greater political power than do the mentally impaired; yet, the
Court should not retreat from applying strict scrutiny. Again, the reason is political power vel
non offers clues regarding the rationality of classifications, but it does not provide a sufficient
basis alone to draw a legal conclusion whether an action is rational.
Finally, the Court revived the floodgate concern:
If the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect
... it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.
Id. at 445.
The Court is absolutely right. There is no "principled way to distinguish a variety of
other groups who have perhaps immutable" [and, I would add mutable] characteristics which
have subjected them to a demeaned and debilitated social status. As quasi-suspectness is
rational basis analysis, see supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text, there is no "principled
way to distinguish" between the irrational treatment accorded many groups. That is precisely
the thesis of this article. The answer, however, is not to turn a blind eye to the plight of such
groups. Rather, using rational basis analysis, all such classifications must be carefully scrutinized
and, if necessary, invalidated to restore lost dignity and freedom.
122. Id. at 448.
123. Id. at 448-49. The Court quickly rejected two proposed justifications. The City
asserted that the home would be located on "a five hundred year flood plain." Additionally,
the City expressed concern over the size of the home and the number of occupants. These
concerns, however, did not explain why other types of dwellings in the same area involving
possible multiple occupancy were not required to obtain a special use permit. Id. at 449.
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are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings and
the like. It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by
referendum or otherwise, could not order city action violative of
the Equal Protection Clause .. . and the city may not avoid the
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of
some faction of the body politic. "Private biases may be outside
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).12
Similarly, rejecting the City's justification that local high-school students
might harass the occupants of the home, the Court replied, "But, the school
itself is attended by about 30 mentally retarded students, and denying a
permit based on such vague, undifferentiated fears is again permitting some
portion of the community to validate what would otherwise be an equal
protection violation. "n Thus, echoing, although not directly citing, Moreno,
Eisenstadt, Plyler, Levy and Trimble, the Court held that bald fear, prej-
udice, traditional distaste and unsubstantiated stereotypical beliefs are not
cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause as rational bases upon which
to substantiate governmental action.
The cases involving a state's attempt to take disparate actions against
unpopular or innocent groups enrich our notions of rationality. First, these
cases, particularly Trimble, reaffirm that rationality analysis is a function
of balancing competing concepts and interests. In Trimble, the statutory
goal to modify the harsh effects of the prior intestate succession law was
legitimate and the provision in question indisputably furthered the legitimate
purpose. Yet, the harm it inflicted against innocent illegitimate offspring
was intolerable. Secondly, the Court has recognized the injustice of penal-
izing individuals because of characteristics over which they have little or no
control. Society has little right to debase and demean illegitimates, children
of illegal aliens, the mentally impaired, and others who, through no fault
of their own, are made to suffer the stamp of social stigma. Thus, rationality
analysis takes an active role in defining social perceptions or, at least, in
reordering the way social perceptions may be acted upon.
However, as the food stamp and contraception cases show, the consti-
tutional inquiry is not limited to immutable or difficult-to-alter character-
istics-that is, characteristics either beyond the control of the individual
such as race, gender or illegitimacy of birth or which cannot be changed
without great cost or difficulty.126 Clearly, premarital sex is mutable because
124. Id. at 448 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
125. Id. at 449 (citation omitted, emphasis added). See Minow, When Difference Has Its
Home: Group Homes For The Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of
Difference, 22 HARv. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 111 (1987) (thorough discussion of Cleburne).
126. Many courts have argued that discrimination cannot occur when classifications are
predicated on mutable characteristics. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (employer does not violate the Fair Employment
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individuals may choose to forego that pleasure. Similarly, adopting the
"hippie" lifestyle is mutable, reflecting individuals' personal choices re-
garding how to live and what to believe. Thus, the foregoing opinions
recognize that constitutional protections are designed to foster and encourage
diversity. Differences in attitudes, appearances, lifestyles, and perspectives
are not simply enriching, but are integral to any society predicated on
promoting the optimal fulfillment of each individual's sense of self, dignity
and individuality. The characteristics a person embraces to assume a par-
ticular identity in society surely are not limited to immutable traits such as
race, sex or status of birth. Indeed, our personalities and identities are
based on a host of choices involving mutable-easily changed-character-
istics. Political persuasions, modes of entertainment, taste in decor, clothes
and personal appearance are integral aspects establishing our singular iden-
tities both as individuals and as components of a variety of groups,
organizations and structures. Rationality analysis, joining judicial review
under the Bill of Rights, particularly under the First Amendment, stands
as a primary tool to prevent the suppression of the identities, dignity and
individuality of social actors.
Furthermore, consistent with the foregoing, the Court, particularly in
Cleburne and Moreno, flatly rejected recourse to fear, prejudice and political
unpopularity as legitimate bases to disadvantage groups of individuals.
Simple concepts of fairness counsel that the protections accorded by due
process and equal protection of the laws become meaningless if the political
system may freely condemn the weak, helpless or politically ostracized
Act of 1964's proscription against gender based discrimination by refusing to hire long haired
male applicants yet making no similar restrictions against females). But see Carroll v. Talman
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929
(1980) (employer violates Fair Employment Act by requiring female employees to wear a
prescribed wardrobe while permitting male employees much greater discretion regarding attire).
The distinction between mutable and immutable characteristics, although widely followed
by the courts, is spurious. See, e.g., Bayer, The Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII
and the Problem of Mutable Characteristics, 20 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv. 769 (1987). Consider,
for example, a hypothetical case offered by Prof. Laurence Tribe: suppose a clever scientist
perfects a completely safe concoction which turns black persons' skin white and back again
at will. Suppose, further, that an employer says to black applicants that he will not hire blacks
unless they agree to turn white during working hours. As Prof. Tribe intuits, it seems
inconceivable that a court would find no unlawful racial discrimination if the employer rejected
black applicants who proudly refused to alter their skin color even temporarily. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073-74
n.52 (1980).
Racial discrimination, under the foregoing hypothetical, is no longer immutable. In fact
it is extremely mutable. But, what have not changed are those moral considerations which
premise the true reasons why racial discrimination is reprehensible. Racial discrimination
offends discriminatees' sense of self and personal identity. Similarly, it insults the history and
heritage associated with the racial class. Indeed, the debasing of the individual, through denial
of some opportunity, is purely vindictive, for race has nothing to do with the actual ability
of the applicant to perform a job.
Thus we see that appealing to the immutability of characteristics offers no logical or
moral basis to discern rational from irrational discrimination.
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elements to suffer disadvantageous treatment for reasons no better than the
very helplessness which give rise to that disparate treatment. Vindictiveness,
insensitivity and stereotyped assumptions are not good enough to justify
governmental action, even if supported by a majority of the electorate.
27
127. It cannot be said that the constitutional command of fairness has been flawlessly
applied. A recent opinion underscores this point. Although dealing with the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than equal protection, the decision implicates basic
notions of fairness, dignity and rationality. Thus, it should be mentioned in this article.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court held that the Constitution's guarantee of privacy does
not invalidate state criminalization of privately performed acts of homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Justice White, speaking for
the majority, stated that homosexual sodomy is not among those "fundamental liberties that
are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [they] were sacrificed."' Id. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-
26 (1937)). In support of his conclusion, Justice White noted the history of the criminalization
of homosexual acts from the statutes of Henry III to date. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844-2846.
Refusing "to discover new fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause,"
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846, the majority rejected analogizing private homosexual conduct to
the private possession of otherwise unlawful obscene materials permitted in Stanley. See Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court ruled that Stanley's holding was predicated on
the First Amendment while the proposed "right pressed upon us here has no similar support
in the text of the Constitution .. " Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The Court asserted further
that applying the privacy concepts of Stanley would remove any principled basis to uphold
state laws prohibiting "adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed
in the home." Id.
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that a law banning homosexual conduct has
no rational basis:
• * . respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there
is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate
in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to
be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based
on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.
Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about.
the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and
are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on
this basis. Id. (footnote omitted).
Writing with humanity and sensitivity, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Justice Blackmun opened his opinion by attacking the
definition of privacy which premised the majority opinion:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at 2844, than Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed.2d 542 (1969), was about a fundamental
right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct.
507, 19 L. Ed.2d 576 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets
from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the right to be let
alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.
Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun noted that previously recognized privacy rights are part of a larger
constitutional fabric. Protections addressing the right to marry, procreate and raise a family
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Writing in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 128 Justice Jackson
expressed the foregoing this way:
emanate from the broad premise that:
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an
individual's life. "[T]he concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a person
belong to himself and not to others nor to society as a whole."
Id. at 2851 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. and Gyn.). See Thornburgh,
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Thus, privacy rights are recognized because they:
so dramatically alter an individual's self-definition ... contribute[] so powerfully to
happiness of ihdividuals... [and because] the "ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a
vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment of close ties with others."
Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
With the foregoing as his backdrop, Justice Blackmun next emphasized that "Only the
most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship
of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2151 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 63 (1973) (emphasis added)).
Concluding his line of reasoning, Justice Blackmun spoke of a constitution and a nation
enriched by diversity and strengthened by tolerance, if not appreciation, for such diversity:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours,
that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that
much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual
has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds....
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of
giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the
fact that different individuals will make different choices.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (emphasis supplied).
Justice Blackmun additionally disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Stanley v.
Georgia, which, Justice Blackmun argued, was predicated firmly on the general constitutional
guarantee of privacy, particularly the security of the home. Id. at 2852-53. See infra notes
324-30 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's opinion in Stanley).
The Blackmun dissent devastates the static and intolerant majority opinion. Neither the
historical persistence of statutes outlawing homosexual conduct nor the distaste certain segments
of the population may have for the practice are sufficient bases to determine whether the right
to privacy attaches. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2854-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rather, as
Justice Blackmun demonstrated, the relevant inquiries are whether the State has limited a
mode of expression integral to an individual's self-conception, autonomy and dignity, and, if
so, whether the state has demonstrated sufficient justification to sustain the restriction.
The discussion of rationality herein shows that the Constitution promotes personal freedom
and dignity by protecting individual expressions of self-identity even if politically unpopular
and divergent from the mainstream. Privately performed homosexual acts between consenting
adults constitutes such expression. The conclusory analysis of the majority opinion-premised
almost entirely on the history of intolerance without discussing the merits thereof-stands as
its own worst critic, demonstrating the intellectual dishonesty and cruel conservatism of the
majority holding.
For example, contrary to the assertions of the majority, it seems clear that according
protection to homosexual acts between adults hardly precludes the criminalization of "...
incest and other sexual crimes ... committed in the home." Id. at 2848. Surely, the right to
privacy can accommodate consensual sexual acts between adults without protecting rape, incest
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"The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal
in operation.'
' 29
3. Governmental Action May Be Unlawful If It Creates Or Threatens
To Create A Caste System
The discussion of "rationality" ends by reviewing Supreme Court
opinions which reaffirm and revitalize the developing conceptions defining
when legislative actions are rational. The pivotal case, Zobel v. Williams,13
0
has previously been mentioned in footnotes to this work. To wisely use the
unexpected windfall of profits the State of Alaska earned from the sale of
minerals, a state constitutional amendment mandated that 25% of the annual
income from minerals sales be placed in a permanent fund the principal of
which could not be touched. The earnings generated from the principle,
however, could be spent for general governmental purposes.
3'
In 1980, the Alaska legislature enacted a dividend program allotting
annual monetary distributions from the earnings of the fund directly to
adult residents of the State. Residents received one dividend share-the
value of which was legislatively established on an annual basis-for each
year of their residency retroactive to 1959, the year of statehood. 32 For
instance, a person who had resided in Alaska since 1959 would receive
twenty more dividend shares than a person whose residency commenced in
and other acts perpetuated against either unwilling others or those too young to make an
informed choice to engage in sexual conduct. The very lack of substance and depth of the
majority rationale encourages the fulfillment of Justice Blackmun's closing observation:
I can only hope that ... the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude
that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in
our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.
Id. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
129. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Although Justice Jackson's analysis concerned administrative regulations, it has
been applied in the very equal protection context discussed herein. See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
130. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See supra notes 65, 70.
131. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 56-58.
132. Id. at 57.
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1979. Constitutional challenge was not brought against the entire design to
link dividends to length of residency. Instead, the attack centered on the
provisions allowing qualified residents to collect dividends from the year of
the statutory enactment in 1980 retroactive to 1959 which was a two decade
windfall.
133
Although the residency provisions implicated infringement of the fun-
damental "right to travel," and therefore suggested the use of "strict
scrutiny analysis," the Court refrained from interpreting that fundamental
right, finding instead that the statutory classification lacked rational basis.
134
The State espoused three justifications for the classification. First, the
scheme was designed to encourage the establishment and maintenance of
residency in Alaska. Secondly, the scheme was drafted to promote prudent
management of the fund. Finally, the classification served to convey the
State's gratitude to long-time residents for their various contributions both
tangible and intangible.
135
The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, quickly brushed
aside the first two justifications arguing that the retroactive award of
dividends bore no real relationship either to encourage residency or to
promote prudent management of the fund. 136 Turning to the final justifi-
cation, the Chief Justice agreed that the classification advanced the attain-
ment of the goal; however, the goal was impermissible and irrational.1
37
Precedent clearly established that a state may not link the apportionment
of services or the distribution of largess to either previous tax payments or
the intangible contributions made by residents.138 As explained by the Court:
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on
length of residence, what would preclude varying university tuition
on a sliding scale based on years of residence or even limiting access
to finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil service
jobs, or for government contracts by length of domicile? Could
states impose different taxes based on length of residence? Alaska's
reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of other
rights, benefits, and services according to length of residence(l 1).
133. Id. at 59.
134. Id. at 60. Justice O'Connor concurred on the grounds that the classification infringed
upon the fundamental "right to travel." Id. at 71-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 61.
136. Id. at 61-62 & n.9. Arguably, the Court was hasty in holding that the classification
bore no relationship to maintaining residency. One might imagine disgruntled long-time residents
who postpone their plans to move to warmer climes because of the large number of dividends
they receive. As described in the text below, however, one may interpret the court's decision
to hold that any arguable rationality in this regard is dwarfed by the enormity of the irrationality
of the classification viewed in light of its threat to create caste systems among the residents
of Alaska.
137. Id. at 63.
138. Id. (citing Shapiro and Vlandis). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-633
(1969); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 449-450 (1973).
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It would permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers
of permanent classes.(12) Such a result would be clearly impermis-
sible.
11. Apportionment would thus be prohibited only when it involves
"fundamental rights" and services deemed to involve "basic neces-
sities of life." See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. at 259, 39 L. Ed.2d 306, 94 S. Ct. 1076.
12. "Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord
and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it."
Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492, 12 L. Ed. 702 (1849) (Taney,
C.J., dissenting).'39
Justice Brennan, along with Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Powell,
joined the Chief Justice's opinion, but wrote separately to explicate the
majority's rationale. 140 Justice Brennan accented that under the "idea of
constitutionality protected equality" a state may not discriminate "against
the recently naturalized citizen in favor of the Alaskan citizen of longer
duration."' 41 Specifically, since the dole of funds is unavailable to minors,
a resident may be penalized because of age. The statute "discriminates
against the eighteen year old native resident, in favor of all residents of
longer duration."'
' 42
The fourteenth amendment confers equal protection of the laws to
persons within the jurisdiction of a state regardless of the amount of time
they have so resided. Sometimes incidents of citizenship may be reasonably
linked to duration of residence. For instance, a state may require a certain
minimum duration before conferring citizenship or allowing persons to run
for public office. 43 Such instances of discrimination based on length of
residency are "rational as they are supported by a valid state interest
independent of the discrimination itself.' 44
Joining the rationale of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan con-
cluded:
In effect, then, the past-contribution rationale is so far-reaching in
its potential application, and the relationship between residence and
contribution to the State so vague and insupportable, that it amounts
to little more than a restatement of the criterion for discrimination
139. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64 and n.l1-12 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 65-66 (Brennan, J., concurring). The concurring justices also agreed with
Justice O'Connor that the "right to travel" provided an independent basis upon which to
invalidate the statute. Id. at 66. Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist dissented alone. Id. at
81-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 68-69 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 69 (Brennan, J., concurring).




that it purports to justify. But while duration of residence has
minimal utility as a measure of things that are, in fact, constitu-
tionally relevant, resort to duration of residence as the basis for a
distribution of state largess does closely track the constitutionally
untenable position that the longer one's residence, the worthier one
is of the State's favor. In my view, it is difficult to escape from
the recognition that underlying any scheme of classification on the
basis of duration of residence, we shall almost invariably find the
unstated premise that "some citizens are more equal than others."
We rejected that premise and, I believe, implicitly rejected most
forms of discrimination based upon length of residence when we
adopted the Equal Protection Clause.
45
Three terms later, Chief Justice Burger applied the rationale of Zobel
to invalidate a New Mexico statute which bestowed a $2,000 property tax
exemption on veterans of the Vietnam War if they had been residents of
the state prior to May 8, 1976.46'
Speaking for the majority, the Chief Justice rejected the state's two
averred rational bases to support a tax preference discriminating between
classes of Vietnam vete:ans. The state could not rationally assert that a
purpose of the tax scheme was to encourage veterans to settle in New
Mexico when the statutory eligibility date of May 1976 was enacted seven
years later in 1983.147 It is hardly controversial to argue that a state cannot
in 1983 attempt to encourage migration prior to June 1976.
Next, the Chief Justice acknowledged that while governmental prefer-
ences for veterans may be legitimate, there was no legitimate basis for New
Mexico to discriminate between classes of Vietnam veterans:
Appellee and the State's evaluation of this legislative judgment may
be questioned on its own terms. Those who serve in the military
during wartime inevitably have their lives disrupted; but it is difficult
to grasp how New Mexico residents serving in the military suffered
more than residents of other States who served, so that the latter
would not deserve the benefits a State bestows for national military
service. Moreover, the legislature provided this economic boon years
after the dislocation occurred. Established state residents, by this
time, presumably had become resettled in the community and the
modest tax exemption hardly bears directly on the transition to
civilian life long after the war's end. Finally, the benefit of the tax
exemption continues for the recipient's life. The annual exemption,
which will benefit this limited group of resident veterans long after
145. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). A similar sentiment, expressed by Justice Jackson, was
discussed in the previous section of this work dealing with classifications which harm powerless
groups. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
146. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 622-23 (1985).
147. Id. at 618-619.
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the wartime disruption dissipated, is a continuing bounty for one
group of residents rather than simply an attempt to ease the veteran's
return to civilian life.
48
Citing Zobel, Burger concluded:
The State may not favor established residents over new residents
based on the view that the State may take care of "its own," if
such is defined by prior residence. Newcomers, by establishing bona
fide residence in the State, become the State's "own" and may not
be discriminated against solely on the basis of their arrival in the
state after May 8, 1976.149
The links of Zobel and Hooper to our definition of rationality are
clear. As Justice Brennan accented in Zobel, creating classes for the sake
of creating classes threatens to impair the sense of individuality, dignity and
self-worth implicated by the equal protection components of the Constitu-
tion. The creation of such classes forces the individual to alter chosen
behavior or forgo state largess, if indeed the classification even affords the
individual the opportunity to deliberately plan in advance whether or not
to perform certain acts or accept state services.
Moreover, as the Chief Justice's Zobel opinion clarified, the ability to
legislate classes is the ability to greatly control behavior. Societal resources,
rewards, and detriments are dispensed through governmental classifications,
thus the power to discriminate must be wielded carefully, permitting only
classes clearly linked to legitimate state ends. As the Chief Justice empha-
sized, irrational classifications, if unchecked, threaten to spread, possibly
covering the entire panoply of state services and jeopardizing all but the
most fundamental civil rights.
Chief Justice Burger's rationale in Hooper identified an additional and
related consideration underlying the rationality, or lack thereof, of govern-
148. Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 623 (citations omitted). During the following term, the Court similarly struck
as unconstitutional New York's civil service employment preference for resident veterans limited
to those who entered the service after commencing residency in New York. See Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317 (1986). A plurality, per Justice Brennan,
held that the preference infringed upon the fundamental right to travel. Under a heightened
scrutiny standard, the state failed to demonstrate that its purposes for enacting the preference
could not be served as well without discriminating among classes of veterans on the basis of
date of initial residency in the state. Id. at 2320-24. Justice Brennan reasoned:
All four justifications fail to withstand heightened scrutiny on a common
ground-each of the State's asserted interests could be promoted fully by granting
bonus points to all otherwise qualified veterans. New York residents would still be
encouraged to join the services. Veterans who served in time of war would be
compensated. And, both former New Yorkers and prior residents of other States
would be drawn to New York after serving the Nation, thus providing the State
with an even larger pool of potentially valuable public servants.
Id. at 2324 (emphasis supplied). Chief Justice Burger, providing the fifth vote, found the
preference invalid pursuant to Zobel and Hooper. Id. at 2323-28.
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mental action. The Court could not discern a legitimate purpose in rewarding
only those Vietnam veterans who established State residency on or before
May 8, 1976. As the Chief Justice observed, "Those who serve in the
military during wartime inevitably have their lives disrupted; but it is difficult
to grasp how New Mexico residents serving in the military suffered more
than residents of other states who served, so that the latter would not
deserve the benefits a state bestows for national military service." 150 By
singling out veterans who had resided in New Mexico, the State, either
deliberately or inadvertently, insulted, belittled, demeaned and economically
disadvantaged similarly situated veterans not on the basis of their military
records or some reasonable measure related to their status as veterans, but
rather, because they happened to have resided elsewhere prior to May 8,
1976. The societal cost/benefit analysis linked with rationality analysis
revealed, according to the Court, that the date of residency has nothing
legitimate to do with expressing gratitude and extending aid to those who
fought and served for an entire nation, not for a particular state:-
It is similarly noteworthy that the classifications in Zobel and Hooper
were not drafted for invidious purposes. The Court's opinions do not
intimate that the Alaska and New Mexico legislatures deliberately sought to
create hostile and conflicting castes in society. Nevertheless, the disparate
effects and potential disparate effects overshadowed any arguable benefits
arising from the statutory scheme.
5'
Zobel and Hooper, then, reaffirm that the constitutional guarantee
against irrational governmental action requires the state to demonstrate with
clarity the utility of its classifications. Any discrimination which appears to
create a caste or disadvantaged group in society with regard to the receipt
not only of fundamental rights but also of state largess, will be reviewed
most carefully.
To summarize, the analysis in Section II has shown that the definition
of "rationality" and ideas and concepts derived therefrom have been put
into operation by a series of expanding. judicial precedents. Rationality is
measured by comparing classifications in relationships to the goals promoted
and effects engendered. This cost-benefit calculus is energized not so much
by economic constructs, but by a sense of right and wrong-by political
and moral ideology.
We have seen further that Supreme Court opinions yield a strong body
of law illustrating and guiding our investigations concerning new questions
about the rationality of discrete governmental actions. The cases encourage
us to uncover irrationality wherever it may be. All the opinions demonstrate
a judicial intolerance for governmental classifications which demean, harm,
humiliate, or debase individuals.
150. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 621.
151. Zobel and Hooper, arguably, are examples of disparate impact analysis applied under
the rational basis standard. See supra note 61.
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We now have the analytical tools to evaluate the coverage of modern
civil rights enactments. In so doing, we must be mindful of one astute
commentator's observations regarding rationality analysis:
In the end, the rationality requirement cannot be judged against
some a priori standard of "democracy" or "law." It must be
judged largely by the uses to which it is put, and the success with
which it is put to those uses.
5 2
III. THE IRRATIONAL UNDERINCLUSIVENESS OF CIvIl RIGHTS STATUTES
A. A General Introduction
Section II developed a detailed set of propositions defining and expli-
cating the concept of "rationality" as applied in equal protection analysis.
That discussion provided perceptions and viewpoints with which to assess
the operations of statutes designed to identify, describe, protect, and enforce
a variety of civil rights. Using the definition of "rationality" as our guide,
this article argues that such statutes are irrational in their decidedly limited
coverage. Rather than according civil rights protection to all individuals
under all applicable circumstances, the statutes protect limited groups of
individuals.
Although limited, the coverage of many laws addresses several of the
most serious and most widespread types of civil rights deprivations. Thus,
this writing in no manner calls for a retreat from existing civil rights
programs. To the contrary, this work concludes that existing civil rights
laws are only the first step. To be rational under our constitutional defi-
nition, however, the statutes must be redrafted to meet their true promise
and potential-the protection of every individual from arbitrary and unrea-
sonable deprivations of civil rights by private as well as public offenders.
Only then will our civil rights laws obey the commands of the rationality
analysis under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, for not until then will
individual integrity, personal dignity, and selfhood be protected to the
fullest.
Reviewing the underlying ideology of civil rights laws, one is immediately
struck by the similar perspective such statutes share with the rationality
analysis. These shared characteristics, of course, are hardly surprising given
that civil rights law, no less than equal protection and due process, concern
protecting basic personal freedom, individuality and economic integrity from
the onslaught of unreasonable governmental or interest group intrusions.
First and foremost, civil rights statutes are drafted to protect individual
dignity. Fairness and preservation of personal integrity are the hallmark of
civil rights laws. For instance, in a pivotal case upholding the constitution-
152. Bennett, supra note 16, at 1099.
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ality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 3 the provision prohibiting
racial discrimination in access to public accommodations, the Supreme Court
observed that the statute was designed to "vindicate the deprivation of
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments."1
54
Similarly, the courts have held that an underlying purpose of the Fair
Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15- is the
eradication of useless stereotypes which serve no purposes better than
degrading persons and depriving them of employment opportunities for
reasons unrelated to their actual abilities to work. As the Supreme Court
observed, for instance,
. the question of fairness to various classes affected by the statute
is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address.
CongreSs has decided that classifications based on sex, like those
based on national origin or race, are unlawful.
15 6
Identically, writing for a unanimous Court that Title VII prohibits
sexual harassment, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[There is] a substantial
body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discrim-
inatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 157 And, addressing the right to
purchase property free from racial discrimination, the Supreme Court held:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white
man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means
at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise
the Nation cannot keep.
158
As the foregoing excerpts, reflecting as well the sentiments of a huge
host of similar precedents, indicate, legislatures may use their powers to
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
154. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting Senate Report
No. 872 at 16-17). Justice Goldberg, likewise citing the Senate Report, echoed that "[t]he
primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, as the Court recognizes ... is the
vindication of human dignity and not mere economics." Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring,
emphasis added).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eet seq., as amended.
156. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
157. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986). Quoting the Eleventh
Circuit, the Court added, "Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets." Id. at 2406 (quoting Henson
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
158. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968). Accord, City of Memphis
v. Green, 451 U.S. 100, 121 n.32 (1981).
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legislate against moral wrongs in society. 159 Civil rights statutes, then, are
different from other legislation in one significant respect: civil rights laws
address areas-projects-uniquely important to personal autonomy and
dignity. Statutes covering the ability to form contracts, to acquire and use
property, to compete for employment and housing, and to enjoy public
accommodations concern basic elements of social intercourse. Individuals
who are unable to perform these projects cannot achieve freedom and
autonomy. Looked at from a slightly different perspective, contemporary
civil rights enactments represent the legislatively determined minimum quality
of life that must be accorded to individuals, not because such individuals
necessarily have earned the protection, but because respect for human
decency demands such protection. Certainly, the same observation may be
made regarding judicial opinions striking down legislation which violates
due process and equal protection of the law. This is hardly surprising
because both civil rights statutes and rationality analysis focus on the quest
for fairness and decency in American society.
B. Underinclusiveness and Incrementalism
Before proceeding with a detailed explication of the nature of civil
rights statutes, some additional threshold considerations should be ad-
dressed. As noted earlier, this article argues that civil rights statutes are
unconstitutionally underinclusive. Rotunda, Nowak and Young assert that
"[a]n under-inclusive classification contains all similarly situated people but
excludes some people who are similar to them in terms of the purpose of
the law."'6 Professor Tribe argues that "underinclusive classifications do
not include all who are similarly situated with respect to a rule, and thereby
burden less than would be logical to achieve the intended government
end."'1 6' We have seen, however, another species of underinclusiveness: a
classification may be unconstitutionally underinclusive if omitting similarly
situated others from coverage is not integral to attainment of legitimate
governmental ends and if such omissions unduly demean, humiliate or
otherwise disadvantage the excluded individuals. This type of underinclu-
siveness withholds benefits from deserving, similarly situated others rather
than withholding burdens as in Professor Tribe's formulation.
159. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). Certainly, civil
rights statutes are motivated by considerations other than sociology and morality. Politicians
may feel pressured by various interests groups to support such laws. The fear of losing a
constituency and bowing to political expediency may prompt otherwise recalcitrant law makers
to propose and enact progressive civil rights measures. Partisan politics and other selfish
interests, then, may play strong roles in the conception, birth and growth of civil rights laws.
Nevertheless, even the most cursory review of legislative history reveals that legislative
desire to promote fairness, alleviate injustice and improve society have been prime motivating
factors for civil rights legislation. It is not quixotic, therefore, to accent the moral and social
imperatives underlying civil rights laws.
160. ROTUNDA, NowAK AND YOUNG, 2 CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 18.2 at 320 (1986).
161. TRiNE, supra note 17, at 997.
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Certainly, it is well established that "[s]tates are accorded wide latitude
in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and
rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical
exactitude,' ' 6 2 and that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity
of the law."' 63 Indeed, it is commonly accepted that all classifications, to
some degree, are imperfect. Nevertheless, it is equally true that a given
classification may be so imperfect that it is fatally flawed. Such determi-
nations, of course, are judicial.'64
The discussion of rationality analysis revealed several cases exemplifying
the third type of fatally flawed underinclusiveness-where the exclusion,
although promoting legitimate state ends, irrationally demeans and disad-
vantages similarly situated others. In Trimble v. Gordon,165 the statute
prohibiting illegitimates from inheriting from the fathers' estates ameliorated
the common law rule forbidding any form of intestate inheritance in favor
of illegitimates. Regardless, the statute was infirm, for denying illegitimates
the right to inherit from their fathers served no valid state purpose. To the
contrary, the limitation demeaned and economically harmed persons who
were innocent of any wrongdoing. The statute then had to be reformed to
expunge the irrationality.
Similarly, the limited classifications in Zobel v. Williams'6 and Hooper
v. Bernalillo County Assessor'67 were struck because of their propensity to
create useless caste systems. By allotting a monetary windfall to citizens
solely on the basis of the date they established residency, Alaska and New
Mexico arbitrarily withheld benefits from individuals who, the Court dis-
cerned, should have been covered to promote the legitimate goals of the
particular program. The property tax abatement to Vietnam veterans in
Hooper exemplifies the irrationality of the "date of residence" classification.
As the Court noted, the purposes of the tax preference-to express gratitude
to those who served in the armed forces during the Vietnam War and to
help their readjustment to civilian life-could be advanced by according the
preference to all Vietnam veterans who reside in New Mexico regardless of
the commencement date of residence. By limiting the preference only to
those veterans who had been residents as of May 8, 1976, the State impliedly
asserted that long-term residents of New Mexico who served in Vietnam
were more worthy of largess than veterans who had recently moved to the
State. This unduly insulted, degraded and economically disadvantaged ve-
terans who had been New Mexicans in mid-1976.16 The statute had to be
reformed either to cover all Vietnam veterans or none at all.
162. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
163. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977).
164. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 997; RoTuNDA, supra note 160, at 321.
165. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing
Trimble).
166. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text (discussing Zobel).
167. 472 U.S. 612 (1985). See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
168. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985).
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
Along identical lines, this article calls for a judicial determination that
similarly situated others-people suffering irrational discrimination concern-
ing certain social projects-are wrongfully excluded from statutory protec-
tion. As will be demonstrated below, there is no rational basis to protect
certain classes from arbitrary discrimination in areas such as employment
and housing, while withholding protection from those who are treated
equally irrationally but on the basis of classifications different from those
set forth in the statutes as unlawful. As such, the statutes must be reformed.
Either the statutes must be struck, which would serve no good cause at all,
or the statutes must be extended to cover all forms of irrational discrimi-
nation.
A related threshold point helps set the stage for our detailed consider-
ation of civil rights statutes. It is beyond dispute in constitutional jurispru-
dence that Congress and other legislative bodies enjoy broad discretionary
power to determine the scope and extent of appropriate legislation. 69 The
usual rule holds that legislatures may deal with a perceived problem or
project in its entirety or in such incremental steps as the legislature sees fit.
... [I]n deciding ... [questions of] constitutional propriety ...
we are guided by the familiar principles that a "statute is not invalid
under the Constitution because it might have gone further than it
did," Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339.... that a legislature
need not "strike at all evils at the same time," Semler v. Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 and that "reform may take one step
at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 4831 489.170
Nevertheless, constitutional jurisprudence has clarified in equally explicit
terms the common sense concept that legislatures cannot act beyond their
powers as limited by the Constitution.' 71 Lawmakers do not have the power
"to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the protections accorded to individuals
under the Constitution. 72 Therefore, even Congress' presumed authority to
legislate in a piecemeal fashion is tempered by the overriding constitutional
command that legislative acts must be at least minimally rational.
Most enactments concern legislative projects not directly related to
individual civil rights. As such, the primary concerns of civil rights protec-
tion-personal dignity, individuality and the appropriate social autonomy
169. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
170. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-657 (1966); accord, New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1976) (per curiam); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 590
(1982).
171. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964); see generally TRiNE, AmmRIcAN CoNsnTUnoNAL LAW §§ 5-1, -2, -3
(1978).




of the person-are not implicated if the particular legislative scheme fails
to provide complete coverage. By contrast, civil rights laws express contem-
porary standards of the basic dignity to be accorded to each person. In this
regard, civil rights laws occupy a special niche in the United States Code.
The usual prerogative to legislate piecemeal does not apply when the
legislation promotes and protects those rights without which individuals
cannot fully function in American society.
Trimble v. Gordon, 7 3 wherein the Court invalidated so much of Illinois'
probate code which allowed legitimate children to inherit through intestacy
from either parent but limited intestate inheritances of illegitimates to the
mother's estate, again provides an example. The Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, acknowledged that the statute in question was designed to
reform the common-law rule which forbade illegitimates from intestate
inheritance from either parent. Thus the statute was something of a refor-
mation addressing one portion of a serious social injustice. 74 The legisla-
ture's presumed power to enact piecemeal laws, however, did not save the
Illinois statute which irrationally penalized illegitimate children by prohib-
iting them from inheriting from their fathers.
7 5
Identically, the Court struck New Mexico's Property Tax Preference
benefiting only those Vietnam veterans who were residents of the state as
of May 1976.176 The state could not have salvaged the classification by
asserting that it had decided to address the needs of resident Vietnam
veterans incrementally, first by benefiting those who were long term residents
and, perhaps later, legislating in favor of the remaining veterans. Rather,
the "commencement of residence" classification was so irrational-the
burdens so outweighed the benefits-that the accustomed power to legislate
piecemeal was inapplicable.
Thus, the latitude generally accorded legislatures as they address the
complex, perplexing problems of the day is limited by the strictures of the
Constitution, prominent among which is the requirement that governmental
actions be rational. Clearly, then, a statute is not rational because Congress
may legislate in increments; rather, Congress may legislate incrementally if
it does so rationally.
173. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
174. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977).
175. Id. at 768-770. Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court, overturning Massachusetts'
statutory prohibition limiting access to contraception by unmarried persons, accented that the
serious gaps in statutory coverage demonstrated that the discrimination against unmarried
persons was unrelated to legitimate governmental purposes. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
The Eisenstadt Court apparently did not regard the gaps as reflecting a legitimate use of the
state's power to address a social problem in a step-by-step fashion. Rather, the incomplete
nature of the statutory scheme revealed the irrationality of the enactment-the apparent desire
to punish single persons who wish to have sexual intercourse. Id. at 448-449. See supra notes
117-20 and accompanying text (discussing Court's holding in Eisenstadt).
176. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); supra notes 146-50
and accompanying text (discussing Hooper).
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
C. The Rationality of Civil Rights Statutes
Precedent informs us that congressional civil rights statutes are consti-
tutional because at the very least, they are rational. 77 A particularly fasci-
nating aspect explaining their rationality is that rational civil rights statutes
control some form of irrational behavior. Civil rights statutes are rational
because the bigoted behavior they outlaw is irrational. Furthermore, con-
sistent with our definition of "rationality," the main considerations used
to perform the societal cost/benefits calculus are moral ones such as human
dignity, self-worth, individuality and self-respect along with protecting op-
portunities to attain individual integrity in which all social actors must
participate. 7 8 These statutes, then, present a grand experiment to reinvent
social reality, expunging certain large segments of irrational discrimination.
This section of the article, therefore, describes the basic structure of certain
civil rights enactments and traces remarkable opinions sustaining the validity
of the laws.
The structure and operation of civil rights enactments are familiar. Such
statutes often contain provisions (1) setting forth specific definitions of
terms and concepts; (2) establishing procedural regulations or limitations;
(3) enumerating appropriate recovery; and (4) listing exemptions and de-
fenses. But the core sections of a civil rights enactment, of course, are those
which express the particular prohibitions or limitations on behavior-the
sections defining unlawful discriminatory conduct.
These core provisions contain two key elements. First, the sections will
list certain social projects-modes of behavior and action-which the statute
will govern. Second, the key provisions will list certain characteristics or
criteria which may no longer play a role in the project, behavior, or action.
Consider, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which states, in relevant part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens....
As the above quoted portion indicates, Section 1981 addresses a particular
project-making and enforcing contracts-and lists a criterion or charac-
teristic-racial discrimination-which has been statutorily declared no longer
legitimate to the project. 79 Race, then, is the criterion of irrationality under
Section 1981.
Similar examples abound in our civil rights regulatory scheme. The Fair
Employment Act of 196480 makes the same two-pronged distinction in such
provisions as:
177. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-259, 261-262
(1964); Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
178. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
179. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976); St. Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026 (1987).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . .. 
Once again we see a covered social project-employment and incidents
thereto-and, this time, a small set of prohibited criteria-race, sex, national
origin, religion, and color-declared irrational under the Act.
The statutes just quoted and other similar enactments address issues
involving basic human dignity, individuality and self-respect. Intrusion into
the particular project-housing, employment and the like-of an arbitrary
consideration, such a race or sex, offends our deeply held beliefs in the
inherent dignity which our society must accord to each individual. We
understand that discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion and
national origin is most often arbitrary because, such criteria seem to be
unrelated to the particular project. Racial discrimination, for example, tells
us nothing about an individual's ability to perform work or to act as a
responsible property owner. Refusals to hire incompetent applicants or
rejections of rowdy persons' applications to lease apartments, by contrast,
seem rational since the former is clearly related to the ability to perform
work and the latter is relevant to whether the individuals will be peaceful,
respectable tenants.821 Furthermore, such discrimination severely impedes
181. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also, e.g, § 2000e-2(a)(2); § 2000e-3 (apprenticeship
programs employment agencies); § 2000e-16 (discrimination in federal government employment).
182. It should be stated at the outset that the irrationality of criteria does not mean that
to be legitimate, criteria must be indispensable or integral to a project. For example, in the
project of painting a house, choosing a contractor on the basis of race is illegitimate because
that considerations has nothing to do with one's ability to paint homes. Insisting, however,
over the better judgment of the contractor, on painting the interior walls red and the ceilings
orange is not irrational because those choices relate to the design and appearance of the house,
considerations clearly germane to the project of decorating a dwelling and aesthetic pleasure
derived therefrom.
Moreover, even a general consensus that certain personal choices are irrational does not
necessarily mean that such choices are legitimately subject to official review or control. A
large and integral sphere of personal privacy mitigates the outmost reach of governmental
authority to regulate irrationality. See infra notes 300-30 and accompanying text.
This is an appropriate juncture to make a few additional remarks. The text has and will
continue to contain broadly based phrases such as "sexual, racial or some other form of
discrimination are irrational" to thus-and-such project. This is simply convenient phraseology
which is not designed to deny the existence of limited exceptions. Of course, these unusual
cases do not involve irrational but nonetheless condonable behavior. Rather, the exceptions
cover rare instances in which usually irrational criteria, such as gender, are rational means to
effect a legitimate project.
Additionally, some may argue that unlawful discrimination is not irrational under this
writing's own definition because, given the prevalence of bigotry in our society, race and
gender's relationship to employment, housing, and other projects is a social reality. It seems
obvious, however, that traditions of irrational discrimination cannot, through their very
persistence and prevalence, make discrimination rational. If such were the case, the enormity
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the ability of deserving and qualified individuals to compete for certain
goals-jobs, houses and the like-on a fair and reasonable basis. Irrational
discrimination robs individuals and groups of economic integrity, personal
dignity and social status. Whatever arguable benefits derive from the practice
of certain forms of bigotry are dwarfed by the enormity of the damage
prejudice engenders.
Clearly, the underlying rationality of civil rights enactments mirrors
concepts of rationality under equal protection analysis. Both look to pro-
jects, goals, means, and effects to determine whether certain classifications
are rational. The determination of rationality is predicated on a cost/benefit
analysis vitalized by concepts of dignity, self-respect, and protection of
individuality. Indeed, as the following precedents emphasize, civil rights
laws are properly within Congress' legislative authority because such statutes
are, at the very least, rational enactments offending no constitutional
provisions limiting Congress' powers.
1. Public Accommodations-The Revitalization of Statutory Civil Rights
In 1883, the Supreme Court struck down the public accommodations
portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that it was an improper
attempt to regulate "social rights" and social interaction not subject to
congressional control even under that body's broad thirteenth amendment' 3
powers to proscribe "badges and incidents of slavery.' ' 8 4 Nearly a century
later, Congress again attempted to regulate racial, color, religion, and
national origin discrimination in access to public accommodations, this time
with greater success. The intervening century's lessons on racial tolerance-
accented, perhaps most heavily, by the anti-segregation decisions of the mid
1950s-did not prompt Congress to reenact the public accommodations
provisions under the thirteenth amendment, the constitutional provision
banning slavery and its vestiges. 8 5 Rather, Congress premised the Public
of discrimination would shield the discrimination from remedy. The self-perpetuation of
irrationality cannot render the arbitrary classifications rational and untouchable. See, e.g.,
infra notes 331-57 and accompanying text regarding affirmative action.
183. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
184. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22-25 (1883). The majority averred:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he
will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit
to his concert or theater or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.
Id. at 24-25.
185. The Supreme Court in Jones and Runyon expressly established that under the
Thirteenth Amendment, Congress may pass legislation proscribing slave-like treatment of
individuals. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976). See infra notes 197-210; notes 220-43 and accompanying text.
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Accommodations Act'8 6 on its authority to regulate interstate commerce.'87
Recognizing both Congress' expansive discretion to isolate and correct
burdens on commerce and the attendant authority to use that power to
legislate against immoral conduct, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Title II.188
Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark established the standards for
review which are echoed whenever civil rights legislation is subjected to
constitutional scrutiny. First, Congress need only show that it had some
"rational basis" to discern that the statutorily prohibited behavior falls
within an area over which the Constitution grants the legislature regulatory
supervision, which in the case of the Public Accommodations Act, was the
commerce power. 8 9 Second, Congress must demonstrate that the classifi-
catory means chosen reasonably and appropriately address the goal, problem
or project. 90 Thus, the general tenor of the rationality analysis under civil
rights legislation is strikingly similar to that discussed under equal protection
analysis.
The Government had little trouble demonstrating to the Court that the
Public Accommodations Act addressed a serious problem regarding burdens
on interstate commerce. The carefully prepared legislative record, culled
from hearings and testimony, established that millions of individuals travel
on the nation's roadways and airways. These travelers, through both their
physical presence and the money they spend, affect the flow of interstate
commerce. Racial and ethnic discrimination, however, severely affected the
ability of many individuals to travel. Refusals of service in hotels and
restaurants compelled discriminatees to travel undue distances to find basic
sustenance or lodging. Such discrimination, Congress determined, was na-
tionwide. 91
Interestingly, Congress' project to regulate racial, religious, and national
origin discrimination in public accommodations was rational, because the
prohibited behavior was irrational. Running a hotel or a restaurant, Congress
determined, involves any number of legitimate, rational considerations but
the race of a customer is not numbered among them. Race and ethnicity
clearly are irrational considerations since skin color and ancestry in no
manner indicate whether the individual will be a peaceful, orderly, paying
customer. Similarly, the burdens on commerce engendered by such discrim-
186. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (hereinafter referred to as "The
Public Accommodations Act" or "Title II").
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8(3), (18).
188. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
189. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258-259.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 253. Earlier cases had established that the concept "commerce" covers "every
specie of commercial intercourse" including permanent or temporary migration of individuals.
Id. at 254-256. See also McClung, 379 U.S. at 299 (Congress properly regulated racial
discrimination in eateries which affect commerce by either catering to interstate travelers or
by purchasing food in interstate commerce).
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ination outweigh the arguable benefits enjoyed by the discriminators. Heart
of Atlanta Motel and McClung sounded a principle that would become a
hallmark of the rationality underlying civil rights laws: the behavior under
prohibition is itself irrational.
Had the Court ended its discussion at this point, we would nonetheless
have strong evidence to link our definition of equal protection rationality
to that of civil rights laws. The Court, however, said more. It was clear to
the Court, as it was to all concerned, that while the impact on commerce
was genuine, triggering constitutional remedial legislation by Congress, the
social morality of the Public Accommodations Act in particular, and the
entire Civil Rights Act of 1964 more generally, emphasized that certain
discrimination would no longer be acceptable social conduct under certain
circumstances. Racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination limiting access to
public accommodations was legislatively declared to be unlawful, not simply
because of its manifest economic burdens on the stream of national com-
merce, but also because such discrimination offends the newly revived,
communal sense that people should not be judged by criteria as arbitrary
as race and color. The legislation, then, was profoundly moral, regulating
discriminators for acting out their discriminatory impulses. Indeed, rejecting
arguments that Congress acted illegitimately when applying a constitutional
power implicating economic considerations, such as commerce, to delineate
moral conduct, 92 the Court embraced the moral thrust of the statute, citing
with approval the Senate Committee report which acknowledged that the
main purpose of Title II was "to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public accom-
modations.""1
93
Identically, in Daniel v. Paul, 94 the Court held that the Title covers
amusement parks which cater to interstate travelers or which receive supplies
through interstate commerce. Addressing whether the statutory definition
of "public accommodation"1 95 includes places where individuals entertain
themselves, such as amusement parks, the Court concluded:
Admittedly, most of the discussion in Congress regarding the cov-
erage of Title II focused on places of spectator entertainment rather
192. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.
193. Id. at 250 (citing Senate Report No. 872 at 16-17). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Goldberg reemphasized the integral concept of personal dignity jeopardized through denials of
access to public accommodations. "The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
however, as the Court recognizes, and as I would underscore, is the vindication of human
dignity and not mere economics." Id. at 291-292 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
194. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
195. Section 201(b) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) states in pertinent part:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect
commerce. ...
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
place of exhibition or entertainment....
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than recreational areas. But it does not follow that the scope of §
201(b)(3) should be restricted to the primary objects of Congress'
concern when a natural reading of its language would call for
broader coverage. In light of the overriding purpose of Title II "to
remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory
denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public,
H.R. Rep. no. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess., 18, we agree with the en
banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Miller
v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (1968), that the
statutory language "place of entertainment" should be given full
effect according to its generally accepted meaning and applied to
recreational areas.1
96
Title II, then, conforms with the basic definition of a civil rights statute:
(1) there is a social project of fundamental importance to preservation
of individual dignity, economic integrity and social status;
(2) there is a set of protected classes; and,
(3) a social cost/benefit analysis shows the harm of the discrimination
outweighs the harm of outlawing the discrimination.
2. Racial Discrimination in Property-A Rebirth of the Thirteenth
Amendment
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.197 set forth the dual holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1982, Congress' statutory proscription against racial discrimination
in property transactions, 98 applies to private as well as governmental dis-
criminators and that Congress' regulation of private discrimination under
section 1982 is within its scope of powers to enforce the anti-slavery mandate
of the thirteenth amendment. 99
Reviewing both the plain language and complex legislative history of
section 1982,200 the Court in Jones concluded:
196. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-308 (1969) (emphasis added).
197. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
198. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
199. See supra note 183 (quoting text of thirteenth amendment).
200. The majority engaged in a lengthy review of section 1982's predecessor statute, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, to determine if the original empowering Congress intended the 1866
Act's property provisions to reach private as well as. official acts of discrimination. The Court
found convincing evidence to answer that inquiry in the affirmative from the statements of
representatives and senators, and studies used by those legislators, accenting the pervasive
problem of private discrimination. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-429 (1968).
The Court rejected the argument that a major recodification effort undertaken by Congress
in 1870 which linked the 1866 Act to the recently ratified fourteenth amendment meant that,
henceforth, the 1866 enactment only covered State action. The Court acknowledged that the
1870 recodification did assert that the 1866 Act was re-enacted under the fourteenth amendment,
a provision which covers only the actions of state and state subdivisions. Nevertheless, the
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Whenever property is placed on the market for whites only, whites
have a right denied to Negroes .... [§ 1982] must encompass every
racially motivated refusal to sell or rent .... 201
Next, addressing the constitutionality of section 1982 and its predecessor,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court held that section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment bestows upon Congress the power to eradicate, through the
passage of necessary and proper legislation, all badges and incidents remi-
niscent of the institution of slavery. 2 2 Only by reaching such badges and
incidents, both public and private, can the full force of the thirteenth
amendment's purpose as "an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary
servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States" be fulfilled.
23
Court held that the 1870 recodification in no manner reflected a retreat from the thirteenth
amendment underpinnings of the 1866 Act. To the contrary, the additional reference to the
fourteenth amendment was, at most, an attempt to fortify, not to reject, the 1866's Act
constitutional premises. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S. at 436-437.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented from this interpretation of legislative
history finding that in both its original form and as recodified in 1870, the 1866 Civil Rights
Act was not designed to reach purely private discrimination. Id. at 451-475 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
As mentioned infra at note 224, as of this writing the Supreme Court has decided to
review its earlier determination that the 1866 Act's prohibition of racial discrimination in
contracts, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, likewise reaches private conduct. A reversal of
interpretation regarding section 1981 would portend a similar reversal of interpretation of
section 1982.
201. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
202. Id. at 439.
203. Id. at 438 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. (16 Wall.) 3, 20 (1883)). The
Court explained that section 1 of the thirteenth amendment by its own force eliminates slavery
and involuntary servitude. No act of Congress is required to proscribe public or private .slavery
of individuals. Congress, however, has legislated in this area. See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 ("Peonage
Abolished"); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-88 (Criminalization of Slavery and Peonage). Section 2 of
the amendment, by contrast, invites Congress to legislate against "badges and incidents" of
slavery-those forms of treatment foisted upon individuals which recall the deprivations of
rights, dignity and freedom which were the hallmarks of slavery as an institution.
It appears to be an unsettled question whether private persons, without recourse to specific
congressional enactments, may articulate and litigate privately felt badges and incidents of
slavery under the thirteenth amendment in a manner similar to individual challenges against
governmental action pursuant to the Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses.
Formerly, the answer seemed to be an unequivocal "no." See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217, 226-227 (1970); Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236-1238 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). However, the Court, in City of Memphis v. Green [451 U.S. 100
(1981)] permitted private individuals to challenge the erection of a barrier across a public street
which, plaintiffs asserted, deliberately and invidiously divided the community along racial
residential patterns in an effort to segregate black and white residents. City of Memphis v.
Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). The challengers premised their arguments on both 42 U.S.C.
section 1982 and section 1 of the thirteenth amendment. The Court reserved the question
whether section I of the thirteenth amendment permits private individuals to file claims of
discrimination absent an enabling Congressional statute finding that the plaintiffs' claims did
not possibly amount to a badge of slavery. City of Memphis, 451 U.S. at 125-26. The fact
that the Court entertained the question whether the street closing alone was a violation of the
thirteenth amendment indicates that individuals may be able to press privately conceived legal
theories of badges and incidents of slavery at least when challenging governmental action.
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As further emphasized by the Court, the legislative history surrounding
the passage of the thirteenth amendment accented that the anti-slavery
provision in the Constitution could indeed "destroy all these discriminations
in civil rights against the black male; and if... [it] cannot, our constitu-
tional amendment amounts to nothing." 2°4
With the foregoing as the backdrop, the Court described in clear and
unequivocal terms the threshold Congress must satisfy to establish the
constitutionality of civil rights enactments passed pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment. Identical to its powers to regulate interstate commerce:
[Congress has the power] rationally to determine what are the badges
and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation.
20 5
Section 1982, the Court concluded, is rational since a century of precedent
established that the rights' to acquire, use and dispose of property are
fundamental .2° The Court accented the indignity and humiliation associated
204. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 at 440 (1968).
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 441-443. The Court additionally attempted to assert that the underlying premises
of the Civil Rights Cases were unquestioned by the Jones rationale. Id.; Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883). In the former case, the court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875's
prohibition against racial discrimination in public accommodations could not be premised upon
Congress' thirteenth amendment powers. Access to public accommodations, the Court argued,
involved not "fundamental rights," but "social rights." The thirteenth amendment only enables
Congress to legislate in fundamental rights areas, meaning realms such as property and contract.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
The dichotomy between "social" and "fundamental" rights appears unclear. Although
the Jones Court purported to leave this distinction untouched, particularly noting that the
question of congressional regulation pursuant to the thirteenth amendment of discrimination
in public accommodations had been rendered academic by the Public Accommodations Act
of 1964, it seems clear that the underlying concept of the "social-fundamental" rights distinction
was severely undermined. The impression emanating from the Civil Rights Cases is that the
judiciary will rely primarily on its own best judgment to determine "fundamental" from
"social" rights. The tenor of Jones is distinctly different, holding that the judiciary will not
undercut Congress' rational determination that some form of discrimination amounts to a
badge or incident of slavery. As Professor Tribe observed:
If Jones is read literally, Congress possesses a power to protect individual rights
under the thirteenth amendinent which is as open-ended as its power to regulate
interstate commerce. Seemingly, Congress is free, within the broad limits of reason,
to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement of those rights as a
form of domination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringement
as a violation of the thirteenth amendment. On this view, Congress would possess
plenary authority under the thirteenth amendment to protect all but the most trivial
individual rights from both governmental and private invasion.
The Supreme Court, however, has had no occasion to consider whether Jones
means what it says.
TRmE, AmucAN CONsTInnroNAL LAW, supra note 17, at 259 (1978). To be sure, the courts
have the last word regarding the legality of a congressional determination that a certain
classification or action does indeed amount to a badge of slavery. See Washington v. Finlay,
664 F.2d 913, 927 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982); cases cited at infra note
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with racial discrimination in property. The exclusion of blacks from a
community, the Court argued, becomes a privately performed substitution
for the infamous Black Codes. Indeed, "when racial discrimination herds
men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color
of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.''207 The underlying rational
basis sustaining civil rights enactments that proscribe racial discrimination
in property transactions mirrors the definitions of rationality under Equal
Protection analysis. Nothing less than basic human dignity, self-respect and
the ability to function in society as full persons underlie the rationality of
section 1982. As the Supreme Court emphasizes, the ability to compete for
and to use property without the imposition of irrational criteria such as
race is integral to freedom in society. 2°
Furthermore, as we saw in the realm of public accommodations, the
essence of the rationality of the civil rights enactment stems from the
irrationality of the very discrimination that the rational statute seeks to
control. The Court's analysis supports the argument that, as a matter of
societal morality, race is irrelevant to-has nothing legitimate to do with-
those projects associated with property transactions. When the sellers impose
a racially based requirement, unlike setting a price, they introduce an
irrelevant, irrational criterion into the transaction.
In dissenting from the majority in Jones, Justice Harlan argued that
section 1982 is more humble, simply removing governmental barriers that
promote or permit private discrimination.209 But, the majority totally rejected
214; cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-104 (1971). And, in making this determination
the courts will rely on the moral-political cost/benefit constructs discussed in earlier sections
of this article. Nevertheless, Jones instructs that courts must not substitute their concepts of
rationality unless the congressional enactment is utterly devoid of any rational content. The
deference to Congress-indeed, the seeming thrust of Jones, encouraging Congress to unearth
and legislate against badges of slavery-stands in sharp contradistinction to the inflexible,
stasis-oriented holding of the Civil Rights Cases.
207. Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-443.
208. See id. at 445. Justice Douglas offered an interesting inversion of the foregoing
discussion of rationality. He emphasized that racial discrimination harms whites as well as
blacks:
The true curse of slavery is not what it did to the black man, but what it has done
to the white man. [For slavery made whites feel superior in] character, intelligence
and morality. [And it increased the cruelty of whites towards their fellows].
Jones, 392 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Now, there is a certain unseemly arrogance in arguing that the "true curse of slavery"
was felt by the slave-owning race rather than by those who, through no fault of their own,
were treated in unspeakable ways both prior to and after the purported emancipation. Perhaps
Justice Douglas, a noted and concerned humanitarian, meant something else. His argument
that discrimination and bigotry demeans, harms and humiliates the bigot as well as the victim
is profound and demonstrates that irrational prejudice hurts and degrades every societal
member which adds impetus to eliminate this most repulsive form of human behavior.
209. Id. at 452-453, especially n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This has become known as
the "legal capacity" concept which argues that statutes such as section 1982 were not designed
to forbid private discrimination. Rather, such laws remove official supports or barriers thereby
bestowing upon the formerly downtrodden group the "legal capacity" to buy property or
negotiate contracts if they can find a willing party with which to transact such business.
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Justice Harlan's interpretation. Section 1982, the Court reasoned, confers
an affirmative right to be free from racially discriminatory behavior in
property transactions, and not the mere ability to attempt to find a private
owner willing to sell to minorities. Indeed, the Court noted that the
thirteenth amendment would be but a paper guarantee if:
Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of the
Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a
white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empow-
ered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the free-
dom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever
a white man can live.
210
3. Fair Housing Legislation-A New Dimension in Thirteenth
Amendment Law
The foregoing discussion of general property transactions holds equally
true for rental, sale, and the provision of housing under the Fair Housing
Act of 1968,211 which Congress specifically enacted to address the singular
problems of discrimination within the housing market.
The Fair Housing Act generally forbids not only racial and color
premised actions but also ethnic, religious, and gender based discrimination
affecting an individual's opportunities to compete for and enjoy housing.
212
Moreover, The Fair Housing Act reaches private as well as public conduct.
The constitutional basis for this breadth of coverage is not the Commerce
Clause, but, as with section 1982 of the United States Code, the thirteenth
amendment. Every court addressing the question has agreed that Title VIII
is a valid thirteenth amendment enactment. 2 3 Therefore, concepts of ra-
tionality extend beyond the questions of race that underlay the passage of
the anti-slavery amendment and allow Congress to protect various groups
and individuals from deprivation of access to housing on an irrational basis
such as national origin, color, religion or sex.
21 4
210. Id. at 443.
211. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e).
213. See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 834 (1972), reh. den., 413 U.S. 923 (1973).
214. See Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 12 HousToN L. REv. 1, 7-15 (1974); Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments: Constitutional Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination,
61 MINN. L. REv. 313, 349-362 (1977). Although the cases concern racial discrimination, there
is no suitable basis to restrict Congress' powers under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment
to address only racial and national origin discrimination. See supra note 213 (citing cases that
concern racial discrimination). As a threshold point, the due process and equal protection
components of the fourteenth amendment, by their own force, cover gender discrimination in
particular and all forms of arbitrary discrimination against all groups and individuals in
19881
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To illustrate this new direction in thirteenth amendment law, the Su-
preme Court has enforced Congress' mandate against housing discrimination
by recognizing the broadest standing to sue permitted by Article III of the
Constitution. 21 5 Indeed, the Court has recognized that housing discrimination
is so dysfunctional in our society that individuals may bring suit and claim
general. See supra notes 8-44 and accompanying text. It is unclear why the thirteenth
amendment, the historical origins of which show it protects interests as fundamental as those
contained in the fourteenth amendment, should be read less generously.
Secondly, it is long established that section 1 of the thirteenth amendment "[f]orbids any
... kind of slavery, now or hereafter." Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72
(1872) (emphasis added). Thus, the thirteenth amendment's protection is not limited to racially
based seritude.
Third, both proponents and opponents saw the thirteenth amendment reaching beyond
slavery issues. Speaking in opposition, Senator Howard stated, "I suppose before the law a
woman would be equal to a man, would be as free as a man." Buchanan, supra at 9 (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1488 (1864)). Similarly, according to Professor
Buchanan, "the proponents of the amendment wanted to protect the civil liberties of all
persons, whites as well as emancipated blacks. Here, the pro-amendment faction was basing
its arguments on the Lockean presupposition of natural rights and the protective function of
government." Id. Congress, then, saw an expansive and vibrant thirteenth amendment.
Finally, and most important, the thirteenth amendment is "a denunciation of a condition
and not a declaration in favor of a particular people." Hodges v. U.S., 203 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1906); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see also Calhoun, supra at 346-
47. The amendment makes no specific reference to race. Moreover, insofar as it protects
whites as well as blacks, the amendment does not appear to require that a protected class has
actually experienced consistent treatment similar to black slavery in ante bellum America. See
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976). This implies
Congressional authority as broad as the previously discussed language of Jones would allow.
See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text; see also Calhoun, supra at 355-362; Buchanan,
supra at 1076-77.
Certainly, depravation of rights on bases distinct from, but analogous to, race may place
individuals in a status of quasi-servitude. The person who is denied housing or the opportunity
to form contract because of gender or religion is no less disadvantage than if the opportunity
was withheld on the basis of race. The experience of slavery should sensitize Congress and
the states to legislate against numerous forms of discrimination perpetuated against myriad
groups. Slavery's shameful history should not become the excuse to limit Congress' authority
to protect all individuals from arbitrary treatment.
If the enacting Congress had wished to limit the thirteenth amendment to address only
racial discrimination it could have done so, as it did with the fifteenth amendment prohibiting
racial discrimination in voting. That Congress chose not to so limit speaks forcefully for full
coverage of the thirteenth amendment.
215. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 (1979). The
requisites a litigant must satisfy to demonstrate standing to sue are implicated in Article III
of the Constitution which establishes the judicial branch of the Federal government. In addition
to the "Article III minima," requiring a plaintiff both to present an actual case or controversy
and to allege some form of personally felt injury suitable for judicial redress, the federal
courts have often applied a set of so-called "prudential considerations" which must be satisfied
before a court will hear the plaintiff's case. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975).
Congress, however, by direct enactment or by necessary implications stemming therefrom, may
eliminate the prudential considerations leaving only the Article III requirements. As Title VIII




damage stemming from discrimination committed against others. In Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 216 the Supreme Court held that
both a black and a white resident of a large apartment complex in San
Francisco stated claims under Title VIII alleging that the landlord's racially
discriminatory practices resulted in the creation of a "white ghetto." The
plaintiffs averred stigmatization resulting from the discriminatory environ-
ment, as well as denial of the social, economic, and professional advantages
of living in a nondiscriminatory housing complex.
21 7
Extending these arguments further, the Court held that Title VIII affords
a cause of action to "testers" who, because of their race, are given false
or misleading information regarding housing.21 s "Testers" are individuals
who approach a landlord or realty agency pretending to be interested in
renting or buying homes for the purpose of discovering-testing-whether
the landlord or agent will discriminate on a impermissible basis.
After the encounters with the realty agents, the testers compare expe-
riences particularly with regard to the location and type of dwellings made
available for inspection. Often, testing reveals that otherwise similarly
situated testers are sent to inspect dwellings in mostly minority, mostly
white or racially mixed neighborhoods depending on the tester's race. Such
race conscious manipulation, known as "racial steering," constitutes not
only evidence of discrimination which bolster the case of a bona fide
customer, but also actionable damage to the testers themselves. Testers,
216. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
217. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). Id. at 210. See
also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979) (federal court may
entertain properly pled action alleging that "transformation of (a) ... neighborhood from an
integrated to a predominantly Negro community is depriving [plaintiffs] ... of the social and
professional benefits of living in an integrated society").
Such allegations underscore the fundamental policy of the Fair Housing Act "to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. §
3601. One court defined the purpose of the Act to promote "open, integrated residential
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of legregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose
lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat." Opeto v. New York City Housing
Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court has similarly noted that black individuals denied membership, as well
as white individuals adversely affected thereby, may sue a purportedly private club for engaging
in unlawful racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 if membership in or use of the club
are incidents of property ownership or residency in a given community. See, e.g., Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Association, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973).
218. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 473 (1982). The Coleman
opinion extended to housing cases the concept of the "private attorney general," an individual
who assumes responsibility to test the validity and enforcement potential of civil rights
enactments. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title [II, the Public Accommodations
Act], he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone, but also as a "private attorney general" vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted).
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therefore, have standing to sue in their own right, alleging that they received
false or misleading information about available housing. 2 9 In this way, any
concerned individuals may participate in the social project, established by
Title VIII, to restructure acceptable behavior in the realty market by ferreting
out unlawful discrimination.
The housing discrimination cases reaffirm and enrich the definition of
rationality. Under Title VIII, Congress enlarged the protective power of the
thirteenth amendment to cover badges and incidents of slavery affecting not
only race, but other arbitrary criteria as well. It is a badge of slavery, and
therefore an irrational act, to discriminate in housing transactions on the
basis of race, sex, color, national origin, and religion. A statute that
proscribes such irrational behavior is, therefore, a rational enactment.
In keeping with this expanded concept of "rationality," courts have
accorded the most lenient standing requisites permitted under the Consti-
tution. Any person may become active in promoting the new regime of
equality and dignity promised by the Act.
These measures that give vigor and vitality to The Fair Housing Act
reflect and underscore the fact that Title VIII's purpose is to ensure that
all persons will be free from the humiliations, inconvenience, and indignity
of housing discrimination based on race, sex, and national origin.
4. Racial Discrimination in Contracts-Rationality Theory Extends
Beyond Mere Economic Issues to Promote a More General Project of
Equality
A noteworthy holding, issued eight years after Jones, reaffirmed both
Congress' broad powers under the thirteenth amendment and the irration-
ality of racially based discrimination. Runyon v. McCary220 held that section
1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code's z22 proscription against racial
discrimination in contractual transactions prohibits a private, secular school
from excluding qualified students on the basis of race.
219. Coleman, 455 U.S. at 373-378. Specifically, the tester's cause of action emanates
from section 3604(d) of title 42 of the United States Code which prohibits realtors from giving
racially premised false or misleading information. Under the Coleman facts, for instance, the
white testers were gi'en no racially based misinformation regarding the availability of dwellings
while black testers were falsely told that no dwellings in predominately white neighborhoods
were available for rent. Thus, the white testers, who received only accurate information were
not victims of discrimination while the black testers victimized by the receipt of misleading
information, had standing to sue despite the fact that they never intended to purchase or rent.
Id.
Testers may have alternative routes to sue if discriminated against on an impermissible
basis. See, e.g., Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1lth Cir. 1985) (tester
may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
220. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
221. The pertinent text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
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Similar to section 19 82,
2n Congress originally included the proscription
of section 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Court, therefore,
examined the legislative history and express wording of the earlier statute
to determine whether section 1981 reaches the allegedly offensive conduct
in Runyon. The Court concluded that, like section 1982, section 1981's
proscription only covers race,m however, the coverage applies to both
private and official discrimination. 4 Recalling the discussion in Jones, the
Runyon majority reasoned:
Just as in Jones a Negro's § 1 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1866]
right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated
when a private person refused to sell to the prospective purchaser
solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's § 1 right to "make
and enforce contracts" is violated if a private offeror refuses to
extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same oppor-
tunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.
225
222. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
223. Runyon, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). The Court clarified a decade later that the concept
of racial discrimination under section 1981 and section 1982 is not confined to set biological
or anthropological definitions. Rather, the definition of "race" is informed by the perceptions
of the enacting Congress in 1866 which understood that term to cover many ethnic and
religious groups. Thus racial discrimination is defined very broadly not to track scientific
explications, but to promote the intent of Congress to eradicate discrimination against an
expansive variety of groups. See St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987)
(42 U.S.C. § 1981); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1982).
224. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-171. Commenting on the various revision of the United
States Code that re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court held that the revisers
intended to link Congressional authority to enact what eventually was codified as section 1981
of Title 42 of the United States Code to both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Thus
§ 1981, predicated in part on the thirteenth amendment, was intended to reach private conduct.
Id. at 168 n.8. See also supra note 200.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the legislative history demonstrates
that while section 1981 was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, therefore, a
thirteenth amendment enactment, it was shortly thereafter recodified under first the Voting
Rights Act of 1870 and later the Revised Statutes of 1874, both premises solely on the
fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, Justice White contended that the Voting Rights Act and
its progeny addressed only governmental actions.
As of this writing, the Court sua sponte has ordered a re-examination of its determination
that section 1981 reaches private conduct. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419
(1988) (per curiam). As accented by the following discussion, a reversal of Runyon would
constitute a devastating backwards turn in the otherwise expanding judicial and congressional
sensitivity to promoting dignity, selfhood, and economic integrity through civil rights law. See
Patterson, supra at 1421-23 (Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 170-171 (footnote omitted). The Runyon Court noted that the "private school"
in question advertised and otherwise offered opportunities to apply for admission "to members
of the general public." Id. at 172. Thus, the Court observed that although the schools were
privately run and received no government money, "their actual and potential constituency ...
is more public than private." Id. at 172 n.10 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082,
1089 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). It must be emphasized, however, that these clarifications were
not intended to modify the general holding that section 1981 covers private as well as official
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Once again, the definition of a rationality is reiterated, this time in the
context of racial discrimination in contracts. The majority in Runyon
rejected Justice White's dissenting views that essentially repeated the "legal
capacity" argument that Justice Harlan offered in Jones.226 In Runyon
Justice White argued that at the heart of traditional contract law rests the
dual notion that all individuals must have the opportunity-the capacity-
to compete in society to negotiate contracts. Justice White continued,
however, that no individuals in a free society should be forced to contract
with a party against their will.
Yet, the right to make and enforce contracts is not absolute now, nor
was it ever intended to be. Indeed, contract law is fraught with rules and
limitations affecting individuals' absolute liberty to make any contract they
want at any time under any terms with any party.227 It is surely true that,
as a general matter, individuals are not compelled to contract with others,
yet, under the limited circumstances covered by section 1981, Congress,
exercising its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, recognized a greater
priority. Although not mandating that any given individual must contract
with another given individual, section 1981 informs that refusals to contract
solely because of race places those discriminatees in a slave-like status. Not
even the usual cherished belief in freedom of contract permits society to
condemn classes of individuals to badges of slavery and commercial impo-
tency.
conduct. Rather, the majority in Runyon explained that there was no occasion to determine
whether legislative intent or concepts of privacy under the Constitution implied an exception
under section 1981 covering private clubs. Id. at 172. See infra notes 300-30 and accompanying
text (discussing effects that the right to privacy may have on section 1981 in particular and
theory of rationality in general).
Several commentators have accented heavily the fact that the defendant schools "regularly
and widely advertised for applicants .. " See ROTUNDA, NowAK & YOUNG, supra note 160,
at 748. Yet, aside from the limitation on the Runyon holding stated in the paragraph above,
it is doubtful that the advertising played a very important role in the Court's determination.
Presume that section 1981 excepts truly private clubs and that the schools in question qualify
as such organizations. Under those circumstances, certainly, the private groups have the right
to advertise for members. The only infirmity, then, was that the advertising was a bit misleading
as it failed to mention the racial restriction. The appropriate remedy would be to rewrite the
ad copy.
Suppose, by contrast, that the schools are not truly private clubs. The nonprivate nature
of the schools brings them under the ambit of section 1981 regardless of whether they advertise
or not. It appears immaterial whether the schools advertise extensively, a little bit, or not at
all. If the schools cannot come under a "private club" or "right of privacy" exception, the
civil rights laws attach. Indeed, under such circumstances, it would make no difference if the
schools declared in their advertisement that: "Blacks Need Not Apply." Boldly announcing
unlawful prejudices does not make them legitimate. The fact that the schools advertised
extensively, therefore, was hardly dispositive of the holding, although it certainly indicates that
the schools are not private clubs.
226. See id. at 193-195 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 451-454 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra note 209 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in Jones).
227. See P. Attiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contact (1979) at 398-505.
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The underlying rationale for section 1981-the rational basis that ren-
dered it constitutional under the thirteenth amendment-accents why racially
based refusals to contract are both abhorrent and soially immoral. As the
Runyon Court explained, the ability to make and enforce contracts is integral
to the personal, social, and economic integrity of individuals. Additionally,
a rational Congress could legislate that race is unrelated to the projects of
making and enforcing contracts.
Thus far, the Runyon opinion demonstrates that contracts, as other
transactions, may be regulated by rational civil rights enactments. The
opinion, however, offers considerably more for analysis. After establishing
the bedrock holding that section 1981 proscribes private as well as govern-
mental discrimination, the Runyon majority addressed three constitutional
challenges brought against the application of section 1981 to enrollment
contracts in private schools.
First, the defendants asserted their first amendment right to freedom
of association, that is the right
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
... [which may be integral to] effective advocacy of both public
and private points of view, particularly controversial ones .... 228
The Court replied that the right of free association permits parents:
to send their children to educational institutions that promote the
belief that racial segregation is desirable .... But, it does not follow
that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions
is also protected by the same principle. 2 9
Therefore, the Court determined that while invidious private discrimination
may be a form of freedom of association, it enjoys no affirmative consti-
tutional protection and may be subject to remedial legislation under the
thirteenth amendment. 2 0 Moreover, the Runyon Court accented, the school
remains free to preach racial separatism.Y
228. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1968)).
229. Id. at 176 (emphasis original).
230. Id. (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)). Cf., Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."). In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the
Court held that application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to require defendant
organization to admit women as members did not violate the first amendment's guaranty of
freedom of association. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Citing Runyon, the Court in Roberts ruled:
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgment of
the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish
the State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of invidious discrimination
in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart
from the point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or
other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct
from their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional
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The Court similarly rejected the parents' claim that applying section
1981 to private schools infringes on their constitutional right to parenting.
23
The majority in Runyon acknowledged that the Constitution accords parents
the freedom to beget and raise children as they see fit with minimal
governmental intrusions. For this reason, parents are free to reject the state
school system, opting instead to enroll their offspring in private schools
that accent certain educational themes and preach chosen social ideology.2 3
These freedoms, however, are not without limits. For example, while
the states may not prohibit the very existence of private schooling, they
may set reasonable minimum educational requisites that states deem neces-
sary to permit students to function in society. A similar imperative, the
Runyon Court decided, arises if Congress prohibits a school from imposing
a badge of slavery upon innocent children and their parents. Recalling its
conclusions regarding freedom of association, the Court stated that a school
may teach racial separatism but it can not limit its enrollment on racial
grounds. 234
protection.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628; see also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club, 95 L.
Ed.2d 474, 483-84 (1987).
231. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176.
232. Id. at 176-177. The Constitution recognizes a fundamental right of parenting. See,
e.g., TRIBE, supra note 17, at §§ 15-16, 15-21.
233. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176.
234. Id. at 177. There remains some doubt whether sectarian schools may be exempted
from section 1981 coverage even if they are able to demonstrate that racial mingling violates
basic tenets of their religion. Precedent establishes that a religious school may not practice
racial discrimination regarding terms and conditions of enrollment when sectarian precepts
concerning racial interactions are merely tangential to the religion or not uniformly subscribed
to by practitioners as a basic tenet. See Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144
(4th Cir. 1980). In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Internal Revenue Service
lawfully may withhold tax exempt status from sectarian schools that practice racial discrimi-
nation. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Addressing the argument
that the denial of valuable tax exempt status punishes the schools for their religious practices,
thereby depriving them of their first amendment right to free exercise of religion, the Court
in Bob Jones noted that:
Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional .... The state may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to- accomplish an
overriding governmental interest." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-258 ...
91982) (citations omitted)....
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling ... the Government has
a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education-
discrimination that prevailed, with official approval for the first 165 years of this
Nations' constitutional history. That governmental interest substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious
beliefs.
Id. at 603-604 (footnote omitted).
The Court in Bob Jones considered whether the withholding of a governmentally granted
tax advantage is a political decision uniquely within the policy-making powers of Congress.
The question whether a private, sectarian school must violate deeply held and integral religious
tenets by enrolling minority children is a different issue. Still, as the Court in Bob Jones
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The defendants articulated similar concerns under more general notions
of the right to privacy emanating from the Constitution, particularly from
the fourteenth amendment.2?5 Again the majority rejected the parents'
assertions, noting that the usual freedom from governmental interference in
rearing children may give way to certain important regulations affecting the
"implementation of parental decisions concerning a child's education. ' 216
The Court discerned no undue intrusion undermining a parent's right to
educate their children. Indeed, the Court's rationale implies that section
1981, in conjunction with section 1982 and other civil rights statutes, reflects
a congressional desire to achieve racial equality. 7 The purported privacy
interests asserted by the parents would substantially hinder fulfillment of
this important national goal. The Court, although not saying so directly,
envisioned the elimination of racial discrimination in contracts as a tremen-
dous social project that includes, to some degree, the compelled interrelations
and interactions of different races.
Despite the adamant tone of the Runyon opinion, it is not clear that
the right to control the education and upbringing of one's children coupled
with the right to private schooling should not include an attendant right to
limit the social contacts one's children will need, including contact with
children of other races. Bigoted parents might cogently argue that forcing
their young and impressionable children to attend school with an interracial
student body severely undermines the discriminatory teachings of home and
school, which, according to the Runyon opinion, both parents and teachers
have the constitutional right to promote.?8
Moreover, it is quite possible that the very presence of children of
different races will chill the message of discrimination that the school may
wish to promote. To begin with, certainly a private school cannot racially
segregate minority students into separate facilities or specially demarcated
portions of classrooms, gyms, and dining halls. To engage in such segre-
accented, eradication of racial discrimination in education is a national priority for public
schools and in private education as well. Given this vital governmental interest, it is problematic
whether even the First Amendment's religion clauses imply a limited exception to section 1981's
program of equality.
235. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177-179. See generally TPmE, supra note 17, at Chapter 15.
236. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178.
237. Cf. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179.
238. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that state could not compel
Amish families to send their children for further schooling after completion of the eighth
grade). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court noted that:
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish
children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to
beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish
child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the
crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and
practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child.
Id. at 218.
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gation would impose different contractual terms on students solely because
of their race in violation of section 1981. 239
Secondly, it is possible that the presence of minority children will affect
the separatist teachings purportedly protected in Runyon. Preaching white
superiority or black inferiority may cause tremendous mental anguish for
minority and majority students alike. This, in turn, may lead to fights,
disruptions, and a general decline in the ability of students, especially
minority students, to study effectively. Such disruptions of both study and
social intercourse may amount to racially based breaches of contract pre-
sumably proscribed by section 1981.
Accordingly, it appears as though the Runyon Court's assertion that
the rights under section 1981 may be easily reconciled with competing
privacy, parenting, and associational rights is too glib. The Court should
have recognized the problems inherent in attempting to facilitate the con-
trasting rights of racial minorities and parents who wish to send their
children to private school. By opting for the solution it did, the Runyon
Court boldly joined Congress in promoting a broad project of equality
implicated by the passage of section 1981 and section 1982. Such a project,
as the natural ramifications of the Runyon opinion imply, involves consid-
erable restructuring of certain social relations.
Under the project of equality which was virtually mandated by the
Runyon opinion, children of all races may be compelled to socially interact
in school. Of course, no court order can compel recalcitrant children to
play with, study with, or even speak with one another. Nevertheless, after
Runyon, no individual in the United States will have a right to study in a
racially homogeneous secular school environment. At the very least-assum-
ing that a private school receives qualified minority applicants-white and
black children will see each other, sit near each other, and be aware of one
239. The foregoing argument is not diminished by arguing that the facilities, although
racial segregated, are nonetheless equal thereby providing each student with the same contractual
terms. First, even if the facilities were equal, the very act of dividing the facilities along racial
lines imposes per se racial considerations impermissible under section 1981. Cf., Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954) (compelled racial segregation of public schools is unlawful per
se under fourteenth amendment). Secondly, it seems difficult to imagine that the facilities
would be equal in a meaningful sense. Let us suppose that black children were made to sit in
the back of an otherwise integrated classroom. Even if visual and acoustic access was not at
all impaired for those in the back of the room, the very mandate requiring the black students
into the back would be demeaning, affecting the contract of racially nondiscriminatory
education that section 1981 guarantees. In fact, if blacks were made to sit in the front of the
classroom, the discrimination would likely be no less humiliating because the white and black
students would not be permitted to intermingle. At any rate, the use of a racial basis to
determine which students will sit in the front or rear of the classroom is, at the very least,
arbitrary.
Finally, as indicated above, the act of segregation would itself be humiliating because it
would clearly be an index of the school's attitude regarding the alleged inferiority of black
children. The imposition of a racially based term of a contract imposing humiliation and
degradation upon the psyches of young children likely would invoke the prohibitions of §
1981. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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another. Perhaps such compelled mingling may become a tentative, addi-
tional step towards promoting greater racial tolerance, if not appreciation
and friendship.
Similar projects of equality abound in civil rights laws. While no statute
can require individuals to integrate their circle of friends and lovers, Title
II denies bigots the opportunity to patronize racially segregated public
accommodations. Title VIII and section 1982 similarly proscribe the pur-
ported privilege to live in segregated apartment buildings or neighbor-
hoods. 0 Moreover, the Fair Employment Act prohibits racially segregated
work environments. In many walks of life, the desire for segregation and
the right to advocate segregation and to practice discrimination in private
is mitigated and contradicted by legislatively and judicially mandated inter
fact of races.
The point of the foregoing is simply this: Runyon cannot be viewed
merely as a case arguing that.civil rights involves equalizing objective social
functions such as making contracts to ensure that black dollars buy what
white dollars buy. Much more is at issue than the simple formation of a
garden variety contract in which "the schools would have received payments
for services rendered, and the prospective students would have received
instruction in return for those payments."'4 The Court recognized a strong
underlying social dynamic which holds that with such rights comes a certain
amount of racial interaction, compelling prejudiced individuals to tolerate
racial variety in society. Even young school children will not be immune
from the opportunity to experience racially mixed social environments.
Accordingly, the rationality of civil rights legislation involves a significant
social experiment with all social actors as willing or unwilling participants,
whose prejudices are tested as the insulations that we erect against social
diversity are slowly chipped away. 242 The rationality that supports our civil
240. See infra notes 244-72 and accompanying text.
241. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172. Indeed, the Runyon Court was disingenuous by asserting
that the contract at issue was simply an archetypal contractual transaction. The parents in
Runyon were not buying cars, dishwashers, theater tickets or engaging in the usual commercial
enterprises that are commonly acknowledged. The school experience represents the first time
most children are separated from their parents for any length of time. It is at school that
children first experience a world of other children-a world in which there are new rules, new
demands, new experiences, new social structures-a world in which the individual child is no
longer absolutely unique.
Surely responsible parents are not oblivious to the many and integral effects elementary
education likely will have on their children. The choice of schools, then, is significantly
important and cannot cogently be equated with such routine ventures as buying appliances,
clothes, and the like.
As the foregoing discussion has shown, the Runyon opinion is extremely important in
the realm of civil rights. The Runyon opinion's viability and worth, however, cannot be
supported by stating that all the Court did was to apply a statute on contracts to a simple
contractual transaction.
242. Naturally, section 1981's project of equality energizes the ban against racial segre-
gation in public education as well. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
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rights laws includes a goal-a project-of reinventing social relationships to
help create a society more free from irrational discrimination. 243
457 (1982).
Clearly, the foregoing has a quixotic touch for statutes and legal holdings often fail to
either comport with or to alter social realities. Many contemporary workforces are not free
from unlawful discrimination, neither is housing or accesses to public accommodations.
Moreover, admission and access to costly institutions such as private schools, country clubs
are limited by the economic deprivations inextricably linked to discrimination. Cf. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that Congress may limit funding for abortions). The
right to equal opportunity to compete for slots in a private school may hold little meaning if
there are comparatively few minority families to enter into the competition. And, of course,
the hatred and intolerance that emanates from bigotry may serve as disincentives for individuals
to attempt to exercise their rights.
Nevertheless, the extant system of civil rights laws holds potential to eradicate large
quantities of discrimination from society. Yet, as discrimination is uncovered and dealt with,
other forms of discrimination arise or are discovered. Progressive steps towards a more tolerant
and enlightened society must be considered as only the beginning.
243. The discussion thus far in Part III has presented a line of precedents covering a
number of civil rights topics. The distinct impression left by the discussion may be that
Congress and courts continually have evolved and expanded their notions of impermissible
discrimination, which, to a large measure is true. The foregoing discussion and the following
discussion addressing the Fair Employment Act present strong evidence of our federal govern-
ment's ever growing intolerance of irrational discrimination.
It is necessary, however, to note cases that have limited, in some measure, the upward
spiral of legal theory. In City of Memphis v. Green, the Court held that a governmental act
closing a street to vehicle traffic did not constitute a violation of either the Thirteenth
Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1982 even though the closing resulted in an arguable line of
demarcation separating a black from a white neighborhood which caused some traffic disrup-
tions in the black area. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
Green was a remarkable case because the Court acted more like a finder of fact, analyzing
the particular details of the Memphis street closing, than a court of appellate law that
establishes legal standards for general applicability. See Green, 451 U.S. 100, 130 (White, J.,
concurring). The Green Court concluded that neither the thirteenth amendment nor section
1982 controlled the particular situation because the street closing did not result in any arguable
disparate treatment affecting property on the basis of race. Specifically the Court found that
the street closings did not violate section 1982 because (1) black residents would have been
given the opportunity to petition for a street closing on terms equal to white- residents had
they so desired, (2) the closing resulted in no significant depreciation of property values, and
(3) the closing did not significantly impede, hamper, or delay the flow of traffic into and out
of the black neighborhood. Id. at 120-124.
In a similar fashion, the Green Court determined that no thirteenth amendment violation
occurred. The Court reasoned that the street closing was predicated on genuine health and
safety issues centering around noise and a continuous flow of fast moving traffic that
endangered children as they moved to and from school. Indeed, the Court noted on several
occasions that children have been struck by fast moving cars. The closing of the particular
street, the Court concluded, stemmed the pace of dangerous traffic. Id. at 124-129.
Moreover, the Green Court discerned no racial discriminatory symbolism either from the
street closing itself or from the manifest inconvenient rerouting of traffic into the black
neighborhood. Any such impact, the Court concluded, had but a tangential relation to race.
Because city neighborhoods often tend to become racial or ethnic, affecting the flow of traffic
in neighborhoods unavoidably results in some racial or ethnic impact. The Court in Green,
however determined that this minor impact alone did not give rise to a badge of slavery but
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5. Fair Employment Law-Striking Against Stereotypes, In Favor of a
Society Where People Are Judged on Individual Merit
rather exemplified "a routine burden of citizenship." Id. at 129.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented in Green, finding
that the street closing was patently discriminatory and unlawful. 1d. at 135-155. Although
acknowledging that before the street closing the heavy traffic on the street had posed a danger
to school children, Justice Marshall accented additional factors indicating that the safety issue
was facade to hide the true discriminatory intent of the city. He noted that the procedures
through which the citizens of the white neighborhood petitioned the city to close the street
were highly unusual, especially because no prior notice was given to black property owners.
Id. at 141-144.
Additionally Justice Marshall disputed the majority's holding in Green that the economic
damage and social stigma were de minimis. Id. at 145-146. These factors, coupled with the
tradition of racial discrimination in Memphis in general, and particularly in the litigated areas,
prompted the dissenters to conclude that the city's conduct in closing the street violated both
section 1982 and the thirteenth amendment.
Although Green is one of the most recent statements on section 1982, its place in our
litany of cases is unclear. As Justice White's observation regarding the Green Court's emphasis
on factual detail underscores, so much of the law of Green seems tied to the very unique
facts of that controversy that its use as guiding precedent is problematic. Indeed the majority
does not purport to retreat from any of its previous decisions according an expansive
interpretation to section 1982. See Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523,
1533-36 (11th Cir. 1986) (no evidence of purposeful racial discrimination and no loss of
interests protected under section 1982 and the thirteenth amendment arise from construction
of an industrial plant and rerouting of road adjacent to property owned by black businessmen).
The Court in Green potentially opened a broad legal channel to protect individuals by
intimating that the thirteenth amendment permits private parties to bring discrete actions
claiming constitutional violations not premised on existing federal statutes. See supra note 203.
The Court in Green postponed the opportunity to take certain civil rights concepts to new
levels of analysis. For instance, the court did not resolve the issue upon which it had granted
review-whether section 1982 covers only purposeful discriminatory conduct. Id. at 129-135
(White, J., concurring). Accordingly, it appears as though Green raised more issues than it
resolved.
Not so with General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania which definitively resolved in
the affirmative whether § 1981 limits its coverage solely to purposeful racial discrimination.
458 U.S. 375 (1982). (This holding and the strong historic interrelationship between the statutes
may limit section 1982 to cases of purposeful discriminatory conduct. But cf., id. at 386.)
Reviewing the extensive legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the various
reformulations which culminated in section 1981, the Court in General Building Contractors
determined that the statute was designed to reach only purposeful discrimination, not cases of
disparate discriminatory effect, as the former describes the sort of immediate problems that
concerned framers of early post bellum civil rights legislation. Id. at 384-391.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, vigorously dissented in General Business
Contractors, arguing that the core purpose of the early post Civil War enactments was to
grant individuals rights "in fact" as well as rights in theory. Id. at 409, 407-414 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Thus, withholding coverage in disparate impact cases severely limits section
1981 from achieving its liberating purposes. See supra note 61 and infra notes 368-376
(discussing concept of disparate impact). The Court in General Building Contractors did limit
otherwise expansive Federal court interpretation of civil rights. It must be accented, however,
that although intent is a required element of a section 1981 action, intent may be established
with relative ease by inferential evidence raising a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory
animus. See, e.g., Williams v. Edward Apffels Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir.
1986); Monroe v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 784 F.2d 568, 570-72 (4th Cir. 1986).
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The theme that civil rights statutes are rational because they prohibit
irrational behavior is fortified when considering federal law proscribing
discrimination in employment. As with other civil rights enactments, the
Fair Employment Practices Act of 196424" prohibits certain discriminatory
conduct because such behavior has nothing legitimate to do with the
particular projects of work and employment. Thus, Title VII's prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, color, and
religion are rational because such extraneous considerations humiliate, de-
mean, and offend individuals and unduly restricts their ability ability to
earn a livelihood rather than revealing the true qualifications that applicants
and employees possess to perform certain work.24"
Consistent with the definition of rationality, a clear and primary concern
of Title VII is to protect individuals from unlawful employment practices.
Indeed, the term "individual" is used no less than four times in section
2000e-2(a), accenting congressional recognition that discrimination hurts
every person against whom it is directed. 2 6 Little wonder, then, that the
Supreme Court consistently has held that "the principal focus of the statute
is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of
the minority group as a whole.' 1 7
244. The Fair Employment Practices Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1982)) (hereinafter The Fair Employment Act or Title VII).
245. Courts have applied Title VII in a variety of settings and use a wide range of theories
of discrimination to vindicate the economic integrity and personal dignity of employees and
employment applicants. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986)
(sexual harassment is unlawful per se because, inter alia, it demeans and humiliates employees);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) The court in Griggs declared that it is unlawful
for an employer to rely on unvalidated, non-job related standardized tests when such tests'
results disproportionally disadvantage a class protected under Title VII. The Griggs court noted
that such tests penalize the class for cultural and economic disadvantages beyond their control.
McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 441 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff in Title VII action may
establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination through circumstantial evidence). See
generally Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII,
20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769 (1987) (discussing Title VII's protection from racial and gender
discrimination). Much of the following discussion of Title VII is drawn from this earlier work.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (defining many of the discriminatory practices
made unlawful under Fair Employment Practices Act). Specifically, section 2000e-2(a) states:
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Similar proscriptions attachzto discrimination perpetrated by employment agencies, §
2000e-2(b), and labor unions, § 2000e-2(c).
247. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-454 (1982) (speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan recounted numerous remarks in the legislative history emphasizing that Title VII
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Title VII's focus on the individual has prompted courts to apply a
broad definition of discrimination. For instance, the prohibition against
discrimination towards any individual means that Title VII protects whites
as well as non-whites. 5 Moreover, an individual may assert a Title VII
claim even if a defendant employer can demonstrate that, as a general
matter, the employer's policies or procedures do not discriminate against
the protected group of which the individual is a member.249 As one district
court has noted, anything less would fail to comport with the "respect and
dignity" that Title VII accords to every person.250
Along similar lines, we have seen that governmental action may be
rational if it is designed to eradicate outmoded concepts of group roles and
norms in society. Indeed, the commitment of a civil rights statute towards
eliminating unlawful discrimination may be measured, in large part, by its
effect on prevailing stereotypes associated with forbidden criteria such as
race or sex. Clearly, stereotypical assumptions such as blacks and whites
cannot work in harmony or a woman's proper role is as a housewife/
mother may play no part in an employer's employment decisions under title
VII's proscriptions of racial and sexual discrimination.
The statute, however, goes beyond invalidating the most blatant forms
of discrimination based on stereotype in the workforce. Indeed, courts-have
consistently applied Title VII in a wide variety of situations, defining
employer use of virtually any racial or sexual stereotype as unlawfully
discriminatory. Thus, for example, in an early decision invalidating a policy
requiring that female, but not male, flight attendants be unmarried, the
Seventh Circuit held,
The scope of [Title VII] is not confined to explicit discrimination
based solely on sex ... [the statute was] intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.
25'
protects all individual discriminatees). Identically, Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "Even
if the statutory language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus
on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." Dept. of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 709 (1978); see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95
(1973); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) ("it is clear beyond
cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each
applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race are
already proportionally represented in the work force") (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
248. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 437 U.S. 273, 278 (1976). The
Court in McDonald also held that section 1981 protects whites. Id. at 285-96.
249. See Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (employer's policy
of only hiring bricklayers previously known to employer may result in discriminatory denial
of employment opportunity to "at the gate" unfamiliar minority applicants even if minority
group is well represented in bricklayer workforce); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)
(individual may challenge a sub-portion of employer's hiring process even if the final hiring
statistics reveal no unlawful discrimination).
250. See Aros v. McDonnel Douglas Corp. 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Ca. 1972).
251. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
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The Supreme Court has totally rejected reliance upon stereotypical
assumptions regarding gender and race to justify discriminatory employment
policies. The leading precedents are particularly instructive regarding un-
derstanding the rationality of the statute because the stereotypes invalidated
in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,252 and Arizona
Governing Committee v. Norris,25 3 were factually valid. Indeed, the court
directly stated:
The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes
treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class .... Even a true generalization about the
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to
whom the generalization does not apply.
254
"As a class, women live longer than men. For this reason, the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power required its female employees to
make larger contributions to its pension fund than its male employees."2' "
Nevertheless, the Court held that an employer may not compel individual
women to contribute more money to their pension accounts during the
terms of their employment than similarly situated men.2
6
Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, began his analysis by noting:
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could
fashion his personnel policies on the basis of assumptions about
the differences between men and women, whether or not the as-
sumptions were valid.
It is now well-recognized that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the character-
istics of males or females.
257
U.S. 991 (1971). The Sprogis opinion has been repeatedly cited as a guidepost for Title VII
analysis. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986); Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
252. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
253. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam).
254. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added). Naturally, there are limited instances
where usually unlawful criteria, such as gender, may be considered by an employer. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (the bonafide occupation qualification defense); Western Airlines
v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (bona fide occupation qualification defense in age discrimi-
nation cases).
The hallmark of such defenses is that the employer can demonstrate that recourse to
otherwise unlawful criteria is necessary in the challenged instance. For example, a theatrical
product may make sex based hiring choices to correspond with the gender of the role. It is
important to accent, however, that, with extremely rare exception, the preferences of customers
is insufficient to justify discrimination. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 517
F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tx. 1981) (invalidating defendant's policy limiting the positions of flight
attendants and ticket agents to women) with AFSCME v. Michigan, 40 FEP 1648 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (customer preference concerning intimate bodily or other privacy interests may constitute
a BFOQ).
255. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704.
256. Id. at 707-718.
257. Id. at 707 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens continued: "Myths and purely habitual
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Justice Stevens next noted that although the stereotype upon which the
pension plan was bottomed-the greater longevity of women as compared
with men-is generally accurate, the classwide longevity is not shared by
every woman within the group. Thus, some women will be forced to pay
more money than men into the pension plan-and thereby receive smaller
monthly salaries-without collecting greater net pension payments than
similarly situated males. Justice Stevens concluded that Title VII's protection
of each individual from unlawful discrimination stops an employer from
charging female employees more money on the presumption that, as a class,




Manhart concerned a mandatory pension plan designed and administered
by the employer charging female employees more in monthly contributions
than similarly situated men to receive equal pension benefits. Hinting that
the opinion may be limited to its facts, the Court cautioned that Title VII
does not "revolutionize the insurance and pension industries.
' 259
Whatever doubt existed concerning the application of Manhart to the
full range of employment situations was ended by the Court's opinion in
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris26° holding that Title VII, "prohibits
an employer from offering its employees the option of receiving retirement
benefits from one of ,several companies selected by the employer, all of
which pay a woman lower monthly benefits than a man who has made the
same contributions ....
The pension program under challenge was neither designed nor operated
by the defendant-employer. Rather, wishing to offer its employees a pension
assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer
acceptable response for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less." Id.
258. Id. at 708-710. The Court rejected the employer's argument that the policy discrim-
inated on the basis of longevity rather than sex. "Such a practice does not pass the simple
test of whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a manner which but for that
person's sex would be different."' Id. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment
Discrimination and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HLv. L. Ray. 1109, 1170
(1971)).
259. Manhart, 435 U.S at 717. The Manhart Court clarified further that while an employer
cannot relegate the administration of the plan to a corporate shell in order to avoid liability
an employer does not violate Title VII by giving all similarly situated employees an equal sum
of money to purchase their own pension plans on the open market even if such plans may be
sexually discriminatory. Id. at 717 n.33.
260. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam).
261. Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1075 (emphasis added). The
per curiam holding declined to award retroactive relief. Id. The majority rationale in Norris
that supports the pension plan's invalidation was written by Justice Marshall with whom
Justices Brennan, White, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Id. at 1075-1091 (hereinafter Marshall
Opinion). Additionally, Justice Marshall, with Justices Brennan, White and Stevens, dissented
from the denial of retroactive relief. Id. at 1091-1095. Justice Powell wrote for a majority
consisting of himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and O'Connor
regarding the issue of relief. Id. at 1105-1107. In addition, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented from the finding of liability under
the statute. Id. at 1095-1105. Finally, Justice O'Connor, who supplied the "swing" vote for
both issues, clarified her position at 1107-1111.
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plan, the employer contracted for a plan designed and administered by a
third party.262 Employee participation in the program was strictly voluntary,
with deductions calculated from participating workers' monthly salaries
without regard to gender. Upon retirement, employees could choose from
three options263 one of which, the pension annuity plan, was predicated on
sexually-based actuarial tables disbursing lower monthly income to female
retirees than to similarly situated males.
2 64
The Court found the employer's scheme indistinguishable from the plan
invalidated in Manhart so far as discrimination under Title VII was con-
cerned. 265 Recalling Manhart's admonitions against the use of any stereotype
which effectively discriminates against individuals on the basis of a forbidden
criterion, the Court rejected the justification that the pension plan's actuarial
value for the group of female retirees would equal the value for the group
of male retirees. Rather, the plan was unlawful since individual female
retirees may predecease similarly situated males and thereby receive less in
benefits despite their equal contributions.
266
Expanding earlier concepts of discrimination, the Co'urt found factual
distinctions between Norris and Manhart immaterial. Specifically, neither
the fact that participation in the plan was voluntary nor the existence of
non-gender based retirement options rendered the sexually premissed an-
nuities plan nondiscriminatory. The Court unequivocally stated:
Title VII forbids all discrimination concerning "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment," not just discrimination
concerning those aspects of employment relationships as to which
the employee has no choice .... An employer that offers one fringe
benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape liability because he
also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 267
The Norris and Manhart precedents accept Congress' determination
that, with very limited exceptions, race and gender are irrelevant consider-
ations in the labor market.
268
262. Marshall Opinion, supra note 261 at 1075-1078. Regarding the technical operation
of the plan, the defendant-employer's role was limited to deducting contributions from
participating employees and channeling the money to the pension company which invested the
funds in a diversified portfolio. The employer made no contributions itself. Id.
263. Two options were nondiscriminatory. Employees could simply retrieve their entire
funds of contributions and accumulated interest or could have funds divided over a set of
periodic payments. Id. at 1076.
264. Id. at 1076-1078. Sex was the major discriminatory factor. No other considerations
which might affect longevity, such as alcohol or cigarette consumption, were utilized. Never-
theless, the annuity option was the most popular choice among retirement benefits for it
guaranteed a set income for the remainder of the retiree's life. Additionally, it was more tax
advantageous than receiving a lump-sum type payment.
265. "We have no hesitation in holding ... that the classification of employees on the
basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the pay-
in stage." Id. at 1081.
266. Id. at 1081-1086.
267. Id. at 1081, n.10 (emphasis added).
268. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709; Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084 (1983). However, application of
[Vol. 45:1
IRRATIONAL UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
The brief discussion accenting major philosophical underpinnings of
Title VII shows that the statute, joining the other reviewed enactments, is
rational under our definition of "rationality." The behavior Title VII
proscribes does not concern qualifications, attitude, or other considerations
truly related to the issue whether a person can or cannot perform given
work. Rather, discrimination under the Act serves no function other than
to demean, humiliate and debase individuals regarding criteria and consid-
erations wholly unrelated to rational terms and conditions of employment.
As Manhart and Norris emphasize, it is not necessary that the defendant
intended to disadvantage and humiliate the plaintiffs. Apparently, the
pension programs invalidated therein were neither designed nor administered
to harm or demean women. Rather, they were based on accurate predictions
that, as a happenstance, the class of women will likely outlive the class of
men. Nevertheless, Title VII's proscriptions invalidate reliance on any con-
dition, standard, test or policy which disadvantages any individual on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin or religion. The scientific accuracy
and economic convenience of the gender-based annuity schemes were not
availing. Whatever their worth or logic in other realms, the introduction of
sexually disparate pension plans contravened Congress' unabashed reinven-
tion of the workplace into a setting wherein race and gender discrimination
are simply intolerable.
269
Moreover, Manhart and Norris accent that discrimination is not limited
to considerations of economics. Rather, discrimination, although undeniably
intertwined with economic issues, relates first and foremost to the basic
dignity and integrity to which every individual is entitled. In Norris, partic-
ularly, we see that the availability of non-discriminatory options concerning
a term of employment in no manner relieved the employer from responsi-
bility for engaging in discriminatory practices. This indicates that it is the
very act of discrimination-regardless of the severity of its consequences-
which offends Title VII and that statute's underlying social philosophy
protecting individuality and self-worth. 270
Furthermore, Title VII, joining the previously discussed statutes, seeks
to boldly create a new social reality free from arbitrary discrimination. This
is clear in every instance of Title VII liability; however, it is particularly
a discriminatory policy based on sexual stereotypes may be justifiable if the employer can
demonstrate that the policy is necessary for the safe and efficient performance of work. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception)"; supra
note 254. Since, by definition, a pension plan bears no relation to an individual's ability to
perform a job, the statutory defense is inapplicable to discriminatory retirement plans. Norris,
463 U.S. at 1084, n.13.
269. Compare Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709; Norris, 463 U.S. at 1079-1091 with Norris, 463
U.S. at 1103-1105 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
270. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2406 (1986) (sexual harassment
is unlawful regardless whether it results in economic detriment to the victim). The courts have
likewise recognized causes of action sounding in other forms such as national origin harassment.
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Cariddi
v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
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emphasized and clarified in Manhart and Norris. The defendants argued
that to restructure the existing employment pension plans would contradict
the prevailing insurance systems, predicated, inter alia, on sexually segre-
gated actuarial tables. 271 The Court responded that whatever may be the
reality in other areas, Congress' decree making unlawful sex discrimination
in employment means that, so far as that area is concerned, gender conscious
terms and conditions of employment are uniformly proscribed, 2 Thus the
employment realm could no longer mimic the prejudices of other sectors.
In this way, the Manhart and Norris opinions show that Title VII serves
not merely to grant a legal capacity to be free from discrimination, but
also forcefully restructures large segments of the employment system to
fulfill the promise of equality.
6. Conclusions Regarding Rationality in Civil Rights and Constitutional
Law
Having perused significant civil rights schemes, we may now summarize
comparisons between the definition o f rationality under equal protection
analysis and rationality concerning civil rights statutes.
The crux of the equal protection definition of "rationality" states that
a governmental entity acts irrationally when it creates a classification which
does not promote a legitimate goal or which pursues a goal through
illegitimate means. Similarly, the underlying rationality of civil rights statutes
is premised on the fact that the behavior they control concerns governmental
and private actions premised on classifications either unrelated to legitimate
goals or utilizing illegitimate means. Racial or sexual discrimination in such
projects as housing and employment, for example, in no wise promote any
valid aim or goal associated with those projects.
Honing the definition of rationality to make it more easily applicable
to specific factual settings, we determined that governmental classifications
violate the equal protection clauses' mandate of minimal rationality if a
societal cost/benefit analysis reveals that the classifications are more socially
dysfunctional than useful. We determined that individuals are entitled to a
minimal level of dignity and respect. 273 Although not easily susceptible to
abstract definitions, denial of such different treatment can be recognized
on a case-by-case basis informed by general notion of fairness and ration-
ality. Clearly, each civil right enactment discussed herein concerns denial of
rudimentary fair treatment, dignity and respect to individuals.
Explicating the definition even further, we culled certain operative
measures with which to assess the rationality of governmental actions. Each
one is applicable in the civil rights statutory context as well.
271. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710-711, 715-716.
272. Id. .. . there is no reason to believe that Congress intended a special definition of
discrimination in the context of employee group insurance coverage." Id. at 710; see also id.
at 716-717.
1 273. See supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
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First, we determined that governmental action violates equal protection
standards if the choice of classifications is so random that a coin flip would
serve as well to decide which classes would promote the governmental
purposes or ends.274 Under our civil rights analysis we have seen that much
discrimination is purposeful; but, even assuming that these racial or sexual
classifications were neither invidious nor based on misplaced paternalism,
the decision to classify under such criteria are not better than a flip of a
coin. Were we to posit a racial classification in employment, for instance,
which was designed not to harm individuals but to promote efficiency, we
would still be forced to conclude that such racial distinctions are irrational.
Why require whites to perform some act or receive some sort of treatment-
beneficial or detrimental-which blacks do not? Even if the ultimate result
does enhance efficiency or promote some other legitimate goal, and even if
race is an easy way to classify for efficiency purposes, the ultimate choice
imposing benefits or burdens on one particular race over another would be
no more reasonable than the sex based decision favoring males in Reed v.
Reed.275
The second concept of rationality holds that the government may not
use its powers to deliberately harm and punish downtrodden or unpopular
groups due solely to their downtrodden or unpopular statuses. 276 Surely, no
greater reason explains the emergence of our complex statutory scheme of
civil rights than the persistent efforts of official and private organs to
demean, humiliate, control, punish and harm politically weak and unpopular
groups. Discrimination based on race and national origin clearly recall these
considerations of rationality. Discrimination on the basis of gender is no
different. Even if it may be debated whether women constitute an "unpop-
ular" group, the roles and goals upon which sexual discrimination is
premised define certain concepts of what women may or may not do in
society. 277 Thus, for women to seek equality of opportunity in employment
and housing represents endeavors unpopular to those who fear to live in a
society where all individuals may be judged on their individual merits.
The third consideration, as the discussion of Zobel v. Williams high-
lighted,278 establishes that equal protection rationality analysis prohibits
official actions which create useless castes in society. Similarly, racially
restricted public accommodations, segregated work forces and ghetto com-
munities perpetuate destructive, irrational caste systems inimicable to a
society dedicated to preserving the integrity and dignity of all its members.
Civil rights statutes which prohibit caste creating forms of discrimination
are surely rational.
274. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
275. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Reed).
276. See supra notes 98-129 and accompanying text.
277. See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. (1977).
278. See supra notes 130-145 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Zobel).
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Finally, we have noted in our statutory analysis a vigorous trend
reflecting a national imperative to eradicate recognized forms of arbitrary
discrimination in many aspects of social interaction. This imperative-or
project of equality-involves a serious reordering of power relations among
corporate and private individuals and between individuals and their govern-
ments. One might go so far to assert that our earlier discussed equal
protection analysis coupled with the civil rights statutory scheme present a
reinvention of fundamental customs, perceptions, and presumptions affect-
ing all social actors from realtors to restauranteurs-corporations to school
children. It is truly a national endeavor to attain a greater moral authority
for our society. Yet, the endeavor falls short of the mark.
D. The Unconstitutional Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Statutes
The rules of rationality which energize and inform equal protection
analysis concern our most basic, yet most enlightened, precepts addressing
our worth both as individuals and as a collective. The promise of equal
protection lies in the predominate goal of securing a society which protects
and preserves to the fullest the individual dignity and integrity of each social
actor.
Of course, this interpretation may be severely criticized by those who,
amassing considerable legal, historical and sociological evidence, point to
the myriad ways governmental bodies and private groups alike have per-
sistently sought to trample many forms of individuality with which they
could not abide. 279 Undoubtedly, history and law are marred by actions
reflecting the worst instincts of our nature. Nevertheless, much of the
foregoing analysis attests to the progress that has occurred regarding sen-
sitivity to civil rights.
It is apparent that we have reached a major turning point in fulfilling
the promise of our constitutional system, for more and more persons in
our society are demanding that the various governmental entities in society
protect them from myriad forms of irrational discrimination. Therefore,
can we and should we stop the progress of civil rights, declaring that we
have reached some arbitrary satiation point from which society will budge
no further regarding pleas to eradicate irrational discrimination? To stop
now would stem the legitimate hope and expectations of persons who wait
with ever growing impatience for the time when they too will be protected
from the humiliation, domination, and loss of opportunities resulting from
arbitrary discrimination. If corrective legislation is not forthcoming, these
disadvantaged individuals' protection must arise from another source. The
theory is brief: so far as they go, the civil rights statutes are rational and
worthwhile. But they are underinclusive because they do not protect every
individual from all arbitrary treatment in such realms as housing, employ-
279. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (state may criminalize privately




ment and public accommodations. It is the thesis of this work that not only
does a full reading of our rationality analysis require the reformation of
existing civil rights statutes to cover all applicable individuals, but also, we
are capable of passing, enforcing, and living with such laws.
1. Reforming Civil Rights Law to Meet Our Definitions of
"'Rationality"
Recall that we divided civil rights statutory schemes into two parts: the
first conceives a social project such as employment, housing, or contracting
while the second part consists of a discrete list of protected classes.
The second part of the statutory scheme is problematic under the
definition of "rationality" for one must ask for what purposes and under
what authority does Congress limit the protection of civil rights laws to but
a handful-albeit a vital handful-of protected classes? Why is the protec-
tion concerning social projects such as employment or housing not offered
to all who suffer from irrational discrimination?
From the statutory scheme itself we glean a possible answer: the statutes
are designed to protect favored groups which, because of a recognized
history of discrimination coupled with their political power, have been able
to secure much deserved protection without regard to others who might
suffer equally felt but less popularly acknowledged irrational discrimination.
If the project of civil rights laws is to favor some downtrodden groups or
individuals over others, then the project fails to conform with even minimal
rationality under our definition.
2 0
For example, consider the civil rights to three groups of individuals: (1)
those who practice alternative sexual preferences, particularly homosexuals;
(2) those who suffer discrimination because of personal appearance; and,
(3) those who cohabitate although unmarried. Addressing the first category,
homosexuals present an example of a group battling for nothing more than
those rights which we have discerned to be the very essence of minimal
dignity, humanity, and individuality. To date, for instance, no federal fair
employment statute protects homosexuals' neither do most state laws. 2 2
Yet, given the logic of such statutes, as detailed in the last sections, it seems
simple to prove that sexual preference discrimination is no more justifiable
than other covered criteria such as race or gender.
Applying our definition of rationality as derived from statutes proscrib-
ing racial, gender, and ethnic discrimination we discover that individuals'
280. Recall, as a threslbold point, that the usual legislative perogative to enact remedial
legislation in increments cannot save underinclusive civil rights laws because such laws address
fundamental concepts of fairness. See supra notes 160-176 and accompanying text.
281. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title
VII does not address discrimination predicated solely on sexual preference).
282. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal.3d 458 156 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 595. P.2d 592 (1979) (California fair employment practices act does not cover
homosexuals); Macley v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 379 Mass. 279, 397 N.E.2d
670 (1979) (same holding regarding Massachusetts' employment discrimination statute).
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sexual preferences have nothing to do with-are no index of-their ability
to perform a given job, be a peaceful and orderly tenant, fulfill a contract
or enjoy a public accommodation. Indeed, sexual preference is as useless
as sex, race, national origin, color or religion to predict given persons'
levels of skill, talent, attitude, or inherent worth. The exclusion of sexual
preference from the myriad statutes discussed in this work betrays the very
notion of a civil rights enactment because it permits a virulent form of
irrational discrimination to exist unremedied.
Subjecting sexual preference to the sub-classifications of rationality
under equal protection analysis fortifies the foregoing conclusion. Suppose
Congress argues that it has not covered sexual preference because it decided
that it would be too difficult or confusing to protect all deserving parties
under a single statute through one sweep of the legislative hand. Thus, the
argument would go, something had to be excluded, protection for sexual
preference just happened to be it. Such a rationale violates the first sub-
tenet of rationality which forbids classifications to be derived through
processes little better than a throw of dice. Just as the male preference
classification of Reed v. Reed, although containing a surface form of
seeming rationality, was struck as irrational, so too would the decision to
exclude homosexual preference in favor of other forms of protections. It is
not at all clear-in light of our definition of rationality-that those who
suffer from sexual preference discrimination are hurt any less deeply,
humiliated any less greatly, or disadvantaged any less gravely than a person
discriminated against on the basis of race, gender or religion. Certainly,
homosexuals endure severe economic harm through myriad forms of dis-
crimination. Thus, the decision to protect those latter forms of discrimi-
nation over other forms, such as sexual preference, is as irrational as
flipping a coin to decide classifications.
Of course, there is the long-standing argument that some groups have
suffered such historic and persistent discrimination that the unfairness
became too blatant to be denied, finally triggering in the hearts of legislators
and judges the basic decency and humanity to establish some forms of
relief. According to this theory, when a group satisfies certain judicially
created requisites of suffering they are accorded special protections by our
Constitution.283 While this concept of "suspect class" has enjoyed consid-
erable success as controlling doctrine, it is unclear why any group or
individual should be made to wait some arbitrary time limit or forced to
endure some socially designated "right of passage" from ignored, down-
troddeness to elevation to status of societal concern before their victimization
283. Perhaps the most quoted formulation of the "suspect classification" concept is
Justice Stone's observation that governments must not act in manner reflecting "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities ... which tends ... to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities." U.S. v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 159-163 n.4 (1938). Recently, speaking for the Court, Justice Powell
explicated those factors judicially recognized as indispensable to demonstrating the suspectness
of a classification. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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from arbitrary treatment is remedied. The very existence of arbitrary treat-
ment is sufficient reason to generate official protection and relief as, indeed,
much of the earlier explicated equal protection precedent demonstrates.
Furthermore, while it is undeniable that provisions such as the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments were adopted initially in response to the needs
of the newly freed slave race, those provisions have been expanded far
beyond considerations of race. The foregoing discussions have shown that
concepts of equal protection of the laws inures to every group and each
individual in society. Identically, the thirteenth amendment's proscriptions
protect any individual against slavery and involuntary servitude, not simply
those enslaved on the basis of race. Similarly, exercising its powers under
section 2 of that amendment, Congress has legislated against gender, national
origin, and religious discrimination in housing as well as treatment based
on race and color. Congress and the courts have correctly reasoned that
many groups may suffer ill effects of discrimination so reminiscent of race
that they too must be protected. It is far too late, therefore, to stem this
tide by reference to the historical events which gave rise to our broad-based
constitutional and statutory protections.3 4
Naturally, the fact that society will condemn all forms of arbitrary
discrimination does not imply that the same amount or type of societal
resources must be expended regardless of the form of discrimination. It
seems rational and appropriate to spend more of society's resources to fight
the most pervasive and persistent forms of discrimination while according
necessarily smaller amounts of such resources to handle correspondingly less
widespread discrimination. Such logical disbursement of money, time and
other societal goods to handle irrational discrimination is much different
from simply ignoring discrimination and, thereby, allowing its harm to
thrive. At the very least, private causes of action should be permitted to
those who wish to vindicate their rights.
Considering, next, the second sub-tenet, it seems clear that any action
by governmental entities to punish or degrade homosexuals simply because
of their political powerlessness or unpopularity among certain factions
constitutes an irrational and wholly impermissible purpose. Numerous cases,
previously discussed, involving illegitimate children, the mentally impaired,
political nonconformists, sexually active singles, and other groups demon-
strate that the Constitution protects those who are too weak to face alone
the wrath of irrational and selfish power elites. Thus, going back to our
specific example, Congress cannot justify its exclusion of homosexuals from
civil rights protection by casually asserting that they are not worthy of
protection, that such groups because of their nonconformity to so-called
284. Commenting on Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., Justice Stevens observed, ". . . even
if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely
accords with the prevailing sense of justice today." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (1967), supra notes 197-210 and
accompanying text. Stevens stated that the Jones opinion has become "an important part of
the fabric of our law." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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norms are to be more despised than protected, or because the members of
Congress fear that it will be politically dangerous to protect that group. As
the equal protection cases show, the rights of individuals ought not be
trampled by pure, partisai politics.
285
Finally, the third sub-tenet informs us that Congress, or any govern-
mental body, cannot simply use the device of classification to tautologically
assert that the classification must be rational. This is particularly important
when, as in Zobel v. Williams, the classification threatens, albeit inadver-
tently, to create a caste system through which innocent groups are subject
to arbitrary treatment regarding the disbursement of governmental largess.
Certainly, the standard is no less regarding important civil rights.
Segregating and isolating homosexuals from social projects such as
housing and employment invites the creation of a hurtful and useless caste
system. To be sure, there are many in society who would not care to work
with, eat near, live along-side-of, or otherwise be reminded of the existence
of homosexuals. These persons' wishes, should be accorded no greater
deference than those who wish the same treatment for blacks, women, Jews,
Asians, or any other of the seemingly inexhaustible lists of groups and
individuals against whom arbitrary discrimination has become common-
place.
28 6
A similar analysis informs application of the proposed theory of ra-
tionality to classifications based on appearance and on marital status . 287 As
the Harvard Law Review recently noted:
Although our society professes a commitment to judge people by
their inner worth, physically unattractive people often face differ-
ential and unequal treatment in situations in which their appearance
is unrelated to their qualifications or abilities. In the employment
285. Moreover, it is not necessary to demonstrate that homosexuality is an immutable
characteristic. Our equal protection analysis has demonstrated that the Constitution protects
alternative life styles and advocates of unpopular political/social philosophies. See supra notes
98-129 and accompanying text. Similarly, the fact that states may criminalize certain homosexual
conduct does not mean that states may extract penalties, in the form of civil rights depravation,
for those who admit their homosexuality. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841
(1986), with Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (Army may not
discharge soldier solely because soldier is acknowledged homosexual), reh'g granted, 847 F.2d
1362 (1988). But see Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1353-62 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). As noted earlier,
homosexuality, like race or gender, does not address the legitimate concerns associated with
housing, employment and the like. Neither can it seriously be argued that a homosexual's
mere presence could constitute a corrupting influence sufficient to justify discrimination.
Certainly, unsolicited or disruptive homosexual overtures, like similar heterosexual overtures,
may unduly disrupt workforces, apartment buildings, and public accommodations sufficiently
to justify disciplinary action. The status of being homosexual, however, is no more relevant
to projects such as housing and employment, than is the status of being heterosexual. Such
statutes are not rational bases for discrimination.
286. Similarly, we might add sex, national origin, sexual preference, and religion to the
protective coverage of section 1981 and section 1982.
287. See infra note 295 for a discussion of one important distinction.
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context [,for example,] appearance often functions as an illegitimate
basis on which to deny people jobs for which they are otherwise
qualified.
28
The Note documents that generally accepted standards defining physical
attractiveness exist and are actively promoted within the various sectors of
American society. These standards are applied in all walks of life, providing
so-called attractive individuals with opportunities and expectations consid-
erably more enhanced than those enjoyed by individuals perceived to be
less physically attractive.
28 9
Based on the empirical investigation revealing the nature and effects of
discrimination in the employment context,290 the author concluded, "...
appearance, like race and gender, is almost always an illegitimate employ-
ment criterion ... it is frequently used to make decisions based on personal
dislike or prejudicial assumptions rather than actual merit." 29'
Likewise, the third proposed criterion-marital status-is often an ir-
rational basis upon which to classify and to affect the lives and livelihoods
of individuals. One arguable instance, to illustrate the point concerns
discrimination in housing. The previously discussed Federal Fair Housing
Act292 permits landlords and vendors to refuse to sell and rent because of
the perspective tenant's or vendee's marital status. Yet, it is not clear why
single individuals or those who cohabitate but are unmarried should be
denied housing. Certainly, the bold presumptions that such individuals are
288. See Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrim-
ination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HAgv. L. REv. 2035, 2037 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
289. Id. at 2036-2042. For instance, parents and teachers treat unattractive children more
severely and presume them to be less capable than so-called attractive youngsters. This stigma
follows such individuals throughout adulthood. "Ugly" persons are apt to receive harsher
treatment from courts than are "beautiful" people. Strangers are less inclined to assist
unattractive individuals and ". . . studies have shown that in general, attractive people are
disproportionately likely to receive credit for good outcomes, whereas the good outcomes of
unattractive people are more likely to be attributed to external factors, such as luck." Id. at
2039 (footnote omitted).
290. Focusing on the singular question of employment discrimination, the Author argues
that The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), should be read to protect
individuals against discriminatory treatment based on personal appearance factors unrelated to
qualification or merit. Id. at 2043-51.
Understandably, based on current precedent, the Note waives away recourse to the
Constitution as a buttress against such irrational discrimination. Id. at 2042. "These victims
could plausibly frame a constitutional equal protection challenge, although this appears unlikely
given current restrictive interpretations of the clause's reach." Id. This article attempts to
show that contemporary equal protection analysis, taken to its logical and worthwhile limits,
requires that extant civil rights legislation specifically proscribe irrational instances of personal
appearance discrimination.
291. Id. at 1035; cf. Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769, 837-873 (1987) (arguing that the Fair Employment
Act must cover discrimination based on factors such as grooming, dress, and physical
appearance when such considerations are linked to prohibited criteria such as race and sex).
292. See supra notes 211-219 and accompanying text.
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unworthy and will be poor neighbors are as irrational as basing similar
conclusions on the bases of the individuals race, religion or gender. In all
such instances, the classifications fail to adequately inform interested parties
whether the affected persons will be peaceful homeowners or tenants.
Rather, the discriminations are based on personal distaste, misinformed
stereotyping or both.
293
293. Indeed, even a statute which expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"marital status" may not protect individuals who are discriminated against because they are
not married. For instance, Maryland's Fair Housing Act provides that:
because of ... marital status . . . for any person having the right to sell, rent,
lease, control, construct or manage any dwelling. . . (2) To discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith . . . (6) To include in
any transfer, sale, rental or lease of housing any restrictive covenant that discrimi-
nates; or for any person to honor or exercise, or attempt to honor or exercise any
discriminatory covenant pertaining to housing.
49B MD. ANN. CODE §§ 20(a)(2), (6).
In Maryland Comm'n on Human Rights v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc. an unmarried mother
of a young boy, C. Lynn Kuhr, applied to purchase a co-operative apartment from the
defendant. 300 Md. 75, 475 A.2d 1192 (1984). Her application was duly approved by the
defendant subject to the co-op's bylaws that limited occupancy of any unit to members of the
owner's "immediate family." Id. at 1193. The definition of "immediate family," however,
included the unit owner's "husband" or "wife." Id. at 1195. Shortly after taking occupancy,
one Richard Searight moved into the apartment with Ms. Kuhr and her son. Because male
cohabitants were not listed in the by-law's definition of "immediate family," the defendants
threatened to terminate Ms. Kuhr's contract.
Ruling for the defendant, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the proscription
against "marital status" discrimination in the state fair housing statute was not violated. The
majority reasoned that the defendant opposed Mr. Searight's occupancy not because he and
Ms. Kuhr were unmarried but because they were unrelated. The same result, the Court argued,
would have applied if "Searight had been Kuhr's best girlfriend, her favorite aunt, her destitute
cousin, or her infant nephew." Id. at 1196.
The dissent, however, noted that spouses are included in the bylaw's explication of
"immediate family." Thus, had Mr. Searight been Ms. Kuhr's husband, he could have moved
into the unit, utilized the parking and other facilities without any interference whatsoever. The
dissent concluded:
Manifestly, under the applicable contractual convenant, Kuhr's right to reside in a
Greenbelt housing unit with Searight depended upon whether she was "married or
not married" and, therefore, depended upon her "marital status."
Id. at 1198 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
More remarkable was an earlier lower court decision, cited approvingly in the above
discussed opinion, wherein the Court held that an unmarried couple's unsuccessful attempt to
purchase a unit in Greenbelt Homes was not based on "marital status" discrimination even
though the application was denied solely "because [the applicants] were not married." See
Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 49 Md. App. 314, 315, 431 A.2d 745, 746
(1981). The Court reasoned that, "neither Mr. Hemphill nor Ms. Bradley were denied
membership in Greenbelt Homes, Inc. because he or she was single. They were denied joint
membership because neither Greenbelt nor the law of Maryland recognized their union as
cloaking them with a 'marital status'." Id. at 748 (emphasis supplied).
Surely, this rationale seems to owe more to Lewis Carroll or Joseph Heller than to
Holmes or Frankfurter. The Greenbelt Homes Court concluded that because the plaintiffs
were not married they had no marital status. Thus, it would seem that it was the lack of a
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Identically, Federal civil rights laws do not proscribe marital status
discrimination in such realms as employment, contracting, and the sale, use
and disposition of property.
Personal appearance and marital status conform with the offered defi-
nition of irrational classification. As with race, gender, and other usually
prohibited criteria, physical attractiveness and marital status are unrelated
to-have no useful, legitimate nexus with-those projects to which the
prejudice might be applied. Appearance and marriage do little to inform
about an individual's ability to work, desire to be a good neighbor, or
willingness to faithfully fulfill the terms of a contract.
Applying our specific measures of rationality to the two examples
emphasizes the strength of the foregoing conclusion. The omission of such
classifications from civil rights laws cannot be adequately justified by arguing
that it would be too cumbersome, inefficient, or administratively inconven-
ient to include marital status and personal appearance within the protection
of the statute. As has been shown, convenience and efficiency are insufficient
bases to compel powerless individuals to suffer the devastating effects of
irrational discrimination. Surely, individuals who are refused employment
or housing because of their marital status or appearance are demeaned,
humiliated, and disadvantaged in a manner most similar to those who are
denied such opportunities on the bases of classifications more generally
acknowledged to be arbitrary.
29 4
Moreover, pursuant to the second index of rationality, legislators are
without authority under the Constitution to refuse legislative assistance to
groups simply because the law-makers dislike those groups or deem it to be
politically inexpedient to protect them from arbitrary discrimination. Leg-
islators may be insensitive or hostile to the legitimate needs of the alleged
physically unattractive or those who suffer marital status discrimination.
Such motivations, however, may play no constitutionally legitimate role in
the defining of rights or the doling of largess.
Looking to the third sub-tenet, legislatures may not create useless caste
systems. The segregation and demeaning of the so-called ugly disgraces
many areas of social intercourse. While such considerations may be rational
legally acceptable marital status which led to Greenbelt Homes' decision to deny the couple's
application to purchase a unit. Certainly, it is no stretch of law or logic to conclude that
"because of" the lack of the appropriate "marital status" the plaintiffs were denied housing.
The Greenbelt Homes opinions, however, are not atypical. See, e.g., McMinn v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 105 A.D.2d 46, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776-77 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 544 (1985) (local zoning ordinance that prohibited occupancy of single-
family homes by two persons unrelated by blood, adoption or marriage did not contravene
State Human Rights Law which prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of "marital
status").
294. Some courts have upheld employer's rules forbidding the hiring or retention of
employees' spouses although the policy results in a disparate impact against women. Compare
Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978) (upholding "no-spouse rule") with EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 40 FEP 580 (8th Cir.
1986) (invalidating "no-spouse rule").
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or useful in certain extremely personal decisions, such as the choice of
friends and lovers, 295 discrimination on physical attractiveness threatens to
form a caste of persons whose inherent worth is measured only by their
surface appearance, with little if any consideration of the myriad other
facets which combine to define the whole individual. Thus, the example of
homosexuals, persons who are perceived to be unattractive, and those who
are discriminated against on the basis of their marital status explicate the
irrational underinclusiveness of the civil rights laws.
Now, the problem with the foregoing is simply this: we can add
protection to cover sexual preferences discrimination and thus include an-
other protected group to our civil rights laws. 296 But we could immediately
find other groups which receive little or no protection. We might ask why
the elderly are discriminated against in certain social projects, or why
otherwise capable handicapped persons may be discriminated against in
given situations. Similarly, we might ask why persons should be judged by
the clothes they wear, the schools they went to, the politics they espouse
or any other factor which can be demonstrated to be unrelated to the
particular social project involved.29 7 Indeed, we could devise an unending
list of possible bases which constitute irrational discrimination. Our statutes,
therefore, must be framed along the lines of our Equal Protection Clauses
and Bill of Rights which set forth general protections, applicable to all,
against any form of arbitrary discrimination arising during certain social
projects.
Of course, it will be particularly useful to list certain classes within civil
rights statutes as primary examples of irrational discrimination. 298 Racial,
sexual, and ethnic discrimination, for instance, have been demonstrated to
be irrational criteria in most social projects. Realization of that irrationality,
and sensitivity to protect individuals from such historically egregious and
persistent forms of discrimination, should in no manner be mitigated or
295. It must be reiterated that this article calls only for protection against irrational
discrimination. Individuals must be accorded the opportunity to present to a court, an
administrative agency, or other appropriate body a good faith claim that they were victims of
arbitrary treatment. Certainly, one may envision many instances in which physical appearance
discrimination is not irrational, although, perhaps, as our sensitivity to the evils of appearance
discrimination deepens, so too may our determination to expunge even such discrimination as
may now generally be considered not problematic.
296. See infra notes 310-333 and accompanying text.
297. Recall that we are only looking to expunge irrationality from social projects. It is
not argued, for instance, that employment decisions related to clothing styles are always
irrational. It is irrational for an employer to mandate that its female employees choose their
attire from a prescribed wardrobe, while making no such restriction upon male employees, on
the assumption that women cannot be trusted to dress seriously or appropriately. See Carroll
v. Talman Fed. S. & L. Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 929 (1980). By contrast, a restaurateur may require all his food servers to dress in
costumes consistent with the historic or ethnic theme of the restaurant.
298. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE, § 51 et seq. (the Unruh Civil Rights Act, discussed at
infra notes 305-309 and accompanying text).
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lost in the project to protect others whose victimization has thus far
engendered less social outcry.299
Thus, we may draft civil rights laws with lists of protected classes, and
urge enforcement agencies to likewise list more protected classes, for two
important reasons. First to reflect and preserve the societal realization that
certain forms of discrimination are usually per se irrational. Secondly, we
may analogize to these already established groups to test newly conceived
challenges asserting that other classifications are irrational as well.3°°
2. Examples of Rational Enactments in our Legal System
Some may assert that the statutory system proposed cannot be accom-
plished because enforcement would be too cumbersome, too open to friv-
olous suits, and too unmanageable. Certainly, a system which took rights
seriously would invite many new law suits as individuals actively attempted
to vindicate civil rights which, heretofore, were left to atrophy through
social indifference, intolerance, or ignorance. Yet, we can staff courts and
agencies to handle the new cases. Moreover, the system may extract a
penalty from those who bring truly frivolous or harassing suits without
unduly chilling good-faith litigation.30 Moreover, it would not be surprising
to find that the costs in dollars and cents of a truly liberating civil rights
system is less than the costs in terms of loss of dignity, individuality, and
economic opportunities tolerated by the system as presently operated.
30 2
Similarly, the gains engendered by promoting a society in which individuals
are judged on rational bases such as ability and experience are worth the
time and money required to attain these ends. Human dignity and equal
opportunities are certainly worth, at the very least, the costs associated with
allowing plaintiffs to prosecute private law suits.
Indeed, in certain major areas, we do promote and finance the very
type of system envisioned by this writing. First and most obvious is the
equal protection analysis upon which the proposed rights system is be-
drocked. As has been established, the concept of "equal protection" and
its source of vitality-"rationality"-are not limited to any particular class
or element in society. To be sure, equal protection purports to apply
differing standards of analysis to different groups, but no individual is
deprived the opportunity to present to a court a specific claim of deprivation
299. Thus, similar concerns expressed by commentators such as Professor Parker, supra
note 44, easily can be addressed.
300. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal.3d 721, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982);
infra notes 307-309 and accompanying text (discussing Wolfson).
301. For example, defendants have recovered attorneys' fees after demonstrating that the
plaintiff's employment discrimination suit was frivolous. Jackson v. Color Tile, Inc, 803 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-
1029 (2d Cir. 1979); Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 463 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
302. Moreover, as the public accommodation cases have established, discrimination en-
genders great economic burdens on both discriminatees and society in general. See supra note
191 and accompanying text.
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of "equal protection of the laws. 30 3 Every statute, ordinance, regulation,
or other official action may be the subject of a colorable claim that some
group has been subject arbitrary treatment. As a general matter, the claims
fail, but courts nevertheless entertain them for each suit either vindicates
the official action or reveals unlawful treatment.
Similarly, protection under the Bill of Rights is accorded to all, not
solely to interest groups such as blacks, women, Jews or other classes.
Deprivations under the Bill of Rights may be linked to-or stem from-
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender based considerations; but, the nature of
the protection of the Bill of Rights inures to all individuals regardless of
the groups to which they belong. For instance, it would be ludicrous for a
state's attorney, addressing an alleged violation of the fourth amendment,
to assert that the possible unreasonableness of a search is unimportant
because the victim is homosexual, because the victim wore a grotesque hair
style, or because the victim is white and white individuals traditionally have
been subject to little fourth amendment deprivation thus an occasional
misstep by the State against a white person is permissible. To the contrary,
such extraneous considerations play no proper role in fourth amendment
or general Bill of Rights analysis. The protections of the Bill of Rights
involve social projects such as speech, press, police investigations, and the
like. Protections from arbitrary actions under such projects are not limited
to special, selected groups of individuals.
304
As the above shows, we can and have devised systems which set general
protections from arbitrary treatment and which allow individuals to litigate
specific cases seeking to enforce their rights. Extending similar protection
in the realm of civil rights statutes is neither impossible nor unworkable.
Indeed, the same general rights under the Constitution allowing individuals
to bring private suits articulating personally conceived causes of action have
been applied to specific statutory schemes with much success. An example
is California's Unruh Civil Rights Act which reads in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business establish-
303. Similarly, individuals may articulate and prosecute actions under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments' guarantee of "due process of law." See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down school board's requirement that every teacher
must take unpaid maternity leave at end of fourth month of her pregnancy).
304. This does not mean that class status is always irrelevant in given instances. For
example, consider the sixth amendment's guarantee of right to counsel in criminal cases. The
right to counsel inures to everyone regardless of race, religion, or other classifications. By
contrast, the government enforces the right to counsel by providing cost-free legal assistance
only to those who cannot afford such representation. This, of course, is discrimination on the
status of wealth but the discrimination is not irrational. Those who can afford lawyers can
acquire to their own legal assistance. To make the sixth amendment truly applicable to all,
the government must provide attorneys to those too poor to afford a lawyer.
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ment of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege
on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is
applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion,
ancestry or national origin 0 5
Recognizing, as its opening sentence explicitly states, that the statute
protects all individuals, the California courts have declined to limit the
coverage of the Unruh Act solely to the classifications listed in that statute's
text. Rather, as the California Supreme Court reaffirmed:
In [In re] Cox [3 Cal. 3d 205, 216 (1970)], after reviewing the
origin, legislative evolution and prior judicial decisions construing
the Unruh Act and its predecessors, our court concluded that the
"identification of particular bases of discrimination-color, race,
religion ancestry and national origin- . . . is illustrative rather than
restrictive. "
' Although we recognized that in recent years the act had been invoked
most often "by persons alleging discrimination on racial grounds",
we emphasized that the act's "language and its history compel the
conclusion that the Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary
discrimination in business establishments.2
Recognizing the broad interpretation accorded to the Unruh Act, the
Court held that a landlord may not refuse to rent a dwelling to a family
solely because the family has minor children. The Court rejected the
landlord's justification that the classificatory exclusion was rationally based
on several incidents in which:
young tenants had engaged in annoying or potentially dangerous
activities, ranging from acts of arson to roller skating and batting
practice in the hallways to the attempted solicitation of snacks from
the landlord's office staff. °7
While those incidents might make landlords justifiably wary about young
children, the Court clarified that:
... the Unruh Act prohibits business establishments from with-
holding their services or goods from a broad class of individuals in
order to "cleanse" their operations from the alleged characteristics
of the members of an excluded class.
305. CAL. Civ. CODE, § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
306. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal.3d 721, 725, 640 P.2d 115, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 858 (1982) (quoting In re Cox, 3 CaI.3d 205, 216 (1970) (emphasis supplied)); see also
Isbister v. Boy's Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72, 86-87, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1985).
307. Wolfson, 30 Cal.3d at 727-278.
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As our prior decisions teach, the Unruh act preserves the traditional
broad authority of owners and proprietors of business establishments
to adopt reasonable rules regulating the conduct of patrons or
tenants; it imposes no inhibitions on an owner's right to exclude
any individual who violates such rules. Under the act, however, an
individual who has committed no such misconduct cannot be ex-
cluded solely because he falls within a class of persons whom the
owner believes is more likely to engage in misconduct than some
other groups ... the Unruh Act protects individuals from arbitrary
discrimination.
3 °
The Unruh Act precedents demonstrate that a civil rights statute which
protects all individuals from arbitrary treatment concerning particular social
projects is feasible. Our failure to construct such systems, then, is due to
our reluctance to accord all persons full protection rather than a physical
or economic reality rendering such a system impossible.
309
IV. YEs, BUT . ..
A. Introduction
The first three portions of this work set forth a general definition of
rationality under the Constitution and certain civil rights enactments. Fur-
308. Id. at 725. See also, e.g., Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 2-3 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) (Unruh Act, as defined in Wolfson, proscribes discrimination
based on status, thus landlord may not refuse to rent dwelling simply because applicant is a
homosexual). Of course, a defendant is not foreclosed from showing that a given classification
is rational:
[Wolfson] left open the possibility, however, that the Act might allow the exclusion
of an entire class whose presence "basically [would] not accord with the nature of
[the] business enterprise and of the facilities provided." (30 Cal.3d at p. 741, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.) Specifically it suggested that limitation of access to
members of certain groups might operate in certain cases "as a reasonable and
permissible means under the Unruh Act of establishing and preserving specialized
facilities for those particularly in need of such services or environment. [Citation
and footnote omitted.]" (Italics added.) An example was housing facilities reserved
for the elderly, which by design and function served the unique physical, social and
psychological needs of this minority group. (Id. at 742-43, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510,
640 P.2d at 128.)
The court suggested that the "social need" served by such a "specialized
institution" must be well-documented and established as a matter of public policy.
The case for "specialization" is strengthened if the facility was designed to satisfy
the particular concerns and characteristics of the needy group making it less suitable
for general use. (Ibid.).
Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72, 87-88 (1985) (emphasis supplied).
309. I have no data to determine if a full system of civil rights would economically
disrupt society beyond reasonable limits. Dire predictions of economic ruination always
accompany proposals to protect civil rights. Thus far, our economic system has managed to
adjust to the demands of the existing civil rights laws. Moreover, our nation has coped for
over 100 years with a Constitution permitting individuals to sue under the Bill of Rights and
the Civil War Amendments. Identically, California has managed to persist with vigorous
enforcement of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Arguably, the principles of that Act applied on
a national basis will better rather than bankrupt the country.
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ther, these portions derived from the definitions a general proposition
arguing that most modern day civil rights laws are irrationally underinclusive
and that society would be improved by more comprehensive enactments.
These arguments promise to raise a host of objections some of which
I have tried to anticipate and counter.
B. Privacy and Public Functions
The hallmark of the rationality of civil rights laws, as heretofore
demonstrated, is that they proscribe irrational behavior. Yet, statutes are
often written with limited exemptions excluding certain social actors on the
basis of their size or impact on society. For instance, the Fair Employment
Act of 1964 does not cover employers with workforces of less than 15
employees. 310 Similarly, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 does not apply to all
dwellings. The statute specifically exempts certain single-family homes in-
cluding:
rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or
intended to be occupied by no more than four families living
independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.
31'
Congress may have believed that some good is engendered by exempting
such employers or dwellings; or, perhaps, Congress envisioned a greater evil
should these things be regulated by the civil rights laws.
31 2
Along similar lines, our constitutional and statutory system protects
individuals who wish to form discriminatory but truly private clubs. For
example, the Public Accommodations Act of 1964 specifically exempts
private clubs from its prohibition against discrimination. 3 3 And, at least
one court has held that this exemption, to be meaningful, implies a similar
limitation upon section 1981's proscription against racial discrimination
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). It might be noted that state fair employment
practices statutes may establish a lower minimum employee threshold. For instance, the
Massachusetts law defines an "employer" as, inter alia, employing at least 6 individuals. See
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(5) (West 1982).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (commonly referred to as the "Mrs. Murphy's boarding
house provision").
312. It must be accented that these exemptions are very strictly construed to preserve the
remedial effects of the statute as a whole. See, e.g., Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.
1974) ("Mrs. Murphy" provision does not imply an exception to section 1982's prohibition
against racial discrimination in property transactions); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476
(N.D. Ga. 1971) ("Mrs. Murphy" provision does not apply to Fair Housing Act provision
which prohibits blockbusting).
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). See also Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order
of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203-1204 (D. Conn. 1974) (3 judge court); United States v. Jordan, 302
F. Supp. 370, 375-377 (E.D. La. 1969) (suggesting criteria to be used to distinguish genuine
private clubs from public accommodations).
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affecting the right to contract, although that statute contains no express
privilege for private organizations.31
4
While it seems clear that individuals may band together as a private
club to exercise discriminatory impulses, consistent precedent establishes
that such clubs are not truly private, and therefore, not beyond the reach
of civil rights enactments, if, inter alia, membership therein may be consid-
ered part of the privileges, expectations or "bundle of rights" attendant to
owning or leasing property in a particular neighborhood. 315
Similarly, an organization may become so large, its general social impact
may become so pervasive, and its predominant purposes so attenuated from
promoting the exclusive nature of its membership requirements, that the
states may regulate it as a public accommodation to proscribe membership
restrictions based on considerations such as race and gender.3 16
We may discern from these holdings a distinction recognized by both
Congress and1the Courts between private and public type transactions. In
the former, the social actors engage in projects that are so personal and
internalized that the law will not attempt to regulate. The touchstone of
these projects may be that the actors do not hold themselves out to the
public at large, inviting any and all comers to join them in the project.
Thus, the law is loathe to regulate concerning such personal decisions as
choosing friends and lovers.
The situation is far different in public-type transactions for therein, as
defined by law, the social actors are inviting all interested members of the
public to join them in a social project, although particular actors may not
have intended to engage in a public transaction, nor might they have known
they were doing so as a matter of law.
Not surprisingly, the switch from one type of project to the other recalls
our definition of rationality because in public-type transactions the impo-
sition of personally held prejudices plays no necessary or meaningful role.
By contrast, acting out otherwise impermissible discrimination may be the
legitimate essence of a private project's purpose. Thus, we allow people to
indulge their prejudices-including racial, ethnic, sexual, and religious-
when engaging in a truly private endeavor.
314. Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1198-1203. The three judge court noted that the Consti-
tutional right to privacy may compel an implied private club exception to section 1981. Id. at
1202.
315. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Wright
v. Salisbury Club Ltd., 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
316. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Minnesota Human Rights
Act constitutionally forbids organizations such as Jaycees from discriminating on basis of sex);
Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987) (same
holding regarding California's regulations affecting Rotary International); New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2232-35 (1988) (upholding facial constitu-
tionality of New York City public accomodations code establishing that, with limited exceptions,
an entity is not a private club if it has over 400 members, provides regular meals, and regularly




We must determine why we protect discrimination even for such ultra-
personal choices. This article offers two discrete but interrelated explana-
tions. First, we protect extremely intimate decisions in situations involving
few individuals (small employers, very small apartment houses, small private
clubs, and the like) to preserve and protect the very personhood of the
decision makers. In other words, a society which regulates the choice of
friends and lovers would ultimately threaten the development of individual
character and identity. Thus, even if it is irrational to discriminate regarding
intimate choices on the bases of race and ethnicity, the threat to personhood
mitigates against regulating such decisions.
Secondly, protecting intimate choices concerns preserving the free flow
of ideas in society. A basic constitutional tenet holds that the State has
little legitimate role regulating the traffic in and content of concepts. One
may argue, therefore, that prohibiting certain discriminatory action may
violate this paradigmatic tenet when the action and the idea are virtually
inextricably intertwined.
317
Supreme Court opinions have upheld state regulation of large, private
public service organization. The Court ruled that the States may designate
such organization to be "public accommodations" and proscribe, inter alia,
gender based discrimination in terms and conditions of membership despite
any incidental infringement on members' freedoms of expression and as-
sociation. 318 In so holding, the Court recognized two types of freedom of
association of which, "intimate association" is relevant herein.
3 19
317. A third reason may be briefly added. Sometimes the choice of friends, and certainly
the choice of lovers, are affected by factors which are not susceptible to legislation. For
example, to the effect that falling in love is a biological, chemical or otherwise natural
phenomenon, attempting to draft a statute controlling such responses would be as availing as
legislating the tides.
Even so, we must still inquire why legislatures should not outlaw certain types of
discrimination insofar as intimate personal choices are intellectual decisions. In making this
analysis one may presume that discrimination in certain personal projects is in fact arbitrary.
For instance, the person who decides to reject a potential friend because of race has demeaned
and humiliated the person in a manner similar to rejection by a potential employer or landlord.
The economic and other ramifications may be different but the insult and hurt are comparable.
To be sure, one can make sociological and psychological arguments that discrimination
in the choices of friends and lovers is rational. However, the discussion offered in this article
will demonstrate that, under a societal cost/benefit analysis, the harm engendered by proscribing
discrimination in certain personal projects significantly outweighs the benefits even if such
discrimination is arguably irrational. Or,. viewed slightly differently, the cost/benefit analysis
will provide independent proof that such personal discrimination is rational.
318. See supra note 316 (citing cases that forbid organizations to discriminate on basis of
sex).
319. See infra notes 320-24 and accompanying text (describing "intimate association").
The second type of association discussed by the Court is "expressive association" and it
encompasses "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise
of religion." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. The Constitution protects expressive association to
"preserven political and cultural diversity and [to] shield[] dissident expression from suppression
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In careful detail, the Roberts Court defined "intimate association" as:
choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relation-
ships .. .secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom
that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom
of association receives protection as a fundamental element of
personal liberty.3 2
Having established the general framework, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion explained that "intimate associations":
cultivat[e] and transmit[] shared ideals and beliefs . . .foster diver-
sity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power
of the State [and, protect the] emotional enrichment from close ties
with others ... therefore safeguardfing] the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. 2'
These critical associations include marriage, family and other relation-
ships characterized in part by:
such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship .... Conversely, an
by the majority." Id.
"Expressive association," as with all rights, is not absolute. The state may impose
necessary restrictions limited to promoting compelling state interests such as the eradication
of irrational discrimination. The motive to regulate, however, must be "unrelated to the
suppression of ideas .... Id. at 623.
Applying the foregoing standards, the Roberts Court held that Minnesota's regulation of
its chapters of the Jaycees by proscribing gender discrimination in membership, did not offend
the first amendment. The Roberts Court noted that the organization's fundamental missions-
to promote charity, to develop leadership skills among members, to aid members' employment
opportunities and to better the community-are not related to its gender disparate membership
policy. Thus, the pursuit and espousal of their main goals are not seriously threatened by
Minnesota's regulations mandating gender neutral membership rules. Id. at 626-28. Indeed,
the interests of the Jaycees, the Court in Roberts averred, pale before the goals of the state
to "remov[e] the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that
have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women." Id. at 626 (citations
omitted).
Noting that the Jaycees allowed women to join as non-voting members, the Roberts
Court was unable to discern how permitting women to vote would significantly jeopardize
Jaycee policy and practice. Id. at 627-28. Similarly, the Court in Rotary Club of Duarte, supra
note 316, determined that the civic and commercial purposes of the Rotary Clubs are not
seriously disturbed by application of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act to forbid gender
discrimination in membership. See Rotary Club, 95 L. Ed.2d at 486, supra notes 305-309 and
accompanying text (discussing Unruh Civil Rights Act). The Court in Rotary Club accented
that, as a general matter, Rotary Clubs do not publish positions on political issues of the day
and nothing contained in the Unruh Act limits the clubs' right to advocate any stand they
wish. Id.
320. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
321. Id. at 619 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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association lacking these qualities-such as a large business enter-
prise-seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this constitu-
tional protection.
3 22
[These associations include] deep attachments and commitments to'
the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only
a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also




As the foregoing definition establishes, the Constitution protects private,
intimate associations because they are integral components of individuality
and personal identity. Regulating such personal interactions, except in the
rarest instances, constrains individuals and seeks to control them on the
basis of their most personal definitions. Clearly, the threat to individuality
and freedom is manifest in societies where "intimate associations" are
proper subjects for extensive and continual regulations resulting in the
imposition of a societal norm restricting or obliterating those differences of
attitude, demeanor, character, and appearance which define one person
from another. While society may have a compelling interest in regulating
intimate associations which threaten to harm innocent or unwilling others,
there is no corresponding interest in routinely regulating intimate relation-
ships .
324
Nevertheless, as the quotes from Roberts instruct, there comes a point-
admittedly not easy to determine-when the usual limitations on regulation
change. We have seen examples in the Fair Employment Act's application
only to employers of greater than fourteen employees and the Fair Housing
Act's "Mrs. Murphy" provision-examples which relate to size. 325 The
reason for the transformation of the States' powers to regulate cannot stem
from the simple assertion that the larger an enterprise grows, the less
intimate associations therein become. Neither can it be cogently argued that
the founders and managers of large enterprises do not necessarily harbor
the same emotional and personal ties that small entrepreneurs may feel
toward their businesses. Such might be true in discrete instances, but one
certainly can envision both a powerful manager of a large concern who
feels genuine emotional attachment to the business and an owner of a small
store whose connections to her business are strictly utilitarian.
326
322. Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
323. Id. at 619 (emphasis added); accord, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233-34 (1988); Rotary Club of Duarte, 95 L. Ed.2d 474, 484 (1987).
324. For example, it is no mystery why we permit individuals to define themselves through
voluntary associations and choices of friends and lovers, but forbid rape, murder and other
destructive acts committed against unwilling victims. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986); supra note 127 (discussing Bowers).
325. See supra notes 319-321 and accompanying text.
326. Looking at modern business, who can truly show that board chairman Lee Iacocca
loves Chrysler Corporation any less than the proverbial "Mom and Pop" love their grocery
store?
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The answer, however, does stem from the "bigness" of the enterprise
as the Court's consistent references to "relative smallness" as contrasted
with "large business enterprise" indicate. 327 For instance, the Jaycees failed
the Court's definition of "intimate association" because, simply put, the
organization had grown too big. As of August, 1981, the Jaycees boasted
295,000 members in 7,400 chapters located throughout the United States, 32
prompting the Court to characterize them as "large and basically unselective
groups. ' 3 29 The Court further noted that the myriad purposes and projects
of the Jaycees31° are apparently unrelated to any legitimate reasons to exclude
women as full members. 33' Indeed, gender, along with age, were the only
bases upon which full membership was denied. The Court, therefore,
discerned "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" usually associated with
legitimate private clubs.3 32 Sex discrimination practice by the Jaycees, then,
served no purpose better than denying women opportunities both to perform
charitable works and to establish contacts in the business and professional
communities. While camaraderie measured by the absence of women may
conceivably be legitimate within the confines of small, private clubs, the
Court found gender discrimination unacceptable in a large, public-service
organization.
33
The foregoing opinions establish that, at some indeterminate point, an
organization becomes so large-and affects so many lives-that the owners'
and managers' prerogative to set certain limitations on membership is
outweighed by the States' legitimate interests in protecting individuals from
arbitrary discrimination. The price of success as measured by size is that
the enterprise must assume new social responsibilities. By attaining a certain
size, the concern touches so many individuals that we will no longer allow
the enterprise to arbitrarily discriminate. Or, discrimination, once rational,
has become irrational due to the size of the discriminator. A very small
327. See supra text accompanying notes 325-327.
328. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
329. Id. at 621.
330. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (prohibiting Jaycees from discriminating
on basis of sex).
331. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
332. Id. (quoting Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973)).
333. Three years later, applying the Roberts standards, the Court in Rotary Club of
Duarte held that California constitutionally prohibited its chapters of the Rotary Club from
practicing gender discrimination in terms and conditions of membership. Rotary Club, 95 L.
Ed.2d at 486. The facts showed that Rotary International, as of the litigation, consisted of
907,750 members in 19,788 clubs located in 157 countries. Id. The Court held that the clubs'
goals, to perform humanitarian works and to promote high standards of business ethics, are
unrelated to their gender-based membership requisites. Id. at 485-86. As with the Jaycees,
Rotary International became too large and engaged in too many civic functions-thus, no
longer sufficiently personal in design and structure-to qualify under the First Amendment's
protection for "intimate associations." Id. at 485. See also New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (holding that city's definition of "private club"
acceptably balanced the constitutional protection of private clubs with interest in affording
women access to clubs wherein business contacts routinely are established).
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landlord, for example, may humiliate and disadvantage apartment applicants
on the basis of gender, but when the landlord becomes too big, the quantity
and attendant impact of her discrimination becomes too great. At that
somewhat abstract point, preserving individual integrity through permitting
discrimination falls in favor of preserving the personhood and opportunities
of the discriminatees.
The second explanation regarding permissible arbitrary discrimination
to establish personal relationships stems from the related premise that the
Constitution fosters the free flow of ideas.
In Stanley v. Georgia,334 the Court held that "the mere private possession
of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime." '335 In support
of this holding, Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority, noted:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right
to receive ,information and ideas .... This right to receive infor-
mation and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental
to our free society.
33 6
Justice Marshall accented these observations by reference to the famous
dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. U.S.117 Making that dissent part
of the Stanley majority holding, Justice Marshall quoted as follows:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intel-
lect .... They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. 338
With these concepts Justice Marshall concluded:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds ... [the State has no] right to
control the moral content of a person's thoughts.
339
334. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
335. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
336. Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
337. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (quoted in Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564).
339. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (footnote omitted). While the U.S. Supreme Court has
declined to extend Stanley by creating a right to provide or receive obscene materials, the
privacy standard of Stanley was reaffirmed in Board of Education v. Pico. See Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 866-869 (1982) (plurality opinion holding generally that "the First Amendment rights of
students may be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of books from the shelves of
a school library"). See also United States v. Anderson, 803 F.2d 903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing
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Under Stanley the government has no more authority to regulate private,
interpersonal associations than it does to control the flow of ideas. Pre-
venting persons in a private setting from choosing friends and lovers, like
preventing persons from reading books or viewing films, threatens to
penalize individuals for their very thoughts. Certain private transactions are
so intimately connected with the formation and consideration of ideas that
to prohibit the acts amounts to punishing the ideas themselves.
However, public-type transactions, although predicated on concepts and
ideas, are not subject to the same constitutional problems. For example, as
discussed in Runyon v. McCrary,34 0 prohibiting a private school from
engaging in racial discrimination does not prevent it from espousing and
teaching ideas of white superiority and racial separatism. Similarly, com-
pelling a public accommodation to refrain from racial discrimination does
not prevent the owners of the accommodation, its employees or patrons
from debating and promoting their closely-held personal concepts of prej-
udice. And, purportedly private clubs which actually link their membership
to residency in a community, rather than solely to race or gender, evidence
no genuine factors of exclusiveness of membership sufficient to invoke
constitutional privacy protection.
Regulating truly private clubs, or interfering with the home and with
personal social choices, by contrast, come uncomfortably close to prohibiting
people from so much as thinking about, debating or discussing prejudice.
This is intolerable, for we profess that the only cure for bad ideas is better
ideas. If we compel reformation of thought, rather than convince others to
change their minds, we cannot contend that our ideas are truly superior,
more enlightened or more just. We can only say that we wielded sufficient
political coercion to punish others for harboring contrary ideas. When the
ideas and actions are virtually identical-as in privately practiced discrimi-
nation-we cannot take the chance of regulating conduct and thereby punish
people for their thoughts. To do so, at the very least, would strip us of
our moral authority to assert the ethical superiority of our ideas. However,
once the ideas become sufficiently attenuated from action that we can
control the action without unduly jeopardizing the ideas, we may regulate
instances of irrational discrimination.
C. Affirmative Action
Aside from initial discrimination itself, few civil rights issues have
inspired such diverse and impassioned debate as the question of affirmative
cases that decline to extend Stanley). The Court recently asserted that Stanley is essentially a
first amendment case rather than a privacy case. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,
2846 (1986). But the Court also has interpreted Stanley to be premised heavily on privacy
concepts emanating from the fourth amendment. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 66 (1973). The clear words of the opinion, noted in the text above, support the
conclusion that Stanley is a privacy precedent.
340. See supra notes 220-43 and accompanying text (discussing Runyon).
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action: the permissible reliance upon a usually irrational criterion-such as
race or gender-as part of a program designed not to demean or debase
usually downtrodden groups but to remedy the effects of past discrimina-
tion
41
The Supreme Court has spoken on affirmative action several times in
the last decade. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,342 con-
cerned constitutional and statutory challenges against "a special admissions
program at the ... Davis Medical School under which 16 out of the 100
places in each entering class were reserved exclusively for minority appli-
cants. ' 343 The Court's holding invalidated the minority set-asides, but upheld
the right of the university to consider race-and the attendant background
factors-as part of the evaluation of applicants' qualifications.
3 4
Applying the strict scrutiny standard to the allegedly benign racial
classification, 345 Justice Powell concluded that to promote academic freedom
as well as to diversify the student body, a university may have a legitimate
interest in considering the racial background of applicants.
346
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,347 addressed whether Title
VII's proscription against racial discrimination forbids employers and unions
from collectively bargaining employee training programs in which a certain
percentage of the slots are reserved solely for minority applicants. The
particular AAP, created to rectify a racial imbalance in certain skilled work
forces, was designed to last only until the percentage of minorities in the
given work forces matched their availability in the relevant labor market.
348
In a 5-2 opinion, the Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, upheld the
program even though white applicants were denied slots in favor of less
senior minority workers.
Justice Brennan noted that the employer, Kaiser Aluminum's Gramercy,
Louisiana plant, had not been adjudged a discriminator under Title VII
341. E.g., J. Wright, Color Blind Theories and Color Conscious Remedies, 47 U. op Cm.
L. REv. 213 (1980); T. Barton, Affirmative Action: Making Decisions, 83 W. VA. L. R~v. 47
(1980); Lavinsky, The Affirmative Action Trilogy and Benign Racial Classification-Evolving
Law in Need of Standards, 27 WAYNE L. Rsv. 1 (1980).
342. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
343. Lavinsky, supra note 341, at 7.
344. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-320 (per Powell, J.). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White, Marshall and Blackmun, would have upheld the program, arguing that a university
may recognize and attempt to remedy the effects of general societal discrimination. Id. at 324-
387. The Supreme Court has rejected the desire to alleviate generally felt discrimination as a
permissible basis to establish an affirmative action program. Rather, the plan must address
discrimination or imbalances actually experienced by the particular establishment. See Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1844-52 (1986) (plurality opinion per Powell, J.);
id. at 1853-54 (O'Connor, J.)
The remaining Justices rejected the notion that race may be considered as a factor in
such cases. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
345. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-95.
346. Id. at 311-18.
347. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
348. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-99 (1979).
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prior to the creation of the affirmative action plan. Nevertheless, the extant,
although unintentional, manifest racial imbalance in the work force,
349
coupled with the care with which the program was crafted3 0 rendered the
affirmative action lawful. In essence, the Court recognized two Title VII's:
a long-range enactment which foresees the day when discrimination in
employment will be all but eliminated and a short-range statute which
permits occasional and duly limited race or gender conscious measures to
achieve the restructuring of the labor market promised by the long-range
goal.351 To this end, voluntary affirmative action plans under Title VII may
be implemented even if the extant conditions surrounding the adoption of
the plan would not constitute a violation of the statute. The Court reasoned
that to require otherwise would frustrate the policy of TItle VII to encourage
employers and unions voluntarily to ferret out and cure discrimination.
After all, if an employer was required to admit committing a statutory
violation in order to justify implementing an affirmative action plan, she
would be extremely unlikely to adopt the plan and thereby incur costly




Recently, in Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC,
35 3
a majority of the Supreme Court held that under appropriate circumstances,
section 2000e-5(g), 354 the remedial component of Title VII, "empowers a
349. Id. at 197; see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cali-
fornia, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1452-53 (1987) (employer lawfully adopted a voluntary affirmative
action plan in which gender of applicants for promotion was a factor considered during the
promotion process).
. 350. The Court accented that the program did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests
of the white employees" because (1) no incumbent workers were discharged to accommodate
the affirmative action personnel, (2) only a portion of the slots in the training program were
designated solely for minority applicants, and, (3) the program was designed to terminate once
the racial hiring goal was attained. Weber, 433 U.S. at 208; accord, Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at
1451.
351. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204. Justice Brennan clarified the position of the Court by
noting:
[it would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries
of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded
from the American dream for so long" constituted the first legislative prohibition
of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of
racial segregation and hierarchy.
Id.; accord, Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1450.
352. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204; Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451. See also Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1844-52 (1986) (plurality opinion per Powell, J.) (under
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, racially based affirmative action
program is legitimate if predicated on compelling state interest and carefully designed to
promote that interest); id. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1853-54 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
353. 92 L. Ed.2d 344 (1986).
354. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Section 2000e-5(g) states in pertinent part:
if the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice . . ., the court may enjoin the respon-
dent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative
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district court to order race-conscious relief that may benefit individuals who
are not identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination".
311
The plurality supported its holding on a number of interpretive and
policy grounds. Accenting that the language of section 2000e-5(g) "plainly
expresses Congress' intent to vest district courts with broad discretion to




Justice Brennan explained why race-conscious relief is lawful and appropriate
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.... No order of the court shall require the admission
or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement,
or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
violation of ... this title.
Id.
355. 92 L. Ed.2d at 357 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan's opinion,
explaining why the challenged affirmative relief was viable under both Title VII and the United
States Constitution, was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. See id. at 368-
92 (hereafter Brennan or "Plurality" opinion). Two other justices, however, clarified in
separate opinions their positions supporting the basic holding that section 2000e-5(g) does not
forbid judicial creation of affirmative action programs which benefit nondiscriminatees. Finding
that the plain language section 2000e-5(g) does not apply solely to individual, actual victims
of unlawful conduct, and concluding that the relevant legislative history does not clearly forbid
application of that statutory provision to nondiscriminatees, Justice Powell wrote "I ... agree
[with Justice Brennan's opinion] that section 706(g) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)] does not
limit a court in all cases to granting relief only to actual victims of discrimination." Id. at
393 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part).
Similarly, Justice White, in his separate opinion in Sheet Metal Workers, wrote:
As the Court observes, the general policy under Tide VII is to limit relief for racial
discrimination in employment practices to actual victims of the discrimination. But
I agree that § 706(g) does not bar relief for nonvictims in all circumstances. Hence,
I generally agree with Parts I through IV-D of the Court's opinion.
Id. at 403 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice White's dissent in Sheet Metal Workers was predicated on his belief that the
particular relief sustained in Sheet Metal Workers constituted a rigid quota rather than a
temporary union membership goal.
356. Id. 92 L. Ed.2d at 369 (Plurality opinion). The plurality in Sheet Metal Workers
rejected the too narrow interpretation of the remedial provision offered by both the petitioners
and the Solicitor General. Justice Brennan stated:
The last sentence of § 706(g) prohibits a court from ordering a union to admit
an individual who was "refused admission ... for any reason other than discrimi-
nation." It does not, as petitioners and the Solicitor General suggest, say that a
court may order relief only for the actual victims of past discrimination. The sentence
on its face addresses only the situation where a plaintiff demonstrates that a union
(or an employer) has engaged in unlawful discrimination, but the union can show
that a particular individual would have been refused admission even in the absence
of discrimination, for example because that individual was unqualified. In these
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under a statute which strongly proscribes such considerations in most
employment contexts. His opinion emphasized that the Act is designed to
strip away those hurtful, irrational barriers which demean and denigrate
individuals rather than distinguish employees and applicants on the basis of
merit. 357 While, under section 2000e-5(g), courts may not create unnecessary
or unduly burdensome remedies, the clear command of that provision
requires courts to formulate relief as expansive as is necessary to eradicate,
as fully as possible, the vestiges and effects of a regime of discrimination.
As Justice Brennan explained:
In most cases, the court need only order the employer or union to
cease engaging in discriminatory practices, and award make-whole
relief to the individuals victimized by those practices. In some
instances, however, it may be necessary to require the employer or
union to take affirmative steps to end discrimination effectively to
enforce Title VII. Where an employer or union has engaged in
particularly long standing or egregious discrimination, an injunction
simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination will
often prove useless and will only result in endless enforcement
litigation. In such cases, requiring recalcitrant employers or unions
to hire and to admit qualified minorities roughly in proportion to
the number of qualified minorities in the work force may be the
only effective way to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights
protected by Title VII.
3
11
The Plurality fortified its logic by noting that, broad, affirmative relief
may be necessary to thaw the "chill" engendered when a business' reputation
for discrimination is so prevalent and long-standing that minority applicants
are dissuaded from making any form of employment application at all. This
"chill" may persist long after the employer has ceased performing direct,
manifest acts of discrimination. Reputation alone often perpetuates the
effects of a former discriminator's history of unlawful conduct. 359
Along interrelated lines, the Brennan opinion stated that strong, race-
conscious relief constitutes a prompt and, often, immediately effective
remedy. Eradicating the effects of persistent discrimination may be best
effected through clear, pointed and potent measures the merits of which
include their susceptibility to immediate enforcement. 36°
As the foreg6ing explains, court ordered affirmative relief to remedy
the consequences of given employers' proven history of continual unlawful
discrimination reflects a clear instance in which race-consciousness furthers
the letter and spirit of Title VII. Unlike irrational discrimination, the use
of affirmative action is not designed to impede a traditionally discriminated
357. Id. at 370 (Plurality opinion).
358. Id. at 370-71 (Plurality opinion).
359. Id. at 371.
360. Id. at 372.
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group's entry into the labor market. Neither does such relief, either by
accident or by design, unduly humiliate and demean individuals or preserve
artificial, non-job related barriers to employment. To the contrary, the
limited affirmative action plans break a persistent cycle of discrimination
thereby allowing individuals to compete for employment opportunities on
rational bases such as merit and seniority.3 6' As the Sheet Metal Workers
opinion clarifies, a carefully drafted and constrained affirmative action
program is a rational and legitimate use of race-consciousness intended to
promote the goals of Title VII.362
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,363 a bitterly divided Court upheld a provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977364 which mandated that,
absent administrative waiver, no less than ten percent of public work
program grants be used-"set aside"-to retain minority contractors and
firms. In one plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
White and Powell, accented that the program was devised by Congress to
remedy past systematic discrimination. Deference to the leglature, accented
by the limited and temporary nature of the set-aside program, validated the
affirmative measure.
3 5
Justice Powell submitted a concurring opinion in which he applied the
strict scrutiny standard, but noted that the elimination of both present
discrimination and present effects of past discrimination may be compelling
governmental interests supporting limited race explicit measures. 366 Indeed,
Powell indicated that a Congressionally enacted set-aside, designed to elim-
inate discrimination and then self-terminate need be only reasonable, rather
than the most expeditious means to achieve those ends.
3 67
In the foregoing cases, the Court upheld some form of affirmative
action because the race consciousness was at least rational. An arguable
interpretation of the affirmative action cases applying our rationality analysis
holds the following:
(1) because diversity of a student body is essential to many educa-
tional institutions, race, and the social factors often associated
361. The Sheet Metal Workers plurality accented that, while the given facts of each case
will dictate the nature and extent of appropriate affirmative relief, if any, the "equitable
considerations" informing "a court's judgment would be guided by sound legal principles."
Id. at 388. The Plurality emphasized that affirmative relief cannot be implemented "simply
to create a racially balanced work force." Id. Rather, the trial court must determine if recourse
to race-specific remedies are required to remedy the effects of past discrimination preseited
by the case-at-bar. Id. Guidelines include the considerations set forth at supra note 350
(considerations to be included in Sheet Metal Workers guidelines).
362. The Court has applied similar logic to uphold court ordered affirmative action in
the face of a challenge predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. v. Paradise, 107
S. Ct. 1053, 1064-74 (1987) (Plurality opinion); id. at 1074-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
363. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
364. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1982) (Supp. I1 1978).
365. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475-83.
366. Id. at 497-517 (Powell, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 510, 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
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therewith, may be rational considerations among the myriad criteria
for deciding which candidates to accept;
(2) to eradicate the effects of discrimination in employment, and to
afford the employer the opportunity to rectify racial imbalances
prior to being sued, affirmative race conscious measures may be
rational;
(3) Congress may determine that systematic discrimination has plagued
a social realm so severely and for so long that strong, race explicit
remedial measures are necessary, therefore, rational.
In each example, racial consciousness designed to reverse the demeaning
and debilitating effects of persistent discrimination is rationally related-
perhaps integral to-achieving our social project of equality. These measures
do not demean, humiliate nor harm the majority race. Rather, they are
necessary infusions of highly concentrated equality to energize the transfor-
mation of a social realm from its irrationally discriminatory practices. Thus,
affirmative action, in carefully controlled doses is rational for it is relevant
to the ultimate elimination of irrational discrimination.
D. The Unusual Case of Disparate Impact
A primary question raised by any civil rights law concerns what types
of behavior are irrationally discriminatory. Clearly, actions deliberately
utilizing a forbidden criterion will establish at least prima facie discrimi-
nation. Thus, for instance, the Fair Employment Act prohibits per se
discrimination whereby an employer's policy, term, condition or practice is
blatantly and unquestionably linked with one of the five statutorily forbidden
criteria.
The courts have recognized, as well, that purposeful discrimination may
be proven through circumstantial rather than direct evidence. Again using
Title VII as our example, a plaintiff may present to a court a series of
seemingly neutral facts and events which, when viewed in toto and contrasted
with logic and experience, raises an inference that the acts could not have
occurred when they did as they did absent impermissible discriminatory
intent.
68
In a third version of purposeful discrimination, a plaintiff may present
a wide range of evidence including statistics, individual testimony and expert
368. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Dougids Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Because a prima facie case is
premised on a presumption of discrimination, the alleged discriminator may rebut the pre-
sumption through a mere evidentiary articulation of a non-discriminatory reason explaining
the sequence of events. Green, 411 U.S. at 803; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The plaintiff,
however, has the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's rebuttal is either a pretext
hiding intentional discrimination or too improbable, under the circumstances, to be believed.
Green, 411 U.S. at 804-805; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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witnesses, demonstrating a pattern and practice of discrimination on the
part of the defendant3
69
Discrimination, however, need not always be intentionally perpetrated.
Under certain statutory schemes, discrimination arises out of "policies and
practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless
discriminate in effect against a particular group." 370 This is known as
"disparate impact". As clarified by the Court,
[Claims of disparate impact] involve ... practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity.
37'
Thus, for example, the Court has invalidated the use of racially neutral
employment examinations which resulted in a significantly larger percentage
of minority than white applicant failure.372 Similarly, the Court held as
violative of the Fair Employment Act, the use of certain minimum height
and weight requirements for employment which disqualified a disparate
percentage of female applicants.
373
The interesting question about the "disparate impact" cause of action
is whether it fits into our rationality analysis. After all, the unlawful practices
under disparate impact do not seem to be irrational. An employment
examination of height/weight requirement, for example, may not be terribly
useful in differentiating among the most qualified, minimally qualified and
unqualified individuals, but neither can it usually be shown that such devices
are absolutely irrelevant to all aspects of applicant qualifications. Unlike
purposeful discrimination which imposes a wholly irrational criterion onto
a social project, devices invalidated under disparate impact often bear some
369. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977) (both Title
VII opinions).
370. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977).
371. Id. at 335 n.15; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S_ Ct. 2777
(1988).
372. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (Teal is particularly significant for those who were permitted to challenge that
portion of the hiring process which discriminatorially eliminated them from competition despite
the fact that sufficient numbers of minority applicants successfully completed the entire process
allowing the employer to hire the same percentage of minorities as reflected by their represen-
tation in the applicant pool).
373. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (general population data may be
relevant to determination of disparate impact). The defendant may attempt to rebut the
disparate impact case by demonstrating that the plaintiffs' statistics are infirm or that their
interpretation of the data is faulty or inconclusive. Moreover, the defendant may defend by
showing that the offending test, device or practice is necessary for the safe and efficient
running of the business. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. The plaintiffs may counter the defense
by showing that these legitimate goals may be accomplished through less restrictive, non-
discriminatory means. Id.; Teal, 457 U.S. at 447.
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
rational relationship to a legitimate social project such as culling acceptable
from unacceptable employment candidates.
The clue to the application of impact analysis in our thesis comes from
the courts' explanation of the utility of this cause of action. Speaking about
employment discrimination, but arguably applicable in other contexts, the
Supreme Court noted,
[T]he objective of Congress ... is plain from the language of the
statute ... to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identi-
fiable group of white employees over other employees....
Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not merely to motivation.
3 74
The Court recognized, therefore, that seemingly neutral practices might
unintentionally isolate social, political, economic, cultural or physical dif-
ferences among groups thereby perpetuating or inspiring decisions which
exclude the group from employment opportunities. If the offending practices
are integral to the operation of the enterprise, the employer may utilize
them despite their disparate impact. 375 But, when the practices, although
convenient or traditional, are not important-or when the information
gleaned from important practices may be obtained through alternative,
nondiscriminatory means-the resultant disparate impact is sufficient to
activate the protections of Title VII.
We see, therefore, two ways to reconcile disparate impact with our
rationality analysis. First, under our societal cost/benefit analysis, the courts
have instructed that the benefits gained-the good engendered-to the
employer through the use of the devices or practices is outweighed by the
harm suffered as large groups of individuals are excluded from the em-
ployment process on the basis of cultural or physical characteristics which
are linked to a forbidden criterion and which serve no integral purposes for
the employer.
The second argument, which may be joined with the first to form a
solid basis to justify disparate impact analysis, views the impact cause of
act'on as something akin to an affirmative action program. As explicated
by the courts, the impact analysis is designed to eradicate the consequences
of discrimination-consequences which may linger from decades of system-
atic social, cultural, educational, economic and physical discrimination.
376
Enforcement of the statute-fulfillment of the goal to expunge arbitrary
discrimination from the employment realm-requires certain social recon-
struction, sometimes on a fairly large scale. We have seen, for instance,
that affirmative action programs are often appropriate means to infuse a
civil rights schema with the requisite energy to place discriminatees and
374. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30, 432 (emphasis supplied).
375. See supra note 373.
376. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
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discriminators on more equal plateaus. Similarly, outlawing devices and
standards which result in a racial or sexual disparate impact is a way of
providing needed equality by eliminating practices which prevent downtrod-
den individuals and their constitutent groups from attaining equality of
opportunity resulting from the consequences of persistent societal discrimi-
nation.
A serious program against discrimination requires remedies for the
harmful and continual effects resulting from the momentum of discrimi-
nation. The disparate impact action, therefore, like affirmative action,
results in a major redistribution of power by forbidding employers from
even unintentionally calling upon the specter of discrimination in the conduct
of their businesses.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many reasons to explain the limited coverage of the civil
rights laws. Some reasons are political, some economic, some sounding in
morality, others sounding in fear, ignorance, intolerance, apathy, misplaced
paternalism, or complacence. But, in our constitutional system, all of these
reasons are beside the point. The Constitution commands that all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States be treated fairly by all organs
of government. The primary inquiry, then, is whether the limits of our civil
rights laws are fair. This article argues that they are not.
There is no sufficient principled base to recognize an area of funda-
mental social importance, such as property or contract, and limit the
protection from irrational discrimination to only certain classes. Arguments
appealing to history have no place in restraining a Constitution whose
definition of "fairness" was intended to grow and build upon itself. Pleas
addressing cold economics are unavailing in a constitutional system which
places the highest value on protecting the integrity of those too weak to
protect themselves. This is especially so when the legal system may create
systems to handle additional case loads, if any, generated by the recognition
of expanded civil rights.
Stands based on intolerance or personal distaste for certain groups or
group practices are singularly inappropriate in a society energized by a
constitution which promotes and protects diversity and the myriad ways in
which the human imagination may express itself.
Of course, discrimination based on characteristics which genuinely relate
to the legitimate conduct of a given business, action or project is not
arbitrary and, thus, not unlawful under this Article's definition of "ration-
ality". If, however, "the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
the laws' means . . . that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest, ' 7 7 then the civil
rights statutes may not be limited to express the legislatures' ill will or
insensitivity towards unprotected groups.
377. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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If "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by [relevant] factors
.. 37 cannot pass muster under the Constitution to support governmental
action, neither should such considerations justify governmental inaction-
the purposeful or negligent limitation of civil rights laws.
If the Constitution does not allow official actors to create useless caste
systems, 379 so too it must forbid those actors from perpetuating caste systems
by demanding that civil rights coverage inure to all who suffer irrational,
humiliating and disadvantageous treatment.
It may occur that applying the constitutional command for rationality-
for fairness-will encourage some foolish or frivolous claims. But, no legal
rights are so well defined that they forestall all misuse of the courts.
Certainly, the vindication of personal dignity and freedom is worth such
costs.
If we find, at some future date, that our society of fairness has
legitimated and protected practices which, today, seem uncomfortable, even
dangerous, we must remember that such has been the very history of the
Constitution itself. The fact that, most likely, the framers of the civil rights
codes of 1866 would not have applied those laws to invalidate behavior
which they proscribe today demonstrates that a regime of rights must be
allowed to thrive and develop, even to the point of invalidating the practices
of which the framers themselves were fond.3 0 The visions of the drafters
of civil rights protection may be great, but the frontiers such protection
covers stretches out many horizons beyond anyone's view.
Adapting the observations of Justice Blackmun, "[w]e -protect ... rights
not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general
public welfare, but because . . . 'a person belongs to himself and not to
others nor to society as a whole'. . . The fact that individuals define
themselves in significant [and varied ways] . . . suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of [defining oneself]
... and that much of the richness of [our social order] will come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of [her person-
hood.]' '381 These fundamental choices of personhood should be protected
fully. Individuals ought not be compelled to choose between defining
themselves and exercising their rights to engage in social projects unless
their self-definition is truly and legitimately related to the conduct of the
social project. Civil rights codes which go that far may be deemed fair and
rational.
378. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
379. See supra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 2.
381. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting,
quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. and Gyn., 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
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